DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

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PREFACE

The problem of development is one of the key issues facing the developing world. When a country shakes off the colonial rule and is in control of its destiny, people expect government to expedite the process of development which had been arrested under the alien dispensation. Administration is the obvious tool to work for the fundamental objectives of development. But people unfortunately have a distrust in administration due to former colonial legacy. They are also not sure of the capability of the administration to cope up with the new and growing tasks of development. Very often, it is also a question of organisation and structure, rules and procedures which may not fully suit the requirements of expeditious decision-making called for by developmental tasks. That is why we find in India and other developing countries the views expressed by some foreign experts as well as many within the country that the conventional or traditional administration must give place to development administration.

Historically speaking, even the traditional administration has over the years carried on many welfare or developmental functions and these, to a certain extent, get adjusted to the new circumstances. The question is very often raised whether development administration is a distinct category or a sector of administration. Does not every kind of development administration also require certain element of regulation? Is it not, on the other hand, equally true that even the traditional administration has to have the perspective of development in view of the need for democratic responsibilities? The debate goes on somehow because of the impatience with administration due to its inability to come to the expectations of the people in the field of development.

As the administration gets more and more complex as well as scientific and technical in nature, it is said that it has to be specially conditioned for the tasks of development. The difficulty also crops up because the basic problem of administration is the need to reconcile conflicting and manifold demands or requirements with the limited resources available and this highlights the need for rationality, expedition, efficiency and even equity in both decision-making as well as implementation processes. The administration, which has to serve the development purposes, must have the capacity for deep thinking, capability to operate in an environment of ambiguity and also a high degree of social sensitivity if people have to be mobilised and involved. Even as regards the simple functions or tasks during the community development

movement, it was felt that the administration at various levels should undergo special training to develop the proper orientation for development.

If development administration is supposed to have any special characteristics, one can say that it should have the in-built capacity for quick responses, inclination and capacity for resource optimisation, capability for quick decision-making and integrated performance. There are certain routine processes of administration which, in any case, development administration will also share but it has to acquire some new dimensions. Development is a multi-sided phenomenon. It aims at economic development and productivity, socio-cultural transformation of the people, and social justice among different sections of the people. This obviously means institutional changes and administrative restructuring. The phrase 'Development Administration' thus tries to draw our attention to the need for building and improving public administration system as an integral part of the totality of our effort in the sphere of development. One may say that it refers to the administration of development, on one hand, and of development administration, on the other, in terms of adding to its administrative capability for multifarious tasks of development. In development administration, efficiency becomes a dynamic response to social changes. Development administration is, in a manner of speaking, is a state of mind which must pervade the entire administration.

The present compilation of articles by Professors S.P. Verma and S.K. Sharma consists of 11 articles which analyse the meaning and significance of development administration as well as other allied and supportive areas. Some of the articles discuss the various shades of meaning or approaches to development administration and are intellectually stimulating. Other articles underscore the importance of speed, efficiency and capacity to respond to the emerging challenges. The problem of implementation is crucial to the very process of development as development policy, however good, loses all significance unless it is effectively implemented. Thus, administrative reforms in the structure, organisation, rules and procedures as well as in behaviour and attitudes assume a definite importance. In a way, the awareness of administrative reforms becomes a continuing element of an effective development administration.

Professors Verma and Sharma provide a comprehensive introduction to the variegated factors of development administration. They have discussed the concept, its evolution as well as the other issues of development administration raised in various articles and their analysis gives a thematic unity to the articles chosen for the volume.

I am grateful to them for acceding to my request to select the articles and edit this volume, which will be of interest as much to the common citizen as to the scholars of public administration and also to those who are concerned with formulation of policies and programmes for development at different levels of the administrative system.

Shri K.P. Phatak and his professional colleagues have given a useful bibliography on the subject at the end. I am thankful to them.

I am also thankful to Shri P.R. Dubhashi, Director of Indian Institute of Public Administration, for giving the opportunity to bring out this volume.

T.N. CHATURVEDI

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INTRODUCTION

Development administration, a by-product of the comparative study of public administration in developing countries, has a distinctive identity in relation to the developing countries which strive to attain self-generated economic growth. Besides serving the traditional foundational functions of the state, it has to perform entrepreneurial duties in the realm of production of goods and services and is simultaneously engaged in protective production and distributive roles. The emerging scenario and the changed social and political conditions demand increased attention to matters like maintenance of stability and security, promotion of national integration and reinforcement of social discipline in the community at large. In recent years, the instrumental role of administration as an agent of institutional, social and economic change and as a catalyst of scientific and technical advance, has assumed greater importance over these years.[1]

The increasing shift of development scenario requires increased diversification and specialisation of knowledge and skills and high level of managerial ability for integrative coordination. To quicken the pace of development there is an additional need for a new breed of administrators of superior calibre and vision with a passion for achieving results and of those who can take risk and introduce innovations. There is an increasing need to have a heightened sensitivity to the welfare of the poorer sections and greater responsiveness to the political process.[2]

Regardless of the stage of modernization, the broad developmental goals of emerging nations are almost similar. Most of the developing countries want to achieve a secure place in the international community, to protect themselves against outside aggression, to preserve domestic order, to increase the rate of economic growth and to provide both

[1]Donald C. Stone, "Tasks, Precedents and Approaches to Education for Development Administration" in IIAS, *Education for Development Administration*, Brussels, Maison, 1966, p. 41. Ratna Ghosh and George Kurian, "Some Ambiguities in the Concept of Development", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XL, 1979, pp. 162-63.

United Nations, *Development Administration: Current Approaches and Trends in Public Administration for National Development*, New York, 1975, pp. 32-34.

[2]John G. Gunnell, "Development, Social Change and Time", in Dwight Wald. (ed.), *Temporal Dimensions of Development Administration*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1970, pp. 74-75. Also Carl W. Stenberg, "Contemporary Public Administration : Challenge and Change", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXVI, 1977, p. 507.

psychological and material security. To meet these demands, administration has to initiate and sustain the modernizing process. Economically, it has to acquire and utilise savings, politically it has to balance the formal powers and functions of the state, socially integrate, ethnic, religious and regional communities, administratively create and maintain public institutions capable of meeting expanding demands.[3]

V.A. Pai Panandikar regards socio-economic and political change as the central theme and this change to be brought about through a series of programmes designed specifically to attain certain clear-cut and specified objectives and goals expressed in operational terms. It should, therefore, be in a position to generate, adopt and implement new ideologies, products and services. Reinforcement of the system as well as imparting it an element of stability as well as resilience to suit the changing environment, is another prerequisite. It is a "reasonable hypothesis that in order for growth to proceed in this direction very far, system change in the form of increased differentiation and coordination together with appropriate accompanying specialisation, would be required. Such changes would be only intermediate dependent variables for the scholar of development administration, however. The ultimate dependent variables would be the goals themselves, the 'pay off' in the society. Thus differentiation and coordination would be development related to the extent that they led to the accomplishment of these goals sooner or later".[4] Breaking down of resistance to change may be possible only if there is . . . a willingness, to question accepted practices in every aspect of administration and development . . . the ability and willingness to re-examine values, values which have hardened into dogma and apply to dogma pragmatic tests of its utility.[5] Thus development needs to be conceived as a dynamic process . . . a state of mind, a tendency, a direction, a rate of change in a particular direction.[6]

The term 'development administration' which continues to hold the stage in spite of its fragile nature was first coined by Goswami in 1955

[3]Walter W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth, A Non-Communist Manifesto*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960. C.R. Hansman, *Rich Against Poor, The Relativity of Aid*, London, Penguin, 1975. Ch. 111. Also Engene Stanby, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries, Political Implications of Economic Development*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 3-4.

[4]V.V. Bhatt, *Development Perspectives Problem, Strategy and Policies*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1980, pp. 47-57. Also Edward Weidner, *Development Administration in Asia*, Duke University Press, 1970, pp. 7-8.

[5]Edward A. Kieloch, "Innovations in Administration and Economic Development", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIX, 1966, p. 610.

[6]Edward W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research", in Ferrel Heady and S.L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, Institute of Public Administration, Michigan, University of Michigan, 1962, p. 99.

but the formal recognition to it was given when the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration and the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Sciences Research Council of the USA laid its intellectual foundations.[7] Since then, there have been a number of definitions, interpretations and attributes of development administration. J.N. Khosla has discussed a number of definitions given by various leading scholars under the heading "Development Administration as a Concept".[8] For the sake of present discussion, views of Donald Stone would suffice that, "Development administration is the blending of all the elements and resources (human and physical) . . . into a concerted effort to achieve agreed upon goals. It is the continuous cycle of formulating, evaluating and implementing interrelated plans, policies, programmes, projects, activities and other measures to reach established development objectives in a scheduled time sequence."[9] In simpler terms, the distinction between the new focus and the traditional administration can roughly be represented as follows:

Traditional (1)	*Developmental* (2)
—Regulatory Administration (Routine operations)	Unpredictable new tasks or problems (rapidly changing environment).
—Oriented towards efficiency and Economy (Emphasis on individual performance)	Oriented towards organisational growth and effectiveness in achievement of goals. (Emphasis on group performance and inter-group collaboration).
—Task orientations and conformity to rules and procedures. (concern for security, playing safe, comfort, status and power)	Relationship oriented with emphasis on high programme standards (willingness to take risks, encouraging innovation and change)
—Sharp and elaborate hierarchical structure	Structure shaped by the requirements of goals

[7]U.L. Goswami, "The Structure of Development Administration", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 1, 1955, pp. 110-118. Also Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.) *Readings in Comparative Public Administration*, Boston, Allyn and Bacow, 1967, pp. 3-6, Also La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, University Press, 1963, pp. ix-x. Brian Loveman, "The Comparative Administration Group, Development and Anti-Development", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXVI, 1976, p. 620.

[8]For the papers included in this volume, no references have been considered necessary and only the authors have been mentioned.

[9]Donald C. Stone, "Tasks, Precedents and Approaches to Education for Development Administration" in Stone (ed.), *Education for Development Administration*, IIAS, Brussels, Marson, 1966, p. 41.

(1)	(2)
(strict and authority climate of mistrust)	(flexibility and continuously changing roles, mutual trust and considerance).
–Centralised Decision-making (Part experience as the main guide to problem solving)	Wide sharing of decision-making. (Empirical approach to problem solving and use of improved aids to decision-making).
–Emphasis on maintaining *status quo* (resistance to organisation change)	Continuing organisational development in response to environmental demands (development of an organisation-oriented which is dynamic, adaptive and futuristic).

V.A. Pai Panandikar brings out that traditional type of administration is designed to fulfil all the legal requirements of governmental operations and to maintain social stability. In the main, this type of administration confines itself to the maintenance of law and order, collection of revenues, and regulating the national life in accordance with the statutory requirements. W. Wood on the other hand objects to the distinction between the developmental and traditional administration and highlights three major disadvantages which stem out of this distinction. First, government servants, who are not fortunate enough to be classed among the developers "may be written off as being unproductive in the development process, and may come to be regarded, indeed as passengers, if not brakes, on the development machine, with a loss of esteem and morale which ultimately seem destined to defeat the whole purpose of public administration. Second, study of the machinery required for development becomes concentrated on innovation and raw design, with consequent neglect of the possibility of adaptation of existing institutions; indeed, there is often an assumption that what exists in a "law and order and revenue collecting" state is *ipso facto* unsuited to the development state. Third, the term 'development' as a description of what is taking place in the real world, is insufficiently analysed. On the one hand, it comes to be treated as something additional to what occurs in the alleged law and order and revenue collecting state, while on the other it appears as having special relationship with independence and post colonialisation.

Waldo has recently shown his concern about public administration and development (used as a substitute for progress and modernisation). Making a distinction between comparative and development administration, he thanks the former refers to those actions, the expectations of which would contribute to theory building in the behavioural sense whereas the latter requires persons across the social science stratum to

develop action that would provide results quickly. He believes that both the types of administration are needed if public administration is to remain a viable entity. He, however, betrays his preference for comparative administration on a global scale; because the solutions to problems will require increasing communications with scholars and practitioners of all countries. Today, we are beyond the point where the western world has the answer to all problems as previously believed.[10] Being mentioned by the environment of the times, development administration laid overemphasis on contextualism, interdisciplinary flavour and logical empiricism. It rested more upon a series of images of development as interpreted in the west and it came to be believed that development could be attained only by modernization that is to say, by the diffusion of western values and technology.[11] Again, the administrative behaviour was regarded as an imperfectly rational activity. The notion popularised by the scientific management school that large scale, rationally oriented and hierarchically ordained organisation was at the apex of social engineering constituted an accepted principle.[12] The task of the developed countries was supposed to be the creation of external inducements to change through technical assistance and transfers of technology and institutions.[13]

The emergence of the Third World nations witnessed a new phenomenon of theory building in the sphere of societal development. It emphasized the multi-dimensional nature of development as it has national, international, corporate, spatial, social, cultural, economic, political and administrative aspects. Development, is no longer to be seen as a unilinear process but as a dialectical one since it releases opposing forces and involves ethical and normative considerations.[14]

[10]Dwight Waldo, *The Enterprise of Public Administration*, California, Chandler and Sharp, Novato, 1980, pp. 210.

[11]Gerald Meier (ed.); *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 7. Donald Cruise O Brien, "Modernisation, Order and the Erosion of a Democratic Ideal", *Journal of Development Studies*, 1972, pp. 351-378.

[12]Max Weber, "The Essentials of Bureaucratic Organisation : The Ideal Type Construction", also "Presuppositions and Causes of Bureaucracy" in Merton *et. al.*, *Reader in Bureaucracy*, New York, The Free Press, 1952, pp. 18-27. Also Alfred Diamant, "The Bureacuratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Reformed", in Heady and Stokes (eds.) *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1962, pp. 59-90.

[13]Bernard Shaffer, *The Administrative Factor*, London, Frank Cass, 1973, pp. 244-45. J. Fred Springs, "Observation and Theory in Development Administration", *Administration and Society*, Vol. IX, 1977, p. 15. Szymon Chodak, *Societal Developments : Five Approaches with Conclusions from Comparative Analysis*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 10.

[14]K.R. Hope and Aubrey, Armustrong, "Towards the Development of Administrative and Management Capability in Developing Countries", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XLI, 1980, pp. 315-21.

Development had been seen as "liberation not only from political domination, colonialism and imperialism but also from economic dependence on other nations and freedom from poverty, disease, illiteracy, ignorance, unemployment and malnutrition. In a nutshell, development is Man, human ascent, freedom from all trades of exploitation and cultural awareness."[15] Such a broad canvas is to be covered if development administration is to justify its existence.

Another significant development has been the explosion of the myth of politics—administration dichotomy. Theoretically, it may be possible to separate the two but in actual live situation—the increasing complexities and technical character makes the area of demarcation between what is political and what is non-political extremely tenuous. An institutionalised mechanism of political control is necessary for ensuring proper administrative accountability but the control may not have a deviating influence of politician in the implementation part has to be guarded. It would, therefore, be essential to clearly demarcate between control and interference but it would be possible only in those situations where there is significant administrative development and structural differentiation.[16]

In the context of modern organisation theory, development administration calls for high standards of group performance and inter-group collaborations, participative management and a high degree of achievement motivation and a continuing innovation of organisation to meet environmental change and internal needs. J.N. Khosla cautions that development administration poses other basic problems which can perhaps only be resolved by some deep empirical studies and organisational ingenuity. Again, an administrative system structured hierarchically may be the only practical proposition in certain transitional societies with traditional values, but such a structure is not conducive to the implementation of developmental programmes where team work is crucial for resolving numerous issues which crop up.[17] Abida Samiuddin is in search of an uniform organisational pattern for development administration and discusses at length various patterns of rural democracy in India. She is optimistic that a broad administrative structure

[15]Mrs. Noorjahan Bawa, "Approaches to Development", *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XLII, 1981, p. 53.

B. Guy Peters, "The Problem of Bureaucratic Government", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. XLI, 1981, pp. 56-82.

[16]Birkeshwar Prasad Singh and Satendra Prasad Singh, "Development Administration in India—Some Essential Requirements, *Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. XLII, 1981, p. 49. Also S.P. Aiyer, "Political Context of Indian Administration", *The Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVIII, 1971, p. 350.

[17]Mekki Mteaw, *Public Policy and Development Policies*, Washington, Howard, 1980, Ch. IV. Also Ronald Pobinson, *Developing the Third World*: The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

at the grassroot level with specific autonomous powers and with equal partnership of mutual inter-dependence with the state government, with constitutional safeguards is possible.

The fanfare with which the new focus started room led to frustration and the objectives, methodologies and even epistomologies came under sharp criticism. The new slogan could not anticipate or solve the crises. The discipline had to "grapple with the effects of the economic and political issues of the domestic and international fronts. Instead of affluence, growth and optimism, the administrative environment (was) being increasingly characterised by scarcity, stasis or declined and lowered expectations".[18] The energy crisis, growing economic recession, contradictions between market enonomies and market policies, trend towards stagnation and political stalemate provided a difficult type of context for development administration. During seventies, the rise of military regimes with distinct structures, objectives, doctrines and techniques provided additional contemporaneous challenge.[19] All the approaches to social system came under severe strain and partly it was because of the everexpanding frontiers.[20] Such a state has been portrayed as, "with development becoming a more magical word every moment and with more resources available for the study of anything about development, development administration became a catch-all for ideolographic applied social scientists and nomothetic theorists. Development administration took off into modernization, nation building, social change, industrialization, central anthropology, urbanization, political ecology and anything else that seemed to promise help for policy makers in development countries.[21] In this process, the very distinctively prescriptive intent of public administration faded away and by the late sixties, development administration, itself became a field in search of a

[18]H. George Frederickson, "Public Administration in the 1970's : Development and Directions", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXVI, 1976, pp. 564-65. Also Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism, Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1969, p. xiii.

[19]James O' Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1973, p. 2. Jorge Tapiavidera, "Understanding Organisations and Environments: A Comparative Perspective", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXVI, 1976, p. 63. OVSaldo Sunkel, "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America" in *Social and Economic Studies*, Vol. XXVI, 1973.

[20]Chris L. Jeffris, "Public Administration and the Military", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXXVI, 1976, p. 321. Jorge Nef, "The Politics of Repression: The Social Pathology of Chilean Micilacy," *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 1, 1974, p. 65.

[21]Gerald E. Caiden, "The Dynamics of R. Public Administration, Guidelines to Current Transformation in Theory and Practice", New York, Holt, 1971, p. 267. Peter Savage, "Dismantling the Administrative State: Paradigm Reformulation of Public Administration", *Political Studies*, Vol. XXII, 1974, p. 147.

discipline.[22] Development administration, in spite of the outpouring of profuse writings on the subject still is an illusory administrative concept whose broad-shadow outlines are widely recognised. It covers a wider horizon and a complex matrix in which all forces political, economic, social and administrative blend together for achieving the goals. However, a number of theories of development have been advanced, evolutionism and diffusionism with their corollaries of modernization and the 'trickle down' effect have been diluted, development and underdevelopment are not two faces of the same coin but inextricably linked as one single historical process.[23] Kamal Nayan Kabra explains the difficulty of evolving indicators of development and concludes that the single indicator in terms of per capita income has better analytical base and utility than the *ad hoc* multiple indicators without a consistent theoretical base. Therefore, instead of wasting energies in manipulating and tinkering with various variables, it may be useful to undertake systematic exercises based on a clear perception of the purposes of the indicators. Critics of the neoliberal and developmentalist model rejected the distributive and socialistic overtones of 'reform-mongering' and instead emphasized growth and stability.[24] These reactions and over reactions confused the focus instead of refining it. Administrative reforms in the context of development administration has to be viewed as a process, which carries with it wider implications than the content of the reforms as behavioural aspects are emphasised alongwith the structural ones to make any study more comprehensive. It is a common experience that most reforms fail at the implementation stage.[25] Mohammad Mohabbat Khan thinks that serious efforts in the field of administrative reforms are seldom made to maintain a balance between politicians, bureaucrats, academicians, and other outside experts when

[22]H. George Frederickson, "Public Administration in the 1970's: Development and Directions", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXVI, 1976, pp. 564-65. Also Theodore Lowi, *The End of Liberalism, Ideology, Policy and the Crisis of Public Authority*, New York, Norton, 1969, pp. xiii Victor Thompson, "Administrative Objectives for Development Administration", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. IX, 1964, pp. 93-94.

[23]Denis Goulet, The Cruel Choice, *A New Concept in the Theory* of Development, New York, Atheneven, 1973, pp. xii-xxi, Susan George, *How the Other Half Dies : The Real Reason for World Hunger*, New York, Penguin, 1976, p. 94.

[24]Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968, p. 4. Harry G. Johnson, *Economic Policies Towards the Less Developed Countries*, Washington, The Brookings Institute, 1973, Ch. III.

[25]Gerald F. Caiden, "Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reforms", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, XXXVIII, 1973, p. 343. C. Mosker, "Administrative Reform: Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Techniq ues", *"Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, New York, United Nations, 1973, pp. 11-13.

members are chosen. This uneven composition results in recommendations which are impractical and difficult to implement.[26] In the sphere of political and administrative theory, new visions, at times contradictory, emerged and liberal democracy was no longer looked upon as the highest state of political development. The term political development was largely used to perform a legitimately rather than an analytical function, and even there it has been used in four different general ways: geographical, derivative, teleological and functional. These distinct approaches have also been identified in the theories of political development, *viz.*, the structural functional, the social process and comparative history approach. Huntington sums up the divergence as "the structural functional approach was weak in change, the social process approach was weak in politics, and the comparative history approach was weak in theory".[27] Similarly the changes in administrative theory were not less fast. Several of the current inadequacies in attainment of development targets stem from the innate weaknesses of the implementation process. Plan objectives, policy and priorities have not always been clearly formulated to facilitate implementation and at times they have been inconsistent. Targets have at times been over-ambitious, set without regard to administrative capacity.[28] Tarlok Singh outlines suggestions for measures to be taken for speeding implementation raising administrative efficiency and standards, securing better management in public enterprises and simplifying procedures relating to planning. Ram K.Vepa with the help of case studies provides a number of valuable guidelines which are helpful to administrators in the implementation process. These case studies have been imaginatively selected and cover a wide range of areas demonstrating that it is possible to forecast emerging problems and devise solutions in advance so that the development projects successfully achieve the objectives. Development planning is an extremely complicated exercise since it has to deal with a multiplicity of variants—variations in resources, cultures, topography, time, etc. The implementation of plan schemes need not necessarily follow the pattern inherent in the conception part of planning.[29] T.S. Murty while discussing

[26]S.R. Maheshwari, *Administrative Reforms in India*, Delhi, Macmillan, 1981, Ch. I. Om Prakash, *Essays on Development Process*, Bhopal, Progress, 1980, p. 50. Also Gerald E. Caiden, "The Challenge to the Administrative State", *Policies, Administration and Change*, Vol. V, 1980, pp. 17-27.

[27]Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay", *World Politics*, Vol. XVII, 1965, pp. 386-93. Also Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development*, New Delhi, Amermid, 1966, pp. 33-45.

[28]Kenneth J. Meior, "Measuring Organisational Power, Resources and Autonomy of Government Agencies", *Administration and Society*, Vol. XXI, 1980, pp. 357-75.

[29]Gregory D. Foster, "A Methodological Approach to Administrative Development Interventoin", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Vol. XLVI, 1980, pp. 237-43.

planned economic change outlines eight components in implementation of orders: desire to obey the order, knowledge of the subject, receptivity of the target group, correct relations to the possible quantum of administrative effort, particularly of time available for the implementor and for the target group habit of implementation, hierarchical structure and attention to what the ground level staff needs. Most of the burden of development is to be borne by the bureaucracy, therefore most effective and rational use of the human resources of the civil service must be made by canalising careers within it so as to produce the skills and competence needed for the work of government today and to maintain efficiency and morale at higher levels. B.K. Dey outlines three key factors in any scheme of developmental bureaucracy, structural refabrication, streamlining of methods and procedures of work and freeing the bureaucrat from the existing conceptual orthodoxies, age old affiliations and narrow mental grooves. R.N. Haldipur discussing the role of bureaucracy in facing the new challenges thinks that current policy-making implies a clear perception of our social structure, value orientation, the strengths and weaknesses of the society, the leadership pattern, etc. There is no cosmetic treatment to solve the problems of the morrow. Ultimately, bureaucracy becomes responsible to meet the challenge and to effectively handle such situations, it has to be forward-looking, humane in content and flexible enough to lend stability while moving forward to keep the momentum of change. Technological progress and the vast amount of new knowledge have made a major impact on these tasks and on the process of taking discussions. Setting a new airport, buying military supplies, starting the right balance between coal, gas, oil and nuclear-powered electricity in a new energy policy—all these problems compel civil servants to use new techniques of analysis, management and coordination which are beyond those not specially trained in them.[30] When this was one perspective, bureaucracy has more aversion than encouragement. Both conservatives and redicals, for difficult reasons, attacked bureaucracy. Cynics regarded efforts at planning and administrative development as useless and leading to modernised underdevelopment. The abandonment of administrative techniques left for development administrative nothing tangible to offer and the practical sterility combined with identity crisis led to a "generalised state of intellectual lethargy".[31]

The decline of the development administration model due to a series of crises of social science paradigms, conflicting theories of development, abandonment of administrative techniques, failure of the foreign aid led

[30]*The Fulton Report*, London, 168, p. 10.

[31]Cf, United Nations, *Development Administration: Current Approaches and Trends in Public Administration for National Development*, New York, 1975, pp. 32-34.

to search for new pastures. The concept of regressive administration has been coined to refer to a situation where development administration does not result from a government's attempt at administrative reforms, and one where the organisations undertaking reform fall short of the goals. Thus, the concept of development administration is to be reserved for the description of those countries which have succeeded in implementing their development programmes and for others which do not fall in this category, a concept of regressive administration be used.[32]

The foregoing analysis presents not an encouraging picture but the crisis offered by the discipline was not secure enough to make it disappear altogether. The problems which are being faced by the societies whether developed or developing are almost similar, and the challenge or creating and managing new international and domestic orders is becoming more serious as the years pass. From an economic point of view, even the so-called Third World has become at least three worlds—the oil producing countries earning huge amounts of foreign exchange, the relatively well off developing countries with other valuable resources or a growing industrial base, and the have-not developing countries such as those in the Indian subcontinent and the Saharian zone of Africa. In this shrinking world and fragmentary boundaries, there is still a desire to unite when the interests are common. It is motivated rather by a desire to adapt policies to new realities so that the legitimate interests of all will be served.[33] So long as such a desire persists, the necessity of development administration will continue.

S.P. VERMA
S K. SHARMA

[32]Jon. S.T. Quah, "Regressive Administration: Some Second Thoughts on the Concept of Development Administration", *Administrative Change*, Vol. VII, 1979, p. 36.

[33]Trilatural Commission, *A Turning Point in North-South Economic Relations, New York, University Press*, 1977, p-69.

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Development Administration: New Dimensions*

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DEVELOPMENT POLICIES and programmes which have been initiated in the newly emerging countries during the last decade or so are primarily directed towards higher income and living standards through industrialisation and modernisation, expansion of social services and cultural activities as well as broad-basing and strengthening of the political institutions. The increase in scale, change in content and the growing complexity of administrative problems in the developing countries have led to the conceptualisation of the administrative process involved in developmental activities as 'Development Administration'. Following the initial attempt made by Weidner to explain conceptually the meaning of Development Administration, several prominent scholars—notably Riggs, Heady, Montgomery, Esman, Pye—have made substantial contributions to articulate the concept and its implications, chiefly as a by-product of their comparative studies of administration in the developing countries of Asia and Latin America. In the following pages we explore in turn how different authors stress different aspects of the concept in their definitions, though they are agreed that it is an effort towards planned transformation of the economy, involving not only the sphere of administration but also politics, and indeed society as a whole. Secondly, we try to show that much of the writing on the subject, therefore, concentrates on the synchronisation of changes in all spheres of development. Special emphasis is placed, however, on the political and social context of administration. Under the former rubric, topics such as the political control of administration and the formulation of plans and policies are discussed. The latter includes issues like the citizens' reaction to administrative action, his active participation in the development effort, and the need to change the administrators' attitudes—attitudes that are conditioned by the society which is sought to be transformed. Thirdly, we turn from this political and social context to study the administrative structures and processes which would be more suitable to the context as well as the goal of planned overall transformation.

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1967, pp. 16-31.

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS A CONCEPT

Problems of development administration have come into sharp focus in the past decade or so with the growing emphasis on accelerated economic and social development and the initiation of national plans of development varying in scope and expanding in content. This does not, however, mean that there was no Development Administration before. Almost every emerging country, whether with experience of colonial administration or otherwise, has had a history of some attempt to build up an infrastructure of economy at national or regional level, long before the present organised effort at all-round economic and social development was initiated. Even in the advanced countries of the west, economic growth and social development have thrown up new administrative problems.

Development Administration as a concept is a part, in the developing countries a large part, of the broader discipline of public administration. The emphasis in the latter has over a period of time shifted from 'fundamental' principles, similar to those of scientific management in industry, to a human-relations approach, and then to behavioural and decision-making aspects of the functioning of an administrative organisation. The emergence of national programmes of development in new states, and of international and bilateral schemes of technical assistance for development during the post-war years, gave a fillip to comparative public administration studies incorporating a great diversity of methods and insights derived essentially from sociology, cultural anthropology and organisational theory. Out of this experience there has arisen a gradual realisation that the western concepts of public administration and Weberian type of bureaucracy cannot be introduced into the administrative systems of the developing countries without regard to their appropriateness or political feasibility.[1] The developing countries themselves have found that their existing administrative systems and practices are frightfully inadequate in coping with the new developmental responsibilities. Administrative changes needed for developmental purposes have to be considered in a much broader perspective than the conventional organisational reforms.[2]

Though some scholars consider development as a change-over from a transitional to an industrial society or as a process of modernization in a generic sense, development may be conceived as planned mobilisation and direction of scarce resources to achieve constantly rising nation-

[1]John D. Montgomery, "A Royal Invitation: Variations on Three Classic Themes", in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966, p. 276.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 268.

al goals and objectives formulated by the national political machinery.[3] Development needs to be conceived as a dynamic process, directed towards transforming an entire society (not merely some segments of it), enmeshing together its economic, social, political and administrative aspects for an all-round. balanced, upward change. As Weidner points out, "development is...never complete; it is relative, more or less of it being possible. Development is a state of mind, a tendency, a direction. Rather than a fixed goal, it is a rate of change in a particular direction."[4]

Merle Fainsod defines Development Administration as "a carrier of innovating values... It embraces the array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernisation and industrialisation. Development administration ordinarily involves the establishment of machinery for planning economic growth and mobilising and allocating resources to expand national income".[5] To Montgomery, Development Administration connotes "carrying out planned change in the economy (in agriculture or industry, or the capital infrastructure

[3]According to Montgomery, "development is usually conceived as an aspect of change that is desirable, broadly predicted or planned and administered or at least influenced by governmental action", *op. cit.* p. 259.

[4]Edward W. Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research", in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), *Papers in Comparative Public Administration*, Institute of Public Administration, Michigan, University of Michigan, 1962, p. 99.

In a UN publication, the term 'development' has been defined as "the process of allowing and encouraging people to meet their own aspirations" *See* "UN Science and Technology for Development", United Nations, *Science and Technology for Development Report on the UN Conference on the Application of Science anp Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas*, New York, UN, 1963, Vol. 1 (World of Opportunity), p. vii. Again, development has been conceived as "organised efforts which engulf concurrently the entire living organism in space and time to further the cause of material and social progress of mankind. It is a systematic endeavour to meet the challenge which has been thrown by lightening advancement of science and technology and integrate the forces thus generated in a way that a social system does not suffer major jerks of dislocation". Shaukat Ali and Garth N. Jones, *Planning Development and Change: An Annotated Bibliography on Development Administration*, Punjab University Press, Lahore, p. 12. Prof. Tinbergen discussing about the design of development, suggested that the elements of development policy should consist of : "(*i*) the creation of the general conditions of development, (*ii*) awareness of developmental potentialities and advantages, (*iii*) basic government instruments, (*iv*) measure to facilitate and stimulate private activity, (*v*) development policy under varying circumstances." *See*, John Tinbergan, *The Design of Development*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1958, pp. 4-8. However, the "general consensus among scholars is, to treat development as a total plan of action which encompasses all aspects of social activities, where growth rates of production and consumption form only one of the several forces which are geared to national progress". *See*, Ali and Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

[5]Merle Fainsod, "The Structure of Development Administration", in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration: Concepts and Problems*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963, p. 2.

supporting either of these) and, to a lesser extent, in the social services of the state (especially education and public health). It is not usually associated with efforts to improve political capabilities".[6] On the other hand, Weidner points out that "development administration in government refers to the process of guiding an organisation toward the achievement of progressive political, economic and social objectives that are authoritatively determined in one manner or other".[7]

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION IN ITS BROADER CONTEXT

It would, however, be seen that the definitions of Fainsod and Montgomery are rather narrowly conceived, in terms of planned economic growth. More realistically, considering the actual conditions in the developing countries, Development Administration is concerned with the will to develop, the mobilisation of existing and new resources and the cultivation of appropriate skills to achieve the development goals.[8] Development is essentially a directed or guided change with a heavy import on achievement of programmatic goals.[9] Waldo argues that development affords a focus which helps to bring into useful association various cluster of ideas and types of activities that are now more or less separate and help clarify some methodological problems.[10] Other scholars predict that development would become an integrated concept for the comparative study of public administration, All these definitions lead us to one common point: development administration is essentially "an action-oriented, goal-oriented administrative system".[11] It is

[6]Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

[7]Weidner, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

[8]V. Jagannadham defines Development Administration as "a process of action motivated by and oriented to the achievement of certain predetermined goals". He adds: "It is a process which either has a will and the skills or, if it does not have, makes the preparations for the creation of the will and the cultivation of the skills necessary to discover or to mobilize the resources so as to reach the goals". He clarifies that the primary concern of Development Administration "is not only with the mobilization of the existing or potential resources but also with the creation of the necessary new resources to reach the predetermined goals or targets". *See*, V. Jagannadham lecture on "The Scope of Development and Administration" in his lecture series on *Development Administration*, delivered at Asian Institute for Economic Development and Planning, in Bangkok (mimeo.), October 1966, p.17.

[9]V.A. Pai Panandikar, "Development Administration : An Approach", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. X, No. 1, 1964, pp. 35-38.

[10]Dwight Waldo, *Comparative Public Administration: Prologue, Problems, and Promise, Papers in Comparative Public Administration, Special Series No.* 2, Comparative Administration Group, American Society for Public Administration, Chicago, 1964, p. 27.

[11] Weidner, "Development Administration: A New Focus for Research" in Ferrel Heady and Sybitl L. Stokes (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 98.

increasingly directed to realising definite programmatic values, not those of routine administration. In other words, it is the programmatic values that make the administration developmental.

In practical terms, such broader approach to problems of Development Administration would imply that the administrative structures, procedures, staffing pattern, techniques of planning, personnel policies and practices and even relations with citizens, all should be attuned and harnessed to the goals and processes of development. Development Administration not only envisages achievement of goals in a particular area of development by making a system more efficient, it must also reinforce the system, imparting it an element of stability as well as resilience to meet the requirements of future developmental challenges. This would further involve administrative innovation and ingenuity as well as breaking down of the bureaucratic resistance to change. Introduction of administrative and other innovations would call for "an earnest willingness to experiment and to take reasonable risks...a willingness, to question accepted practices in every aspect of administration and development...the ability and willingness to re-examine values which have hardened into dogma and apply to dogma pragmatic tests of its utility".[12]

POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENT: SYNCHRONIZATION OR SUCCESSION?

If Development Administration is to be viewed as planned change in administrative structure and processes in response to certain needs and objectives, how is it related to other areas of change or development, such as political or economic development? Riggs defines *administrative development* "as a pattern of increasing effectiveness in the utilisation of available means to achieve prescribed goals", and *political development* as "an enhanced ability to make organizational decisions involving value choices".[13] He considers administrative development as a qualitative change in efficiency, and differentiates it from quantitative increases in bureaucracy which he calls 'growth'. However, the administrative problems of development in the emerging countries are not only those of qualitative improvements in administration but equally those of increase in the scale and scope of developmental tasks. In his concept of administrative development, Leonard Binder includes "increases in size, in specialisation and division of tasks, and in the professionalisation of its personnel".[14] Without going

[12]Edward A. Kieloch, "Innovation in Administration and Economic Development", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1966, p. 610.

[13]Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[14]Leonard Binder, *Iran : Political Development in a Changing Society*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962, p. 57.

into the sophistications put forward by Riggs and taking into account the broader perspective of 'development' discussed earlier, administrative development would include both qualitative and quantitative changes in bureaucratic policies, programmes, procedures and methods of work, organisational structures and staffing patterns, number and quality of development personnel of different types and patterns of relations with the clients of the administration.

From a historical perspective, it may be noted that in many of the advanced countries of the West, industrialisation and the consequential economic development preceded the mass education, and the latter came before the introduction of adult franchise. In countries like India, which is essentially a prismatic society, to use the terminology of Riggs, all the three national objectives—economic development, mass education and adult franchise—have been telescoped to a single all-out effort at a point of time. In this connection, it may be pointed out that there is a school of thought which holds the view that administrative development can precede and set the framework for the other two. Thus, according to the "middle-eastern theory of democracy", it is possible to reverse the order of these developments, because both economic and political development can be brought about by the administrative apparatus.[15] This was carried out successfully two centuries ago by the great Electors of Prussia. Conversely, Riggs believes that "poor administration necessarily characterizes any 'modernizing' bureaucratic polity where the bureaucracy is more political than administrative in function, where external control groups are weak and where government influence over the population is limited". Further, he holds that "until the fundamental political framework changes, one can scarcely expect basic improvements in administration to take place in such politics."[16]

Synchronisation of the three types of development—economic, political and administrative—has particular importance in countries that are characterised by Apter as constituting "reconciliation systems". There is an attempt at meshing of political and administrative developments in these countries and the main problem is to adapt the developmental goals, programmes and policies to public expectations.[17] If the processes of political socialisation, communication, and interest articulation are not advanced enough to enforce social and political

[15]Leonard Binder, *op. cit.*, p. 57; also Fred W. Riggs discusses this aspect in his aper on "Administrative Development : An Elusive Concept", *op. cit.*, p. 226.

[16]Fred W. Riggs, "Relearning the Old Lesson : The Political Context of Development Administration", *Public Administration Review*, March 1965, p. 77.

[17]David E. Apter, "System, Process and the Politics of Economic Development", in Bert F. Hoselitz and Willbert E. Moore (eds.), *Industrialization and Society*, Mouton, UNESCO, 1963, pp. 135-138.

control on the developmental bureaucracy, and if the peoples' expectations in the wake of political independence and plans of development outweigh the ability of the governments to meet them, there would obviously be shortfalls and administrative failures in reaching developmental goals and targets.[18]

Dealing with another aspect of the same question Montgomery points out, "the most direct forms of governmental action are its own programmes but governments may help influence indirectly the actions of other groups and agents, by their use of ideology and doctrine they may affect as well the attitudes and efforts of the entire community. These three modes of action—programmes, promotion, and ideology—constitute the subject matter of development administration...." This is more so specially when the most mundane objectives of development administration may involve major problems in political theory". Continuing on the theme, Montgomery clarifies that, "imposition of modernizing ends upon traditional, post-colonial and otherwise economically stagnant systems lacking viable instruments of administration requires the use of political means: 'mobilising' one-party systems, government-organised and bureaucracy-dominated client agencies and special interest groups, traditional associations, ethnic groups and clans, and organisations of the youth, the educated, the dispossessed, and others whose existence poses a dilemma to the regime."[19] Esman also stresses that in order to deal with ever-rising goals government must cope with a series of significant major tasks, such as achieving security against external aggression and ensuring internal order establishing and maintaining consensus on the legitimacy of the regime, integrating diverse ethnic, religious, communal and regional elements into a national political community, decentralisation and distribution of powers to various levels of governmental units and between different authorities and private sector, displacement of vested traditional social interests, development of skills and institutions and finally fostering of psychological and material security, etc.[20]

Riggs is a little more modest about the range of such governmental tasks but he would discuss the converse, namely, the impact of positive and negative 'sanctions' on bureaucratic behaviour in a given social

[18]J.N. Khosla, Administrative Impediments to Development (mimeo.), Paper read at the IIAS Meeting of Directors of Institute of Public Administration, Brussels, June, 1964, pp. 1-2.

[19]Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 261. Montgomery means two different things when using the terms 'political development. and 'governmental action' The first means the proper expression or articulation of group interests and the latter implies mobilization of power through government to set in motion things such as economic development.

[20]Esman, "Politics of Development Administration" in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 60-65.

system, of formal controls and informal influences, such as education and training, and of rationalism as a device to choose from different alternatives the most appropriate means for achieving desired goals. Emphasising the accountability aspect of administration, Riggs concludes, "administrative development occurs only if we find a bureaucracy becoming increasingly responsible, as agent, for the implementation of policies formulated by institutions outside the bureaucracy. In this sense, administrative development is a counterpart of political development, a corollary to the institutionalisation of rule-making institutions capable of imposing accountability on public officials. This, as we have seen, involves the introjection by officials of norms prescribed by political organisations".[21]

Riggs and others have tried to show that certain factors, which may not be conducive to high standards of administration, may help in political development. It is even suggested that "premature or too rapid expansion of the bureaucracy when the political system lags behind tends to inhibit the development of effective politics. A corollary thesis holds that separate political institutions have a better chance to grow if bureaucratic institutions are relatively weak.... It may be that political development, at least towards a democratic type of political action, can be attained only at the cost of slower economic and social development".[22]

It is true that the values and behaviour styles that are developing among new politicians in the rural areas, towns and small cities of India are in some ways contrary to those which these politicians would be expected to possess when they assume a ministerial office. There is thus emerging a somewhat basic contradiction between the new, behavioural dimensions of our political system and the requirements of an administrative system for pushing ahead with nation-building programmes. However, this could be avoided by appropriate political development. If the political elite had a clear perception of the national objectives, of inter-relations between political, socio-economic and administrative development and the priorities *inter se*, the political growth could be conducive both to economic and administrative development.

In the context of the present socio-political conditions, however, civil services in India would have to play, during the next two decades or so, an increasingly important role not only in the planning and implementation of programmes of development but also in the entire process of transformation and modernisation of the Indian society through

[21]Fred W. Riggs, *op. cit.*, pp. 252-53.

[22]Fred W. Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development : A Paradoxical View", in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 126 and 135.

governmental action. Here, while synchronisation of administrative, economic and political development would be important, administrative development will obviously lead the way "...because the political and social process is going to be somewhat unrelated, if you want dynamism to emerge, if you must permit an unregulated pushes and pulls in the political and social process, that has to be counter-balanced by the administration functioning in more balanced manner."[23] The late Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, emphasising the leadership role of the bureaucracy in India, said: "...it should be one of the principal functions of public administration in its broader context to direct democracy into right channels".[24]

While in countries like India which have a well-established administrative system, the bureaucracy must necessarily give a lead in several directions, administrative development cannot but be only a few steps ahead of economic and socio-political development. In the long run all the three types of development have to proceed together being inter-dependent.

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Citizens' Participation

Another dimension of the Development Administration, which is more pertinent to the developing countries concerns the participation of the citizens in the development process. Such participation in view of the wide scope and the large scale of the developmental functions and responsibilities of the government in these countries, is a *sine qua non* for the success of the developmental plans. In most of the developing countries the governments are paying today an increasing attention to programmes of community development, plans for re-organisation and re-orientation of institutions of urban-local government and mobilisation of people's support. In India, the experiment with democratic decentralisation or grassroots-type of panchayati raj institutions represents one of the major items in the government's efforts for evoking the citizens' participation in the developmental effort.[25] Broadly speaking, India's new democratic institutions, at the level of the village, the block and the district, have demonstrated greater potentiality for

[23]Asoka Mehta, Annual Address to the IIPA, October 1967.

[24]Address to the Third Annual Meeting (April 6, 1957) of the IIPA, Report of Proceedings, p. 8.

[25]It is imperative that "participation must be more than symbolic if popular energies are to be channelled into the developmental process and if self-sustaining institutions are to be created to give development coherence and meaning in political life". Douglas E. Ashford, "Bureaucrats and Citizens", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 358, March 1965, p. 91.

operating successfully the programmes of social services than in regard to schemes of economic development. The problem of effective involvement of the people in economic development plans still remains to be resolved for a large part. The added emphasis in more recent years on programmes of area development may help towards removing this deficiency.

Citizen's participation is specially important for accelerating social change in areas like family planning, community development, etc. Further, citizen's participation has to be viewed in the wider perspective of creating a plural society, in which a network of voluntary[26] organisations would relieve the government of some of its increasing burdens and responsibilities. The growth of voluntary institutions would also help provide a mechanism of social control over the developmental bureaucracy to ensure that it does carry out its tasks and obligations effectively. Another aspect of the problem which needs to be highlighted, and which may have a direct import in changing the attitudes of the clients of various programmes and services, is the role of demonstration and extension services of the government. Further, experience in several countries bears out that dynamic private sector entrepreneurs can help create a favourable climate for developmental activity and change.

The programmes of development in the emerging countries have led to the creation of a plethora of new institutions—political, economic, social and administrative. Attention is being particularly drawn to the peoples' institutions because the programmes of development it is generally agreed, are to be carried out not only by the bureaucracy but also through public participation. The new institutions, however, do not seem to have always been designed after careful studies of previous experience in the field. There are instances of duplication and diffusion of efforts by several of these institutions. Institution-building demands, first of all, a clear and definite policy and a master strategy in the context of the particular social setting, for creating viable institutions; and secondly, a sustained and integrated effort to make them work and grow.[27]

[26]As has been very aptly pointed out by Stone that "no effective developmental plan or programme can be carried out by government alone. The widest possible mobilization of the voluntary agencies and participation of all elements in the national community must be achieved". Donald C. Stone, Education of Development Administration (mimeo.), Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Pittsburgh University.

[27]In this connection Esman has very correctly suggested that "Research into the process of institutional development can be highly significant. . . .Establishing and sustaining viable institutions should be a critical concern of modern political leaders, planners and administrators in the developing countries, since this is a major element

(*Continued on next page*)

Education as a Catalyst of Change

The most important modernising influence concerns the proper development of manpower resources for each sector of the economy and the spread of education in the society. Serious qualitative studies of economic growth in USA and Germany have shown that education is the most significant single factor in such growth. Education—in social sciences, or in physical sciences—needs to be oriented to the development of personnel with professional specialisation tempered with wide general knowledge and liberal outlook for manning the administrative and technical services in a developmental bureaucracy. One of the obstacles in the initiation of a forward-looking educational system is generally the conservatism of the universities in the matter of changing their curricula to meet the need for propagating development education.

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION AS A PROCESS

Development Administration as a process invariably involves four crucial elements: (*a*) developmental goals and their feasibility, (*b*) development policies and programmes, (*c*) organisational logistics and personnel to implement these programmes, and (*d*) end-results. While the determination of developmental goals and policies may not characteristically fall within the jurisdiction of the administrative and technical personnel concerned with development administration, the processes of goal formulation and policy-making do have a definite impact on the programming and implementation of developmental activities entrusted to the bureaucracy. Here, one of the crucial problems which does not seem to have received the requisite emphasis is the plurality and multiplicity of developmental goals *vis-a-vis* the scarcity of the administrative means. This underlines the importance of: (*a*) treating administration as one of the resources in the planning process, (*b*) working out in operational terms the administrative requirements of each developmental programme or activity, (*c*) formulating a clear-cut scheme of priorities as between the different developmental goals and objectives, and (*d*) designing an effective strategy of implementation.

India's experience shows that planning may not always come up to expectations, due to the failure to create a matching system of administration at each operating level. There exists also the problems of synchronisation of complementary plans and programmes in terms

(*Continued from previous page*)
in their operating strategy". He also adds that "Foreign assistance personnel should evaluate their performance less by their success in the transfer of specific skills from one individual to another than by the creation and strengthening of institutions that can perform and sustain modernizing functions". *See*, Milton J. Esman, "Institution Building in National Development" in Gore Hambidge (ed.), *Dynamics of Development*, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1964, p. 143.

of time sequence and coordination between agencies—from central departments down to the field—engaged in the development effort. The successful attainment of one or more developmental goals may depend upon the realisation of some allied economic, social or political objectives. The inter-dependence between different developmental goals and the need for priorities as between these goals *vis-a-vis* scarcity of available means highlight the problem of synchronisation of socio economic, political and administrative development.

Initially perhaps, therefore, a feasible strategy for any developing country would be to concentrate, to begin with, only on selected programmes of economic, social and political development. The net could be cast wider when the priorities as between the different developmental goals and programmes and assessment of the existing and potential resources have been realistically worked out. An attempt at development on a big scale in all the three areas would undoubtedly create a greater momentum for some time, but a pragmatic approach would call for a phased plan of clear-cut priorities and strategy.

We have already discussed earlier how development as a process calls for a blending and balancing of the different aspects of development, *i.e.*, economic, socio-political and administrative. In this connection it is proper to refer to three separate and apparently incongruous views of Riggs. Thus in *Administration in Developing Countries* (1964)[28], he looks upon administrative development essentially as functional differentiation within the structure of government. Secondly, he points out elsewhere that this differentiation need not correlate with the level of performance.[29] Riggs obviously implies that a differentiation in administrative structure out of tune with the level of structural differentiation in society itself does not produce any significant results. In a third place, he stresses the 'rule applying' characteristic of the bureaucracy

[28] "We may speak of administrative development taking place whenever the structures of government become more specialized in function, stressing programme and techniques more, area and clientele less. Any increase in mere number of administrative units, where each unit is oriented primarily toward a particular area, or toward racial, ethnic, religious, or other communal clienteles, is not an increase in functional specialization". Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1964, p. 422.

[29] Riggs adds " . . .the degree of structural differentiation in a social system need not correlate directly with level of performance. We can conceive of a system with a high degree of structual differentiation but a low level of performance. This might be because the actors were ineffective in their efforts to carry out their assigned roles or because they were unwilling to conform with these roles, and hence ineffective...The more structurally differentiated a social system, therefore, the greater its performance requirements but also the greater the possibility that performance levels can fall." "Administrative Development : An Elusive Concept" in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 238.

to the social system as its central function and that the bureaucracy's own functional differentiation is less important [30] This simply confirms our interpretation that the effectiveness of a rule applying bureaucracy consists in its own structural differentiation running parallel with or *just a little* ahead of its counterpart in society as a whole.

New Techniques and New Attitudes

While the developing countries have taken up several new developmental responsibilities, they have for the most part still to adapt and modernise their administrative tools, techniques, organisational structures and staffing patterns to the requirements of development. This is not totally a new aspect of Development Administration, but in terms of the urgency and magnitude of the need it is one of the core problems. Here, there is a wide scope for adoption of advanced techniques of project planning and management, programming, evaluation of results, etc. Two important aspects of the project management concern : (*a*) time targets for attainment of results, and (*b*) cost benefit ratios. There is equally an urgent need for expansion and improvement both of applied and basic research in social sciences to help in the evaluation and adaptation of advanced techniques and tools of administrative management in a developing society.

Despite the pressing need, the bureaucracies of the developing countries are generally inclined to go slow with the introduction of new techniques and practices appropriate to the attainment of developmental goals and targets. They are even resistant to changes in organisational structures and personnel systems. Nor is perhaps there an adequate realisation among the civil service of the need for new techniques and practices. Here again, if the government has a definite but phased programme of experimentation and introduction of new techniques and practices, the bureaucracy is less likely to feel that the administrative innovations would threaten and reduce its security and powers.

Closely linked with the above problem is the question of values, motivations and attitudes of the civil service entrusted with developmental tasks. There is a growing recognition that the attitudes of the civil service are ridden with procedural rigidities of law-and-order-state and have not changed to meet the demands of new developmental responsibilities. But no worthwhile attention is being devoted to research on attitudes and motivation and to the reorientation of training programmes thereof. Development Administration does call for some new attitudes and values, such as initiative, drive, a sense of responsibility to take decisions which are both quick and in public interest, a shift in the

[30] "Structural differentiation involves not so much programmatic specialization within the bureaucracy as the emergence of distinctive functions for the bureaucracy within society", Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235.

emphasis from procedures to end-results, a concern for the citizens' comforts and needs, etc. It, however, seems difficult to polarise civil service attitudes into developmental and non-developmental categories. Some of the attitudes developed during the law-and-order-state are equally relevant to the new responsibilities. Problems of motivation, values and attitudes would need detailed study and research in the context of the national cultural setting and societal values. It is being increasingly realised in India that a verbal homage to altruistic aims is not enough to commit civil servants and politicians to national or programmatic goals and objectives. A change in the individual and group values and norms is really important. It may be possible to reorient the values and attitudes of civil servants through appropriate training programmes and further professionalisation of the civil services. Research on attitudes and motivations may help identify the nature and type of incentives and rewards which would be most appropriate to particular levels and groups of civil servants or type of development programmes.

Equally important is the question of the attitudes of the political executives.[31] The masses in the developing countries of South-East Asia still tend to adjudge the political executive more by their charisma and status than by their actual achievements. The values held by the general public as well as the political executives are in many respects feudalistic. This again underlines the importance of the inter-relationship between political, socio-economic and administrative development.

By and large, the behavioural components of administration, at the level both of the individual and the groups, have not been taken into account by the foreign experts providing technical assistance to developing countries. Nor have these experts been able to suggest any particular administrative patterns suited to the ecological settings of these countries.

The problem of reorienting attitudes and behaviour is partly one of finding ways of removing what civil servants perceive as threats to their personal or institutional survival. Montgomery points out that in the west, this problem, in the sphere of industry, has been dealt with by the use of 'participative' techniques of management, softening of hierarchic distinction without removing them and using group deliberations as a means of reaching decisions and establishing organisational goals without changing the legal structure of an organisation.[32] Braibanti feels that some administrative problems are highly resistant to direct change by

[31] "Western 'universalistic' concepts of impersonality, technical supremacy, and loyalty to some abstraction, such as the public interest, remain alien in societies in which primary loyalties are directed to members of one's family and to personal friends". S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States", in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), *Industrialization and Society*, UNESCO, Mouton, 1963, p. 165.

[32] Montgomery, *op. cit.*, pp. 264-265.

foreign reform efforts. Certain bureaucratic modes of behaviour are so ingrained in a culture that any direct effort at change is not likely to yield result, except when the society as a whole is tackled.[33] Riggs holds that "bureaucracies might expand and proliferate through sectoral differentiation stimulating administrative organs or rule-application, but in fact retaining autonomous decision-making powers. Under such conditions, the normal sanctions requisite for social control would be inadequate to ensure effective role performance by public officials. The necessary conditions for the socialisation of bureaucrats to secure efficient responses to the requirements of a differentiated social system would also not be satisfied."[34]

THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND STRUCTURE

Another aspect of the problem concerns the role of the general administration in maintaining continuity and stability in the governmental structure. A very ambitious plan of development, or too quick a pace of development and the accompanying radical change in the basic governmental structure or procedures, though spectacular at a particular time, may, by undermining the roots of stability, hinder rather than help future development. There is, thus, a need for a proper balance between change and continuity at any given moment of time.

Development Administration also poses other basic problems which can perhaps only be resolved by some deep empirical studies and organisational ingenuity. For instance, it is very essential in the developing societies to strengthen the merit system[35] in order to attract

[33]Ralph Braibanti, "Transitional Inducement of Administration Reforms: A Survey of Scope and Critique of Issues", in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 168.

[34]Riggs, *op. cit.*, p. 253. An example is also provided by Riggs how the values and motivations of civil servants can impede the effort to improve the competence of personnel. He poses the question: how could a trainee use his new skills in administrative technology and managerial principles, acquired through special training, if most of his actual working necessarily involves a struggle for influence in the bureaucratic arena rather than the implementation of policy? Fred W. Riggs, "Relearning an Old Lesson: The Political Context of Development Administration", *Public Administration Review*, March 1965, p. 77.

[35]Weidner explains that in the technical assistance agencies and in academic public administration circles, the objectives of a good personnel system are agreed upon: "a stable personnel system, 'an effective career service', 'a career service with merit as its base'. It is assumed that these objectives are compatible with national development aims. It is usually assumed that they are compatible with any and all legitimate governmental objectives, development or otherwise. These assumptions are false. The government of a less developed country may not want a stable personnel system. It may wish to terminate the current system and to keep a degree of

(*Continued on next page*)

and retain the confidence both of the public and the civil services. However, the need for speed, high quality standards, and responsiveness to the citizens' requirements call for delegation of adequate powers of control over personnel, and some choice in the selection of the heads of the executive agencies dealing with developmental programmes or projects. While national planning has tended to centralise the decision-making process, the implementation aspect simultaneously demands extension decentralisation of administrative and financial powers. Again, an administrative system structured hierarchically may be the only practical proposition in certain transitional societies with traditional values, in which the people, be they civil servants, or citizens, are apt to lose sense of responsibility and discipline if they have too free an access to their superiors. A hierarchical structure, however, is not conducive to the implementation of developmental programmes where team work is crucial for resolving numerous issues which crop up.

Any worthwhile theoretical concept or practice of Development Administration cannot obviously afford to ignore most of the problems which have been posed in the preceding paragraphs. Some of these problems call for sustained empirical study and research. They also present some food for thinking on basic issues. Development Administration is a complex matrix in which political, economic, social and administrative forces blend together for achieving results. It calls not only for new techniques and skills but also for new perspectives, insights and understanding. Both these aspects should find a place in the programmes of education, training and research of governmental bodies and voluntary organisations devoted to promoting the study of public administrat on. □

(*Continued from previous page*)
flexibility in a new one, to make sure that recruits are action-oriented in the preferred direction. The government may not want a career service; if it is development minded it certainly will not want a traditional career service or a modern one that does not facilitate development objectives. The government may not want a career service based on merit as defined by the visiting experts." Edward A. Weidner, *Technical Assistance in Public Administration Overseas : The Case of Development Administration*, Public Administration Service, Chicago, Illinois, 1964, pp. 179-80.

Development Administration: An Objection*

W. Wood

SO SIGNIFICANT for the well-being of the world is the present development era and so important for the success of this development are the processes which are involved in its administration, that the present concentration of support for the concept of development administration as a special, and peculiarly relevant, type of public administration is understandable.

The general argument is as follows: "Development then, can be defined as the dynamic change of a society from one state of being to another. Regardless of the objectives of the country or of the scope and character of plans and programmes an essential to development is administration... Broadly, development administration is concerned with achieving national development... The goals, values and strategies of change may vary but there always are generic processes through which agreement on goals is reached and plans, policies, programmes and projects (the four 'p's) are formulated and implemented... Development administration, therefore, is concerned primarily with the tasks and processes of formulating and implementing the four 'p's in respect to whatever mixture of goals and objectives may be politically determined."[1]

This is useful as a general concept. However, the argument has tended to become more rigid, and here is where the trouble arises. What is suggested is that : (*a*) there are two 'states of being' which can be contrasted, the second arising by 'dynamic change' (in development) from the former ; (*b*) development is identified with the development plan; (*c*) the development process calls for a type of public administration called 'development administration' ; and (*d*) its 'development administration' is distinct from the type of administration encountered in the former state and classed as 'traditional' or 'law and order

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, 1967, pp. 702-15.

[1]Donald C. Stone in the introduction to *Education for Development Administration*, Brussels, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1966.

revenue collecting'.[2]

The distinction would not be invidious if it were employed only in some introductory course of study of public administration just as 'Crusoe economics' was a convenient starting point in the examination of economic theory and practice. However, this is not the case for the distinction is made in that literature which may fairly be called 'manuals of procedure', and its significance has, therefore, more directly practical effect, for those who work in the public administration of developing countries (and those who train them) are being led to oversimplify the variety of administrative practice and to oversimplify the historical process of succession from the 'law and order' state to the 'development' state.

There are three, at the least, disadvantages which seem to flow from such a specialised concept of development administration. One is that those government servants who are not fortunate enough to be classed among the 'developers' may be written off as being unproductive in the development process, and may come to be regarded, indeed, as passengers, if not brakes, on the development machine, with a loss of esteem and morale which ultimately seem destined to defeat the whole purpose of public administration.

A second disadvantage is that study of the machinery required for development becomes concentrated on innovation and raw design, with consequent neglect of the possibility of adaptation of existing institutions; indeed, there is often an assumption that what exists in a 'law and order and revenue collecting' state is *ipso facto* unsuited to the development state.[3]

A third disadvantage is that the term 'development' as a description

[2]See, for example, George F. Gant's chapter in *Education for Development Administration*: "As countries progress, or desire to progress, from traditional agricultural societies to modern industrial societies, their governments and their administrative structure become larger and more complex. This change is more than a change in degree; it is a change in kind. Public administration in a complex society requires more than additional law and order.

It requires more and different kinds of agencies whose functions and relationships are quite different from those of police and regulation . . . . This dimension of public administration, as a matter of convenience, can be called "development administration". Nsilo Swai, in the same publication, as a Tanzania Minister with responsibilities for development planning, is more precise: "The administrative system must be transformed from a *laissez faire* and law-and-order type to a service and welfare type of administration."

[3]In an interesting review of the concept of development administration prepared for the Second Conference of Directors and Principals of Institutes of Public Administration in the Commonwealth, held at New Delhi in January, 1967, and subsequently published in the Jan-March 1967 issue of this Journal, Dr. J. N. Khosla, Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, makes the observation that "Some of the attitudes developed during the law and order state are equally relevant to the new responsibilities. This is a special area for research." The present article seeks to examine some of the implications.

of what is taking place in the real world, if insufficiently analysed. On the one hand, for example, it comes to be treated as something additional to what occurs in the alleged 'law and order and revenue collecting' state, while on the other hand it appears as having special relationship with independence and post-colonialism (so that, in effect, colonial government is identified with the 'law and order and revenue collecting' state)[4]. Again, 'development' is increasingly identified with that which is (or should be) in the development plan, while that which is in the development plan is (or should be) that which is arrived at by the application of economic analysis and projection.

We are oversimplifying, of course, but this may be excused, perhaps, if, as a result, we can provoke some rethinking of the rethinking that has stimulated the development administration philosophy. For all is not well with either development or development administration, neither being as easy to achieve as our first rethinking led us to believe. The Alliance for Progress programme, and the experience of Latin America, is a prime example of a development administration approach which has failed, so far, to translate plans into action. The paraphernalia is all there, development plans, modern budgeting techniques, O & M units, civil service classification schemes, and yet not only is development slow in coming, but these administrative innovations seem to be impotent to cure the ills of the existing system and indeed seem to make them worse, for instead of one method of administration proving itself to be inadequate for the needs of development there tend to be at least two, the old and the new, at loggerheads.

Therefore, perhaps, we should make sure that we know what we want development administration to do.

We have noted already some typical definitions of development administration. There are two main choices. The first is well expressed by Leslie Fainsod : "Development administration is a carrier of innovating values. As the term is commonly used, it embraces the array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernisation and industrialisation. Development administration ordinarily involves the establishment of machinery for planning economic growth and mobilising and allocating resources to expand national income. New administrative units, frequently called nation building departments, are set up to foster industrial development, manage new state economic enterprises, raise agricultural output, develop natural resources, improve the transportation and communication net work, reform the educational system, and achieve developmental government."[5]

[4]For example, *see* Everett Hagen's Comment: "Colonial governments performed largely caretaker and welfare function", Chapter VII of *Development Administration: Concept and Problems*, edited by Irving Swerdlow, Syracuse University Press, 1963.

[5]Irving Swerdlow, *op. cit.*, Chapter I.

Thus development administration is seen very largely as the new apparatus required in a situation where the government is involved in development planning and assuming a preponderant role in achieving the aims of the plan, development itself being closely allied to, but not necessarily restricted by, economic growth.

A second definition would be wider: "There are, or should be, many important, clearly recognisable differences between public administration in a poor country striving to attain gelf-generated economic growth and public administration in high income countries."[6] Again, the background is economic growth, but the concept of development administration is wider in that there is no specific emphasis on development planning structures and methods. Swerdlow goes on to say that "officials must make enough different decisions, adopt enough different policies, and engage in enough different activities to warrant the distinctive designation". The distinction is between what poor countries should do and what rich countries may do.

A third definition could be 'good public administration of developing countries' but here the danger is felt to be that the special problems of development and of developing (or under-developed, or poor) countries may not be sufficiently pinpointed, and the need for new structures and methods may be under-explained. In the end, however, this may be the most practical and realistic definition.

All these definitions, however, require us to understand what development is, and what development plans are.

Development, in the context of 'developing countries', is defined, generally, as an increase in social and economic betterment, involving pronounced government intervention and planning over wide areas of social and economic activity. This broadly is the basis on which governments prepare their development plans, the overall and specific targets and time-scale varying, in the best plans, according to local circumstances. On such a basis, development administration becomes either the overall machinery of government adapted to the process of social and economic development or, more selectively, it can be those activities of administration which are related directly to the development process.

Here is where, commonly, the distinction arises between the 'law and order and revenue collecting' state of affairs and the development state, or between the law and order and revenue collecting activities and the development activities.

Even if such a concept of development were sufficient to describe what is really happening in developing countries it would be necessary to guard against such clear-cut distinctions, as will be argued later. But what is happening to 'developing countries' is not just a process

[6]Irving Swerdlow, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

of trying to get on with promoting social and economic betterment. Nor can their development plans be so simply identified with social and economic betterment. For many of them—the majority perhaps—social-and-economic development programmes have coincided with political (and in this sense social) development programmes brought into being by independence. This, however, is not the same as saying that the social and economic programmes are a product of political independence, or that they are to be treated simply as taking place against a background of changed circumstances resulting from independence. Both of these views are held but they are, I suggest, over simplifications, which among other things operate against a realistic appreciation of the situation and a realistic assessment of the needs of development administration.

The coincidence of independence and development is well illustrated in the introduction to the Three Year Tanganyika Development Plan published in 1961. Tanganyika became independent in December 1961 and the Plan was, therefore, prepared "in a momentous period of Tanganyika's history—the period of transition from the colonial type of administration to independence. The rapid political development of the country, the realisation of new, far-reaching responsibilities, the new feeling of national awareness and its expression in many forms make a background to this plan. It is not surprising, therefore, that the requirements arising from the new political status of the country such as the need to establish a foreign service, to accelerate certain training programmes, and to build up security forces have had to be considered alongside the purely economic objective."[7]

These circumstances are recognised by responsible investigators but difficulty arises, and not only in connection with the concept of development administration, because it is not apparently accepted that: (*a*) 'development' was not a process brought into being solely by independence, and (*b*) that the factors mentioned in the quotation from the Tanganyika Plan are not so much a 'background' to development as a parallel and sometimes competing, sometimes causal activity. Whether competing or causal activities, however, their significance for the administration of the countries in question is such that it is unwise to treat development administration as being a matter only of 'new' structures and processes geared to the development plan, or to see a difference between "the law and order and revenue collection" activities and the 'development activity. Security forces may fall within the one, but security forces designed to acquire or defend national water resources, for example, affect the latter. Moreover, is it not necessary to ensure law and order before any 'development' can take place?

[7]Development Plan for Tanganyika 1961/62-1963/64, Dar-es-Salaam, Government of Tanganyika.

Further, it is not important to ensure that the administration of law and order (and revenue collection!) change to meet the needs of the developing nation? Law and order and revenue collection can no more be static than any other aspect of administration in a development era. Indeed, their improvement may be one of the most significant 'developments' which a developing country should plan. And quite apart from this consideration the general change in the situation which is brought about by independence (even where it does not call for special emphasis on the improvement of 'law and order and revenue collection' activity) creates, not so much the background for 'development', as the conditions; the administration relevant to the change is, therefore, relevant to the conditioning of development.

Much of this is recognised and accepted. It is less generally recognised or emphasised, that development does not begin with independence. It may begin before, and it may not begin afterwards. The over-identification of development with independence, therefore, creates dangers. We may accept that independence gives additional impetus to some aspect of development, creates additional opportunities in some cases, and creates additional demands (not least through the 'demonstration effect' which follows from participation in international and multi-lateral activity). Yet, however, much we recognise the legitimate, and indeed, historical needs, for the new political leaders, to identify themselves and their policies with development, nevertheless in the long run over-identification of independence with development may restrict development by forfeiting support, among the public, the government service, and even among some of the political leaders, though appearing to produce no significant change from what was achieved in colonical times. What developing country of this sort has not heard (and not only from the 'dispossessed') the complaint: "We were better off under the colonial power"?

If the motives of 'colonial' development may be suspected (and this article is not concerned with the motives), the fact should not be overlooked, indeed suppressed. This size of the development may have been inadequate in the then circumstances, or inadequate when viewed against present needs, but development implies growth and if development was of modest size in colonial times, where else was it more impressive and had the process not at least been begun?[8] Roads and railways were built in colonial times; they did not have to wait to be classified as 'infrastructure' in latter day development plans before beginning to serve the purposes of social and economic betterment.

[8]It should be made clear that the author is referring to British colonial development, not because he believes that the argument would not apply in the case of other colonial powers, but because he confines his argument to the processes of which he has experience.

If formal development planning became 'popular' (outside Russia, Germany and Italy) towards the end of the 1939-45 war, colonies did not, in most cases, have to wait until independence before they experienced development planning. The pre-planning began during the war, and the plans started to be published very soon after its end, and if they were not as thoroughgoing or imaginative as more modern conceptual thinking and research have made later plans, they realised, in the main, their targets and formed the foundation and the framework for later plans, including post-independence plans. Many of the 'development' structures and processes were in fact introduced in colonial times: they have had to be modified, sometimes radically, to suit the changed nature of political control and national aims, and availability of staff, subsequent to independence, but essentially 'independence' development has been built upon 'colonial' development and it has not had to be introduced to fill a vacuum.

Of course, such a 'defence' of colonialism is not intended to imply that the developing countries would be better developed if they were colonies of 'good' colonial powers. Nor is it intended as an interpretation of the relationship of development to independence in countries like India (though it should be noted that pre-planning of development in the sub-continent began before partition and was overtaken by the dislocation caused by the disturbances which followed partition) or those countries, particularly of East Asia, where independence came at a time when the disruption created by the war still persisted. Nor does it apply to the countries of Latin America where independence has preceded the development plan by over a hundred years.

Yet, so much does perhaps apply, namely, that independence is not, historically, the sole begetter of development; and the institutions and processes required for development do not have to be exclusively creations of newly independent countries but may in many cases survive, validly, from colonial days or be built upon what existed in colonial days. Also, to the extent that self-government and development are related, historically or causally, the administrative system must relate to both, and development administration should be as preoccupied with "law and order and revenue collecting" as with development planning.

If we have now given some consideration to the nature of development, as it is taking place, in relation to independence and "nation building", what other aspects of development should we consider?

We should next recognise that a development plan, aimed at promoting social and economic betterment, can hardly take shape in a pure form. Here is one defect of many attempts at planning, and particularly of central planning institutions. The models for development planning announce too readily that what goes into the plan will

be justified in terms of its contribution to social and economic better ment, the whole being an exercise primarily for the economist. (It is even necessary to emphasise that the subject-matter is social and economic development in order to combat the tendency to call it 'economic development'.) Thus the group of experts convened by the Secretary General to the United Nations in 1962 to make a study of the planning of economic development by different countries begins its report "The purpose of formulating a plan is to identify and define the policies best calculated to achieve general economic and social objectives. A plan provides guidelines for policy through the translation of these general objectives into physical targets and specific tasks for particular economic and social activities. Everywhere, in the formulation of plans, decisions have to be much about the pattern of revenue allocation which appears to be the most efficient in relation to general objectives. At the same time, the targets set for output and economic allocation have to be consistent with economic and technical possibilities and not place greater demand on the community than it has the capacity to finance."[9]

But in fact this is only part of the plan which a developing country finds itself drawing up (or if not drawing up, attempting to implement). Some 'development' cannot be determined on internal grounds. For example, a country has very little choice about the international class airport or airports which it has to provide. or indeed little choice, in practice, whether to have one or not. Yet in terms of social and economic priorities the country's resources may be such that the airport ought to have little priority and its standards may be quite out of relation to anything else which the country can afford to provide. But what country can effectively resist giving the airport a first priority? Again, a developing country has to take into account what foreign aid is available for, and mould its plan accordingly. This is not to suggest that aid. being made available for purposes which satisfy, in part at least, the criteria which are attractive to the donor, must necessarily be available for purposes which do not satisfy the recipient. It is simply that there is inelasticity in the ceriteria (and the processes) relating to the provision of aid, and a recipient country (and all developing countries are would-be recipients whatever their aversion to the conditions which make aid necessary or to the conditions of aid) must frame its priorities accordingly The distortion of the development plan—not of course necessarily a reprehensible distortion—takes various forms. In one African country a programme of feeder roads was prepared, to serve agricultural areas whose production had reached a stage where significant exports from the areas could be foreseen. The trunk route programme, in terms of the financial and human and equipment resources available,

[9] *Planning of Economic Development*, United Nations, 1963.

was to be restricted *pro tanto.* Aid became available, however, for further trunk routes, but not for feeder roads. It would require the greatest exercise of will power to refuse such aid, so the programme was re designed to allow the aid to be used for the purpose for which it was available, despite the inconvenience of foregoing some of the feeder road programme.

This is a minor example of the circumstances in which a development programme is prepared. We know that the model planning process requires us to formulate objectives and programmes, then to assess the resources available, and then to modify the plan accordingly. What is forgotten at times is that we are not free agents in respect of such modifications, but may be specifically controlled by the conditions of aid.

Other controls exist in respect of the planning process. One of these is allied to the foregoing circumstances. It may be best expressed by saying that a development plan must also be a shopping list. It must throw up items which aid organisations can 'buy', given the difficulty of obtaining 'budget' or 'across the board' assistance. We may not like this situation, but if we cannot dictate the situation we have to accept that the situation will dictate our plan, or at least the eventual programme. Planning in this sense goes beyond economics (and unfortunately it may go beyond economic common sense) but any planning officer or finance minister soon learns that when he shops for aid the plan is a shopping list, and if he has sense (and the finance minister generally has) he tries to ensure that the items shown on the shopping list are well marked and can be separately wrapped up.

A further condition attached to the development plan is that it has to have the nature of a diner's club card. The reasons are similar to those which apply to the need to observe aid criteria and the need to prepare the plan (in some respect at least) as a shopping list. Aid (including loans) is increasingly being administered, not only in respect of items, but also in respect of the whole package. To put it bluntly you have more chance of interesting X country or Y organisation in your agricultural cooperatives if you can show that the Z Survey Mission has approved the 'balance' of your plan and this can mean inclusion in the plan projects, or 'weighting' of projects, otherwise than in accordance with your initial programme. Also, to put it more bluntly, the ideological approach revealed by X item of your plan (or by the whole plan) may effect your chances of obtaining aid for Y item. Similarly, the plan itself does not in fact cover all your development, whether that which you propose or that which is proposed to you. The plan tends to be concentrated, in the first place, on those programmes which have a financial cost. This is not unreasonable because costs, despite their vagaries, are the only aspect which can generally be quantified.

Significant improvements in this respect can be made through the use of cost-benefit analysis and input-output techniques, but even so, it is the cost or input side which will receive most attention for being more predictable. The cost of your government financed tourist hotel (for all that it will rarely fail to exceed the estimate) becomes a concrete amount, met somehow from revenue or loans; your receipts from tourists are less sure. Your plan is, therefore, having to 'balance' items whose degree of predictability is different.

But more important than this (for you can arrive at sensible input-output assessment of projects) is the fact that some items of your development are not costed in this way. As a result, though they may receive mention in the plan, such mention tends to be incidental and the items in question are rarely programmed.

Reform of the administration, of taxation structure, of investment loans, of legislative procedures, of land, or profits regulation, and the like, are cases in point. Such predominantly 'administrative' development, cannot be worked out in the development plan in the same way that a road programme can be computed and it cannot be quantified in terms which have any claim to realism. As a result it tends to be treated as the 'background' or 'basis' for the development plan, though it may be a condition precedent or on integral part of the development.

We may look at this point from another angle, namely, the importance of relating development programmes to current programmes. There are many facets. One is that the development project will eventually have to be 'maintained' as a recurrent commitment; the more the development programme is presented, or administered, separately from the current (this applies particularly to the cost of personnel) the more care is needed. Another facet is to be seen in, say, measures adopted to stimulate new industry; these may be less significant to potential investors than the basic measures applicable to all industry; equally the effect on established industry of stimulus given to 'new' industry must be borne in mind. Again, the efficient operation of existing services (such as, posts, telephone, railways, water supply, refuse collecting, etc.) may control the feasibility of development projects. Development, in other words, is more than the development plan.

A development plan has other features which relate to the development process but which are not covered in 'model' concepts such as that already quoted. It has, for example, high political significance, and as a result its preparation, its content and its administration have political implications. Not only will it have to reflect the overall political philosophy of the government, but it may be expected to contain programmes and projects whose justification is mainly political rather than social or economic, and in any case the execution of some

part at least of it will have to take account of political pressures, national local and personal. Any development plan which assumes that "a good politician will not interfere with operations while engaging in his citizen-action and legislative roles"[10] is defective.

A development plan is also, or should be, a manual of development, in the sense that having set out the development which is proposed, it can, and should, be used as a check list against which progress can be noted. Too much should not be made of the point, but it is worth noting that participation in the development process (on the part of the public and of the civil servant) requires that the development plan should be capable of being understood by those who are being 'developed'. This goes beyond saying that it must be intelligible. It is desirable that the civil servant (and the public and press)—and not just the planners—should be able so to identify projects that realistic progress reports can be prepared and compared. Indeed, the good plan will, wherever possible, be an accounting document whose items can be referred directly to items in the annual budget, and the administration of the plan should include such reference.

With this examination of what development and the development plan are, it is time to consider once more the concept of development administration. Is there some type of administration which is specially related to promoting development as opposed to "maintaining law and order and revenue collecting"? Are there some administrative structures and processes which, because they relate so closely to the development process, require special consideration against, as it were, a background of 'general' or 'traditional' administration? Are the problems of developing countries confined to the problem of development? Is any such distinction valid?

Now we can agree at once that there are certain structures and processes which, as it were by definition, relate peculiarly to the development process, like development planning units, development banks and corporations, 'nation building' schemes and others. That they should have specific features and methods, and even in some respects a special 'language' is again not surprising. But is the special nature of a development planning unit more special than the special nature of the Commissioner of Police or the land surveyor or the tax collector? Irving Swerdlow suggests that "Perhaps the concept of development administration can best be conceived by comparing the tasks involved in administrating an urban renewal programme and in operating a water department in an American city. Assume that both are equally well administered in that quality of performance does not make the difference. The water department has the job of maintaing an adequate water supply and distribution system, planning for future

[10]Donald C. Stone, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

requirements and expansion, reading meters and making appropriate charges for use, training employees, dealing with the public, the budget director, the mayor, and the unions, purchasing and maintaining supplies and equipment and all the multifarious activities of operating a programme in a busy, changing city. Yet, though broad and universal, these activities are significantly different from those performed by the posts of the city government responsible for identifying the areas of the city to rebuild, acquiring the revenues and land, moving the people now living in the area, re-designing the uses of the area, contracting for rebuilding and construction of the new buildings, and supervising the construction and re-integration of the area into the life of the city."[11]

Yet he goes on "Described functionally, the differences do not appear significant. Objectives and budgets must be established, employees must be hired and trained, lines of authority established, and progress evaluations prepared—all these are functions common to any good system of public administration. Perhaps the difference lies in the degree of difficulty encountered in executing these functions, the amount of 'pioneering' required, and the difficulties of finding adequate procedures..."

Whether this be a valid distinction in respect of a developed country is open to question. In terms of administration I would prefer to consider the rehousing exercise in a 'developed' country as being little more than an additional but acceptable complication which a society capable of administering its water supply can take on without need of a special concept of development administration (though it might well need a special department in the municipality). In a 'developing' country I would say that the water supply and the rehousing might well both call for "development administration" because for one reason or another the one may impose no greater administrative strain than the other. Indeed, in a developing country the real 'pioneering' may be needed for remoulding the traditional and not for creating the new, for maintaining law and order and revenue collecting and not for realising the development plan; for it is easier to use the outside expert as operation in the 'new' activities than it is to use him in the traditional.

Therefore, though it is valid to consider some aspects of the administration of a developing country as having special characteristics because of their role in the development process, so widespread is the 'spread' of development (or the need for development) in most developing countries and so much do the development organisations depend upon the 'regular' administrative processes for their own fulfilment, that it is unrealistic to talk of development administration as a special type of administration except in the sense that in a country which

[11]Irving Swerdlow, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

is trying to develop, all administration has to be development administration. The administration of 'justice' must be kept up to date with the changing situation; if it is not, either it falls into contempt or it restricts progress. The role of the police has to change with changing requirements; the very quality of the policeman has to change, through recruitment and training, for a semi-literate policeman may be able to perform basic duties especially among an unsophisticated population, but he will not do when general literacy increases or when a sophisticated clientele 'develops' with the rest of the development process.[12] The tax collecting system has to change to take account of new economic activity and policy. The clerk—the often despised babu—is fundamental to the development process and his work has to be 'developed' to keep it relevant to changing needs. The general administrative practices of public administration—committees, files, delegation, training, *et al*—are basic ingredients of the administration of a development situation.

Developing countries encounter many situations. but only some of these situations are 'development plan' situations, and they must contrive to cope with all the situations with reasonable administrative efficiency and with appropriate administrative machinery. The situations can rarely be kept separate one from another—You may be engaged in agricultural development schemes and in famine control at one and the same time, and your administration has to be good enough to cope with each (or your people will not feel that they are enjoying 'development'). All public administration in a developing country should, therefore, be administration for development, though not necessarily all of it related directly to the development plan.

Finally, the greatest care should be taken to ensure that the 'new' structures and processes related to the development plan are integrated with the basic administrative structure and processes. The 'new' structures should not be designed to operate independently of the basic, nor to 'control' the basic,[13] but should rather be new controls operat

[12]We might go further with a recent French example, where the traffic police issue to tourists who offend against car parking restrictions: "Welcome to France—you may care to note our parking regulations" notices in lieu of the summonses issued to French offenders; this is a police contribution, however minor, to the development of tourism and it came about by not treating "law and order" as distinct from development.

[13]Not even, the author considers, to the extent suggested by A.H. Hanson in Chapter VIII 'Administration' of his book *The Process of Planning*, where he says "there is also a case for the (Planning) Commission's saying, as it does, to the administration. The plan that we have formulated has the following general adminis-

(*Continued on next page*)

ed by the basic. They should not be regarded as the preserve of a 'development administration' as opposed to the 'bureaucracy'; instead the 'bureaucracy' must be made capable of administering that measure of development which is realistic, as a further sector of public administration. □

(*Continued from previous page*)

trative implications: please do something about them!" The plan should be formulated to take account of the administrative implications, and, if anything, the administration should 'control' the planning. This may mean less planning but it may also mean more implementation.

Speed and Efficiency in Development Administration*

Tarlok Singh

THIS PAPER outlines suggestions for measures to be taken in the immediate future for speeding implementation, raising administrative efficiency and standards, securing better management in public enterprises and simplifying procedures relating to planning. It is common ground that the volume of administrative work and its complexity have increased to such an extent in recent years that the present machinery is severely strained. At many vital points there is inadequate follow-up. There is insufficient emphasis on individual responsibility and on the observance of time schedules. Delays in the disposal of the day-to-day business of government also occur frequently. Public enterprises, especially those engaged in industrial activities, present a growing number of difficult managerial problems. With increase in the tempo of development and in the range of government's responsibilities, these problems have assumed greater urgency and demand far-reaching changes in procedures and approach. It is being increasingly urged that as far as possible each department should have "self-contained powers" and that the need for constant reference to other departments should be minimised. This observation has relevance as much to the Planning Commission's own work as to other fields. Suggestions in this paper, which are based on a considerable volume of discussion, may be conveniently set out under the following heads:

I. Machinery within the government for improving administrative efficiency and standards;
II. Measures for speeding implementation;
III. Problems of public enterprises;
IV. Other administrative problems; and
V. Reduction of references to the Planning Commission.

MACHINERY WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT FOR IMPROVING ADMINISTRATIVE EFFICIENCY AND STANDARDS

Important questions of policy and approach in administration require

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the directions of the government from time to time. Within the administration there is need for machinery which will be charged with the duty of locating key administrative problems, arranging for their investigation by special study groups advising on policy decisions and, generally, suggesting measures for raising administrative efficiency and standards. In an administrative structure based on parliamentary institutions, the higher ranks of the public services have both the obligation and the opportunity of assisting the cabinet in providing direction and guidance on these lines. Accordingly, it is proposed that at the centre there should be a committee on administration consisting of the cabinet secretary and a few other senior officials who, *as a body*, are given a continuing responsibility for the tasks mentioned above and report to the cabinet periodically on action taken by ministries and authorities subordinate to them. In the states also, it is proposed that there should be similar committees on administration, including the chief secretary and a group of senior officials, who report to the chief minister and the state cabinet.

II

MEASURES FOR SPEEDING IMPLEMENTATION

Avoidance of delays within any organisation depends largely on the quality of the personnel at different levels, the extent to which they have been trained for the work entrusted to them, arrangements for supervision, distribution of work and delegation of responsibilities. Improvement of work along these lines has to be necessarily a process which goes forward purposefully all the time, and the responsibility for ensuring this devolves at the centre on the Organisation and Methods Division of the Cabinet Secretariat and in the states on the appropriate units which have now been set up in most states. Suggestions offered here may be broadly grouped as follows:

(*i*) Need to fix individual responsibility and to reduce 'consultation' with other authorities;
(*ii*) Procedures relating to financial control;
(*iii*) Administration of secretariat services; and
(*iv*) References to the Union Public Service Commission.

Two other problems to which attention is frequently drawn are not dealt within this paper. These are delays in the execution of civil works due to the concentration of responsibility in the Central Public Works Department and delays in procuring stores for which responsibility has been placed on the Directorate General of Supplies and Disposals in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply.

Need to Fix Individual Responsibility and Reduce 'Consultation' with other Authorities

It has been frequently pointed out that in the present administrative practice, there is insufficient stress on individual responsibility and that the requirements for consultation with or seeking of concurrences from other authorities are excessive. Both speedy disposal of business and effective delegation of powers on the part of ministries to their subordinate authorities are consequently impeded. It is essential that in each field responsibility for producing results should be cast more definitely both on the department or agency concerned and, within it, on the individuals entrusted with particular tasks, and that consultation with other authorities should be confined to broader matters. These processes are closely connected and are indispensable if delays are to be reduced and implementation speeded up.

The propositions stated above apply equally as between ministries and as between a ministry and the executive departments subordinate to it. It should be pointed out that in recent years ministries at the centre and secretariat departments in the states have tended to assume responsibility for an increasing amount of original work, thus reducing the initiative of the executive departments and offices and their ability to function without frequent reference to and consultation with the ministries. Both in the First and in the Second Plan it was stressed that the primary concern of ministries and secretariat departments should be with matters of policy, general supervision and enforcement of standards and that executive tasks should be left to be carried out by departments and authorities specially designated for the purpose. As there is general agreement in principle on this approach, there is need for a government directive that ministries should review their existing delegations of powers to the executive departments subordinate to them and provide for larger delegations of authority to them. Action taken should be followed up by the Organisation and Methods Division of the Cabinet Secretariat, which should also review the scheme of delegations within individual departments, as this is an essential aspect of the same process.

Procedures Relating to Financial Control

A scheme of delegation of financial powers to ministries and departments was introduced in August 1958. This envisaged that the major scrutiny of the Finance Ministry would be exercised before the framing of the budget and once this had been done administrative ministries would be free to spend sums provided in their budgets up to Rs. 50 lakhs in each case in consultation with their 'internal' financial advisers. Towards the end of 1959, some further delegations of financial powers were agreed to. It has been suggested that the scheme of delegations has not had a chance to work as intended mainly because ministries have not

found it possible as a rule to furnish adequate details of their schemes before the framing of the budget. On the other hand it has been urged that the new procedure has not materially reduced the need for consultation with the Finance Ministry specially in establishment matters, and that there is need for a much larger measure of delegation of powers to individual ministries in the use of funds provided in their budgets.

Control of expenditure presents different sets of problems in respect of : (*a*) projects and schemes, and (*b*) staff and salaries. As regards (*a*), the estimates prepared by ministries are frequently incomplete and defective mainly because enough time and personnel are not assigned for the planning phase. The most important requirements here are, firstly, to ensure that the ministries are adequately equipped in personnel for thorough planning of projects and schemes and, secondly, that the Ministry of Finance are also equipped for similar study of cost estimates. Provided there is careful planning and close association from the beginning between financial and technical experts, after funds have been budgeted, references to the Finance Ministry should be required only where substantial variations take place in the scope or in the costs of a project.

As regards staff and salaries, note has to be taken of the criticism that civil expenditure has risen considerably and that the cost of administration must be kept in check. At the same time, it is important that while adhering to agreed financial limits and to standards based on approved practice or, where necessary, on systematic work studies, departments should have much greater discretion in determining their staff structure and requirements. In this connection, the general policy of government regarding the levels of salaries of highly paid employees and the need to avoid competitive bidding by government departments for personnel in categories in which there is shortage should be kept in view. Further delegations in favour of ministries and project authorities in matters affecting staff and salaries should now be worked out.

Administration of Secretariat Services

Secretariat services are controlled by the Ministry of Home Affairs with the help of a board which also includes officials from some other minitries. The total strength of the secretariat services now runs to more than 20,000. It has been felt that with larger control over their secretariat personnel it should be possible to secure greater efficiency and better human relations within various administrative organisations. The principle of transfer of control over specified categories of secretariat personnel is acceptable to Home Ministry. There is general agreement that selection of officers of the rank of under secretary and above should be on a common basis for the government as a whole. The practical issue for consideration is whether the transfer of control to individual ministries should extend to the level of section officers or to that

of assistants. On a balance of considerations, it is considered that up to the level of section officer, administrative control should be entrusted to individual ministries, but certain safeguards regarding standards, promotion, reporting, etc., should be provided.

References to the Union Public Service Commission

Suggestions have been made that the Union Public Service Commission might limit itself to recruitment to the higher grades of the public service and, in respect of promotion and confirmation, it might leave decisions to ministries to a greater extent than at present. Matters of common interest to government and the Union Public Service Commission are kept under constant review and there does not appear to be need for any fundamental change in the scope of consultation with the UPSC. It is open to government to determine the posts for which recruitment should be undertaken through the UPSC. In disciplinary cases, consultation with the UPSC provides protection which is helpful to the morale of the public services. It should be considered whether references regarding promotion or confirmation within the same grade or class could be reduced. Two questions which deserve to be examined are: (1) whether the present arrangements for recruitments to technical and scientific posts need to be strengthened further, and (2) whether delays which occur at present in the disposal of references regarding vigilance cases could be further reduced.

Action-orientation in Administration

The changes in organisation and procedures suggested above will go some distance to remove causes of delay. They have to be supported, of course, by greater attention to the training of personnel, to supervision and to reporting and evaluation. All these measures, however, will be of little avail without a major effort to make the administration much more action-oriented than it is at present. With growth in the volume and range of work in the central government, despite considerable increase in staffs, the situation is far from satisfactory. Dr. Appleby's observations are still true:

> A general fault of the Indian administrative process exists in the practice of seeking agreement on everything by everybody before anything is done. Worse, the practice requires that these agreements cover not only general objectives, general allocations of funds, general personnel arrangements, and the fixing of general lines of responsibility, but also over specific applications of these general determinations in a continuing and heavy flow. The criticism in rather crude terms is that there is much too much sharing of responsibility for action before the fact, and too little review in

appropriate terms focusing on accomplishment after the fact.

There is no single remedy for this situation but, along with other measures, the four essential conditions which need to be stressed are :

Policy directives : Although policy and administration are closely connected, there is a clear distinction between them which is often overlooked. Administration is necessarily concerned with detail; what gives meaning and focus to it is policy. In every important field, the quality of execution can be greatly improved if the government's policy directives, while being based on a proper study of facts, are set out in bold and specific terms, so that they provide a definite perspective for positive and sustained implementation.

Responsibility for execution : Although they have their place in the scheme of administration, there is at present far too much resort to committees, groups, boards, etc., for carrying out the policies of government. What is important is that for the execution of any programme or project, specific responsibility should be placed on the agency concerned and, within it, on particular individuals. Within defined limits, each individual should be given full responsibility and, with it, the necessary measures of support and trust. If he fails in the discharge of his responsibility, he should be replaced. But so long as he holds an office, he should accept all its obligations and equally he should be placed in a position effectively to discharge them. With responsibility thus specified, it should be open to him to seek such advice and consultation as he may require, but these should not become the necessary ingredients of the executive process itself.

Test of performance : Success or failure must be judged rigorously by the test of results. This is possible only if in the planning stage the aims to be achieved, the tasks to be undertaken, the means to be employed, the obligations of the various agencies or individuals concerned, and the time-sequence in which different operations must flow and dovetail into one another are clearly stated in advance, and are subject to systematic review from stage to stage. In these aspects there are marked deficiencies in the existing procedures, which have to be removed urgently.

Personnel policies : The importance of appropriate personnel policies in securing results can scarcely be exaggerated. Perhaps the most crucial consideration is that for all vital jobs, not only should the responsible officials be selected with the utmost care and suitably trained, but they should remain long enough to grow to the full measure of their responsibility and produce the results expected of the assignment. In any major enterprise a period of less than five to ten years is rarely sufficient for producing large results. Frequently, in service transfers, the factors which are taken into consideration are not of the first importance in

terms of public interest or the success of the undertaking. Such transfers tend to injure both continuity of operations and the morale of organisations whose tasks are nearly always of a difficult and pioneering character.

It is unfortunately true that there is a great deal of slowness, even retardation, built into the existing administrative structure, and there is urgent need for procedures which will make for radical re-orientation in attitudes both at the level of policy and of execution. This central problem must now be attacked from many sides and continuously if the implementation of plans is to be speeded up in any marked degree.

III

PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES

The critical role of public enterprises, in the planned development of the country is being rightly stressed. The future rate of growth will be determined to an overwhelming degree by the efficiency of the public sector and by the contribution which public enterprises make to domestic savings. Problems relating to the organisation and management of public enterprises have been reviewed extensively in reports by the Estimates Committee, studies by high-level experts, a special report on Parliamentary Supervision over State Undertakings, and an international seminar on management of public industrial enterprises organised jointly by the Governments of India and the United Nations in December 1959. There is also considerable experience within the country which can be drawn upon and which it would now be desirable to collate and consolidate.

It has been recently agreed that there should be a separate committee of Parliament for State Undertakings which, in respect of state undertakings brought within its purview, would replace the Public Accounts Committee and the Estimates Committee. In working out the functions and powers of the proposed committee, the principle has been laid down that state undertakings should have more autonomy and greater freedom from detailed control. The powers of boards of state undertakings are to be enlarged and there is to be provision for further delegations to chairmen and general managers. These problems as well as problems connected with the financing and internal administration of public enterprises fall outside the purview of this paper. Here it is proposed to refer only to those aspects of the subject which have a bearing at the governmental level on the speed and efficiency of implementation in respect of public enterprises.

One of the main difficulties which has been observed is that frequently when the government has to approve a project, say, for inclusion

in a five year plan, it has not been worked out fully, nor is it presented in any adequate form. For irrigation and power projects, there has been in existence for several years within the Planning Commission an Advisory Committee which is assisted in its technical work by the Central Water and Power Commission. All projects costing more than Rs. one crore are considered by it before there execution is taken in hand. The items in respect of which project information should be supplied by state governments have been indicated in detail and every effort is made to secure the necessary reports in time. Industrial and mineral development projects present more varied and complex problems. A check list of items included in the cost estimates of projects was circulated to the central ministries concerned early in March 1960, but ministries found it difficult to provide the minimum data required. The consequence is that for a large proportion of projects included in the Third Five Year Plan, the information available is still far from satisfactory. This deficiency arises in part from lack of the requisite technical personnel, but equally it is due to the absence of arrangements, for preparation of projects well in advance of the time for their consideration and approval by government. It is suggested that while the preparation of projects included in the Third Plan must go forward with the utmost speed, the ministries concerned with industrial projects should take in hand forthwith project studies relating to the Fourth Five Year Plan, so as to complete these as far as possible in the course of the next three years. The question is essentially one of technical and administrative preparation on the part of these ministries, there should be no great difficulty in making available the funds needed.

The ministries concerned with industrial and mineral development projects should have strong technical planning cells. These should be maintained as permanent nuclei to be supplemented by additional *ad hoc* personnel according to requirements. It is not, of course, necessary that the preparation of every new project should be taken up by a technical cell located in a ministry, for, progressively, existing enterprises should be in a position to undertake this task successfully within their own fields. It is, therefore, suggested that steps should be taken to strengthen and, where necessary, to set up suitable design and research units within major state undertakings. This is already being done to an extent, but there is need for greater emphasis as well as effort on a larger scale. If the preparation of projects becomes a primary responsibility, wherever feasible, of existing enterprises, the planning cells within the ministries can devote themselves to the broader technical and economic aspects of the project, defining the stages of execution and ensuring that the various related steps for which other authorities are responsible are also precisely coordinated.

A weakness which still persists is the inadequacy of existing arrange-

ments within the Ministry of Finance for the examination of cost estimates. The Ministry of Finance have already a 'projects coordination cell'. This cell needs to be strengthened. Its responsibility should extend, not only to a scrutiny of cost estimates and the broader economic aspects of projects but also to the presentation of a report each year on the financial and economic aspects of state industrial undertakings as a whole. The absence of such a review at present leaves an important lacuna which needs to be filled.

Apart from technical personnel employed in state industrial undertakings and within ministries, the ministries also need to draw upon the advice and assistance of engineers, technologists, economists and financial experts outside the service of government. It would be helpful for ministries to arrange for technical advisers for different groups of industries, so that the technical knowledge and experience within the country, which are, of course, growing rapidly, can be readily utilised by government in developing public sector. The example of the advisory committee for irrigation and power projects suggests that such association with leading technical and other experts will yield good results and at small cost.

In the Draft Outline of the Third Plan, it was suggested that in major projects or groups of allied projects under the same overall management, there should be special units assisting the management in keeping down costs, raising productivity, setting norms and checking performance, so that the physical assets created are commensurate with the original estimates and designs, time-schedules are maintained, and the responsible authorities are in a position to enforce efficiency, economy and integrity. Speaking on the Third Plan in the Lok Sabha in August 1960, the Prime Minister also stressed the need for evaluation of performance in major projects. It is suggested that the ministries concerned with large industrial and other projects should review the existing arrangements in these projects and should provide for suitable units for evaluation and review of progress, which will function independently of day-to-day operations, but under the control of the top management authorities. In giving effect to this proposal, the personnel should be chosen with care and the sense of responsibility of those in the direct line of supervision should not be interfered with.

In view of the strategic importance of public enterprises the Planning Commission has to keep in much closer touch with their working and problems than in the past and be in a position to offer its independent advice on large issues whenever necessary.

IV

OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Administration in the States

Efficiency of administration on the part of the central government is closely bound up with efficiency in the states and *vice versa*. Problems of administrative efficiency, standards and morale have, therefore, to be approached from now on as a matter of common concern between the centre and the states. A large part of the implementation of the plan rests with the states. In the execution of the central government's projects also, state administrations are involved at many points. Both the centre and the states should keep themselves informed regarding measures taken to strengthen administration and make effective arrangements for exchange of information and experience in matters like personnel, training methods, raising standards, etc.

At the instance of the Planning Commission two aspects of administration in the states are at present being studied with a view to making proposals for the Third Plan. The first relates to administrative personnel at different levels in the states and involves a review of requirements for the Third Plan and of the existing arrangements for training and supervision and other aspects on which the quality of administrative personnel depends to a large extent. The second aspect concerns district administration where a series of new and difficult problems are now cropping up as a result of the introduction of democratic institutions at district and block levels. The National Development Council has agreed that steps should be taken along these lines, but it is important that the effective implementation of the plan and satisfactory standards of administration should be ensured at each point within the district structure and, in particular, the agricultural production programmes should be carried out successfully.

Relations with the Public

One of the main aims in administration must be to ensure right public relations, cooperation from and with the public, and a sense of confidence on the part of citizens generally that where the administration comes into contact with them it can be relied upon to function with efficiency and integrity and without fear or favour. In this respect, it is true that an atmosphere of complaint and criticism exists, often vague perhaps, but real enough to demand serious attention jointly on the part of the central as well as the state governments. Many of the major fields of administrative activity which involve public relations lie in the province of state and local administration. Because of the complexity of the subject and the difficulty of proposing precise remedies, there has not been

enough practical effort to bring about a marked change in public opinion in relation to the administration.

If delays could be reduced, accurate information regarding policies and procedures made available and due courtesy shown to citizens by officials at all levels (including promptitude in correspondence), there would doubtless be a change for the better. It would also be worthwhile to make a systematic effort to analyse public attitudes with a view to identifying and removing some of the causes of discontent and adverse public feeling. It is suggested that this task might be entrusted to the Indian Institute of Public Administration and its regional branches and that through this project they should be assisted in undertaking a series of limited but specific studies in collaboration with the local authorities, the object in each case being to analyse problems with a view to finding practical solutions for them and then watching how these work. It is possible that in respect of a number of complaints, which are frequently made by the public, through such a scientific approach to the study of public opinion, measures and procedures capable of producing a favourable response could be evolved. If the general public sensed positive improvement even in a few significant directions and in a few selected areas, this might help turn public thinking into constructive channels and thus suggest ways of bringing about improvements in other directions as well. In a democracy the problems which agitate the public mind can only be solved through cooperation between official agencies, local authorities and citizens based on a sense of common purpose and responsibility for the welfare of the community as a whole.

V

REDUCTION OF REFERENCES TO THE PLANNING COMMISSION

References to the Planning Commission relate broadly to:

(*a*) inclusion of new schemes in the Five Year Plan,
(*b*) revision of cost estimates and outlays for schemes included in the Plan,
(*c*) provision of funds and the formulation of annual plans,
(*d*) central assistance included in the plans of states and for centrally sponsored schemes,
(*e*) progress reports, and
(*f*) general questions of policy and procedure.

Inclusion of New Schemes

Schemes to be included in a five year plan fall broadly into two groups, those concerning the central ministries alone, and those under-

taken in the states. The inclusion of the schemes of the central ministries in the plan requires agreement between the administrative ministry, the Ministry of Finance and the Planning Commission Under the present procedure the Planning Commission's concurrence is required, firstly in principle and, secondly, for securing an appropriate allocation within the Plan. The acceptance of a scheme and determination of the outlay required are connected processes in the case of projects which involve considerable expenditure. The Planning Commission has indicated to the ministries that in the case of new projects it will be guided by the examination of cost estimates undertaken by the Ministry of Finance. In respect of central schemes, there has to be greater emphasis than in the past on thorough examination of estimates of cost by the Ministry of Finance for the larger projects accompanied by an enlargement of discretion on the part of the administrative ministries in formulating detailed schemes within broadly agreed heads and financial allocations.

Schemes undertaken by the states fall into two groups—those whose entire cost is shown in the plans of states and those which are 'sponsored' by the central ministries for which the provision for assistance is made within their budgets, while the plans of states indicate only their contributions. The acceptance of new schemes in either category takes place, in the main, at the time of the formulation of the five year plan, in which process state representatives, the ministries and the Planning Commission jointly participate.

The question of technical examination of projects to be undertaken in the states arises where large expenditures are involved, notably in the fields of irrigation and power and for large-scale industries. Industrial projects from the states are yet few in number. In respect of irrigation and power projects, it has been agreed that detailed examination by the Central Water and Power Commission and the Advisory Committee for Irrigation and Power should not be undertaken in respect of schemes costing Rs. one crore or less. For such schemes it is sufficient if a prescribed proforma is completed by the states with a view to providing the essential information. Once, a scheme costing up to Rs. one crore has been included, the state government can proceed with the execution according to its plan except where inter-state considerations may be involved. The principle that schemes costing Rs. one crore or less prepared by state government should not be subject to technical examination by the central ministries is also being extended to housing programmes.

Revision of Cost Estimates and Outlays

It is desirable that cases of substantial revision in cost estimates of projects entailing large expenditures or where the scope of a project is

altered should be considered by the Planning Commission on the advice of the Ministry of Finance before changes are accepted in the plan. In the past, large variations in estimates have taken place to the detriment of the plan. There should, however, be no objection to variation in cost estimates up to 10 per cent or Rs one crore, whichever is less, being approved by the ministries without reference to the Planning Commission. The same procedure could be adopted by the states in respect of irrigation and power projects which are now referred to the Advisory Committee on Irrigation and Power Projects.

Provision of Funds and Formulation of Annual Plans

The annual plans of ministries are drawn up largely as a by-product of the preparation of the capital budget for which the Ministry of Finance are responsible. In the case of states, the annual plans are formulated jointly by the representatives of the states and the ministries working in collaboration with the Planning Commission. The Planning Commission indicates overall outlays and central assistance for states in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. The existing procedures involve the visit to Delhi of fairly large numbers of officials from states. The preparation of the annual plans for 1961-62 was integrated with the discussions on proposals for the Third Plan and no separate meetings were arranged. It is proposed that in future discussions regarding annual plans should be confined to the more important projects and programmes, and before state governments draw up their proposals, a fair indication of the likely outlays and central assistance should be given to them in terms of the magnitudes agreed under the five year plan. In fields not covered by specific discussions, the states could report the decisions taken by them. Where they consider necessary, the ministries could confer informally with individual states well in advance of the time for drawing up annual plans.

Central Assistance

Considerable simplification of procedure for central assistance was undertaken in May 1958. This was followed by further liberalisation in May 1959. For the Third Plan, a number of improvements are being undertaken in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and the administrative ministries, the guiding principles being the following:

(*a*) The list of centrally sponsored schemes is being "drastically reduced. Only selected schemes will be accepted as 'centrally sponsored" as:

(*i*) relate to demonstrations, pilot projects, surveys and research,
(*ii*) have a regional or inter-state character,

(*iii*) require lump sum provisions to be made until these can be broken down territorially, or

(*iv*) are placed in this group for reasons of overall significance from an all-India angle.

(*b*) A large variety of central assistance patterns have grown up in recent years. It is proposed to retain patterns of assistance for a limited number of schemes only. For the rest, central assistance by way of loans and grants will be intimated under different heads of development. The total amount of assistance due to a state each year is worked out with reference to the plan to be carried out and the assessment of resources which the state can provide. The distribution of schemes within each head into 'groups' which has been in force since 1958 is being discontinued. This will enable state governments, over a large field, to make such adjustments as they consider necessary within a head of development. However, in the interest of implementation, adjustments between heads of development and diversions of funds provided for important projects should not take place without further consultation.

(*c*) The All-India Boards present some special problems. It was agreed in May 1958 that only new schemes should be referred to them by states for technical scrutiny. Recent instructions have rendered this unnecessary in respect of most of the All-India Boards. The programmes of the Khadi and Village Industries Commission, though undertaken in the states through state boards, are at present shown as central schemes. The Khadi and Village Industries Commission, however, constitutes a somewhat distinct category.

Progress Reports

It is proposed that progress reports on projects and programmes undertaken in the states should be received at a single point within the Government of India, namely, the ministry concerned, and copies should be made available for the use of the Planning Commission. To the extent additional information is required by the Planning Commission, this will be provided for in forms drawn up by the ministries in co-operation with the Commission.

General Issues of Policy and Procedure

These arise from time to time and in the interest of planning and coordination, it is considered that there is advantage in the Planning Commission having an opportunity to offer its comments and sugges-

tions before decisions are reached. Frequently consideration by the Planning Commission is only a preliminary stage leading to consideration by the Cabinet. □

Notes Towards a Theory of Indicators of Development*

Kamal Nayan Kabra

BOTH IN the theory and application of development economics, an exercise undertaken on a fairly extensive scale concerns the setting up of various sets of indicators of development. In the early days of the ascendence of modern development economics, many of the variants of the concept of national income were widely and unquestioningly used to indicate the level of development.[1] One thing which was realised rather early was to deflate the national income figure by the size of population. Hence per capita income soon won the race as the most widely used index of the level of development of an economy.[2] Further to it, when attention shifted to measuring the level of development of various regions and/or classes or groups of people in a country, the same index, *viz.*, per capita income, was considered good enough for the purpose.

Such an index of development was widely used in development economics in differentiating the levels of development at international, inter-regional and, to an extent, inter-group levels. Such insights were used as aids in theorising. However, as the guidance of the practice of planning and state intervention for development became the main concern of development economics, index of development (*e.g.*, per capita income) became a tool in the hands of practising economists and policy-makers for arriving at specific policy formulations. To take one example, the development of an economy was generally related to the level of investment and capital formation.[3] For accelerating the rate of

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIII, No. 3, 1977, pp. 768-780.

[1]Kuznets, S., *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, Free Press of Glencoe, 1922, treats development in terms of sustained and substantial increase in national income.

[2]Jacob Viner discusses various criteria, including per capita income of underdevelopment, "The Economics of Underdevelopment", reproduced in *Economics of Underdevelopment* (ed.) A. Singh, S.P. and Agarwala, A.N., London, Oxford University Press, 1958. Also chapter two on Per Capita Output as an Index of Development of Harvey Leibenstein's *Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth*, John Wiley, New York, 1960.

[3]Many studies and theories on the economics of development relate development and capital accumulation. The role of capital formation as a necessary condition

(*Continued on next page*)

growth of an economy it was thought essential to successively push up the rate of savings and capital formation.[4] The capacity to save, therefore, became an important development variable. Now, on the basis of the index of per capita income, attempts were made to determine the capacity to save of an underdeveloped economy. A case was made that since the average level of income was low, the underdeveloped countries had a weak average propensity to save.[5] The low observed ratio of savings to GNP was given as an evidence confirming the inference about the low average propensity to save in the less developed countries. On this basis, it was argued that policy of resource mobilisation in the less developed countries had mainly to rely upon pushing up the marginal rate of savings. Apart from making these countries' development effort dependent on the prevailing low rate of saving, and hence establishing the need for resource transfers from the more developed countries to supplement their development efforts, this proposition ruled out the possibility of any quick and substantial pushing up of the rate of savings and capital formation in the less developed countries. Thus a low rate of growth profile was generated on the basis of the use of low per capita income as an index of development.

It can be seen that low rate of savings owes to many factors. True, people with low incomes will find their capacity to save constrained. But, given the greatly skewed distribution of income, even the microscopic minority controlling the bulk of income, may not find savings an attractive proposition.[6] A number of structural, technological, resource-endowment related and institutional factors account for their low rate of savings. Hence, even in the short-run, initiation of policies dealing with these bottlenecks may bring about an appreciable increase in the rate of savings. Under such a kind of policy frame, these countries need not be so pathetically dependent on financial resource transfers from the

(*Continued from previous page*)
of development is always recognised. See, Cairncross, A.K., *Factors in Economic Development*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1962. Also his, *Home and Foreign Investment: Studies in Capital Accumulation*, Cambridge University Press, 1953.

[4]This was one of the important policies advanced in Nurkse, R., *Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. Various models of growth deal with the process of capital formation. See for an extensive survey F.H. Hahn and R.C.O. Matthews, "The Theory of Economic Growth", *Economic Journal*, Dec. 1984, pp. 779-902.

[5]See, R. Nurkse, *op. cit.* This argument can also be found in the *First Five Year Plan*, Government of India, Planning Commission.

[6]"Savings propensities are after all very low precisely in countries with highly unequal distribution; the industrial countries with less concentration of income have, by contrast, much higher savings propensities. Savings are of course also affected by the absolute level of income, but the explanation must also lie in the high consumption levels of the rich, designed to maintain the standards so important in an unequal society." Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, December, 1969, pp. 2-6.

developed countries as to overlook the longrun real costs entailed by such dependence.[7] Hence breaking away from the narrow per capita income index would have opened many policy avenues for accelerated development. Moreover, such a development strategy would have acted upon many dimensions of development other than per capita income, which in the reality of many countries were lost sight of.

Though at the theoretical level, per capita income and its rate of growth were rejected as indicators of development and exercises were mounted for evolving a more realistic, meaningful and useful set of indices,[8] both at popular level and in the practice of development policy and planning, the imperceptible influence of inherited thought-patterns based on per capita income continued.[9] This means that a good deal of work done in the field of evolving multiple indicators of development remains, largely, an esoteric, academic exercise without much success in influencing practical policy.

In the present paper we intend to review some of the exercises done for evolving such complex indicators. In order to place these exercises in a perspective, we first discuss the likely use of indicators. Then we go on to have a brief look at the shortcomings which made for descarding single indicators derived from some categories of aggregate national product. This critical review, it is hoped, will point out the pitfalls which any scheme of indicators should avoid. From the uses to which such indicators are put we can derive the properties which any chosen indices should possess. In the light of this discussion, we can show how and why many of the exercises at building up a multiple system of indicators did not achieve much success. We conclude by presenting some considerations which should be kept in view in undertaking such exercises.

[7]Among thorough analyses of foreign economic assistance to developing countries, mention may be made of Mende, Tibor, *From Aid to Re-colonization: Lessons of a Failure*, Pantheon Books, New York, 1973; Hart, J., *Aid and Liberation: A Socialist Study of Aid Policies*. Victor Gollancz, London, 1973.

[8]See, D. Usher, *The Price Mechanism and the Meaning of National Income Statistics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967.

Also U.N. Research Institute for Social Development, *Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development*, Geneva, 1970. It attempts to prepare an index of development on the basis of a representative average of a large number of variables and gives a ranking of 58 countries both on the basis of the development index and per capita GNP. A development index of this kind, however, cannot be interpreted and understood, unless one knows in advance the variables it is based on. An interesting discussion on these issues can be found in Morgan, Theodore, *Economic Development: Concept and Strategy*, Chap. 6. Harper and Row, New Yark, 1975.

[9]Majority of countries still publish their GNP rate of growth annually and it is used in public debates, policy conclaves and academic discussions as indicating the development performance.

INDICATORS FOR MANY ENDS

The diverse purposes for which the indicators of development are set up are rarely explicated. In the absence of explicit statement of the intended uses, it is likely that a comparison is attempted of different sets of indicators evolved for disparate purposes. Since the different sets of indicators are meant for different purposes, such comparisons turn out to be unnecessarily confusing and disfunctional. A clear enunciation of the objectives for which such indicators are arrived at also provides the criteria on the basis of which choices can be made between alternative indicators.

It may not be impossible to postulate that an exercise to set up indicators of deve lopment may be undertaken for its own sake. However, it should be equally difficult to justify why the 'leads' given by such subjective pursuits should be followed by any social discipline. Another preliminary consideration worth emphasising at the outset is that there is no directly observable phenomenon as development as such except the characterisation of some extant or contemplated social state as manifesting constituting or representing development.[10] Morever, since such a characterisation of a specific state as representing development reflects specific social and/or individual value-judgements about desirable states of society, the exercises concerning indicators of development are prone to acquire some emotive overtones.[11]

However, it is possible to adopt an objective approach towards development if the laws of evolution of society are used to categorise various stages of society's onward march.[12] In such an exercise, a transition to a higher stage represents development and the maturing of a particular stage in such a way as to contribute to the ultimate transition to a

[10]For example, lately a widely well received definition of development, looked at as a generic process, is the one advanced by Dudley Seers, "Development means creating conditions for the realization of human potential," "What are We Trying to Measure?", *Journal of Development Studies*, April 1972, p. 21. It can be seen that such a phenomenon is *not* directly observable, except by some chosen indicators.

[11]"Development is inevitably a normative term and we must ask ourselves what are the necessary conditions for a universally acceptable aim—the realization of the potential of human development," Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development", *International Development Review*, December, 1969, pp. 2-6. In the present formulation, the universally acceptable aim has been couched in such general terms that for one, it may mean different things to different people, and then, there is likely to be wide divergence of views on the conditions for attaining it.

[12]There are many theories attempting to explain the various stages of development of human societies. See, for a quick survey, B. Higgins, *Economic Development: Principles, Problems and Policies*, N.W. Norton, New York, 1959. Also, Rostow, W.W., *The Process of Economic Growth*, N.W. Norton, New York, 1952. For the theory of development of Karl Marx, apart from the Marxist classics, see Sweezy, P., *Theory of Capitalist Development*, Dobson, London, 1946.

higher (next) stage would also be taken to represent 'development'.[13] The indicators devised to represent such an objectively perceived phenomenon of development can be expected to be free of emotive overtones More on this later in the concluding parts

Indicators of development. then are means for comparing different states of economies internationlly and inter-temporally.[14] They can also be used for placing on the development scale various regions and/or groups or sub-groups of people. Such comparisons are useful both for helping various processes of conceptualisation and theorising as well as for practical planning and policy-formulation purposes. Setting up of indicators of development is a useful device for sifting and systematically organising empirical data about the various facets of socio-economic systems. This exercise enables one to identify several development factors, their-relationships and ranking in terms of their contribution to development both positively and negatively. Since the indicators can be given weights or, it is possible to 'discover' the weights attaching to them this exercise enables a kind of measurement of the level and extent of development, an exercise obviously invaluable for the theorists and practical promoters of development. In fact, there is such a great deal of feedback between these two closely interlinked uses that it is difficult to say at what point the theorists cease to make use of the insights distilled from the indicators of development and at what point the practitioners take over from them. More so because the exercise of evolving suitable indicators itself is one in which the theorists and the practical users will have to join hands in a kind of constant feedback dialogue.

In a more specific sense, the theoreticians need indicators in order to arrange empirical facts in a meaningful manner, to characterise different states and situations in a comparable manner, to uncover the relative roles of various development factors in specific configurations, to make testable generalisation about these various states of development spanning inter-group, inter-spatial, inter-temporal and inter-systemic situations. In brief, some explicit or implicit use of indicators of development lies behind all development theories irrespective of their methodologies. Indicators enable one to go about uncovering the aetiology of development for specific periods, places and peoples.

[13]As Hobsbawm, E. says, "For Marx, progress is something objectively defined, and at the same time pointing to what is desirable. The strength of the Marxist belief in the triumph of the free development of all men depends not on the strength of Marx's hope for it, but on the assumed correctness of the analysis that this is needed where historical development eventually leads mankind." Introduction to Marx, K., *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, London, 1964, p. 12.

[14]For a conventional analysis of comparing growth rates, analysing the growth rates given by UNO, OECD, ILO and the Pearson Commission, see, Kuznets, S., "Problems in Comparing Growth Rates for Developed and Less Developed Countries", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, January 1972, pp. 185-209.

For the planners and policy formulators, indicators are a handy tool for many ends. They help in the design of specific strategies of development, in allocations decisions at the overall level as well as for *inter se* allocative decisions. These decisions are facilitated insofar as they relate first to comparative levels of development and, secondly, to the relative importance of various development factors. A very detailed multiple set of indicators can also be used in deciding the specific form of investments, *i.e.*, in matters relating to project choices.[15]

In other words, indicators may be either policy variables (like overall rate of labour participation, productivity per man, sectoral composition of labour force, earnings in various occupations, rate of tax subsidy payment per person, extent of monetisation, rate of savings and capital formation, etc.), or instruments variables (like rate of investment, its sectoral and regional composition, availability of various infrastructure services, level of skills, etc.) or objectives or performance variables (like average level of living, extent of full employment, degree of skewedness in the distribution of income and productive assets, extent and form of participation by people in vital decision-making processes, etc.). It should be apparent from the example we have given of the various kinds of variables that there is a fairly significant degree of overlap between the policy, instruments and objectives or performance variables. To this list of variables may be added variables like various indices of resource endowment (natural, human, technical, renewable and non-renewable resources), and institutional rigidities and/or malleability which indicate the long-run growth potential as well as provide the background in which the current specific indicators of development may be evaluated. For example, in comparing overall agricultural productivity in two different regions, account has to be taken of the geo-physical conditions.

One final proposition about the nature of various variables which may be chosen to indicate the level of development. A particular scheme of indicators is much more than a simple summation of its constituent parts, because it must be taken as an organically interconnected set viewed in a historical perspective.[16] This is a crucial consideration because it links a scheme of indicators with a theory of development. In

[15]Even when indicators are used to help the choice of specific projects of development, it has to be realised that detailed projects' proposals will have to be prepared. It means that the work behind composite indicators based on multiple variables will supplement and not substitute preparation of detailed feasibility reports and project designs.

[16]In an interesting example showing that the total system is much more than the sum total of the infinitesimal, constituent parts, J. Schumpeter (*The Theory of Economic Development*, OUP, New York, 1961; p. 64, F.N.) says "Add successively as many mail coaches as you please, you will never get a railway thereby". It implies that small, marginal elements do help, though will lead to sustained process of development only if overall, systemic and structural preconditions are taken care of

the absence of such a grounding of the scheme of indicators into a well articulated theory of development, one ends up with various eclectic groupings of factors as indicators, where either gross question-begging empiricism, or sterile statistical methodological manipulations, or, most often, a combination of the two, rule the roost.[17] To move out of such controversies generating more heat than light, it is imperative to base one's scheme of indicators clearly and explicitly on a theory of development. Let it be understood that a scheme of indicators cannot be a substitute for a theory of development; it is only a directly usable adjunct to such a theory.

PER CAPITA INCOME—THE SINGLE INDICATOR

The popularity, both in theory and in application, which per capita national income has enjoyed as a single indicator of development can be appreciated if it is recognised that it is based on a very popular theory of develepment which treated investment capital accumulation in various forms as the kingpin of development.[18] In such a theory of development production or national income is treated as synonymous with the capacity of a system to satisfy the wants of the individuals constituting it. Moreover, based on a production function approach, it is hypothesised that savings and capital formation are the crucial missing elements which can be held responsible for the low levels of national income in the less developed countries. The less developed countries (the ex-colonial third world countries) are identified on the basis of low national and per capita income. Given low national income and the consequent low standard of living, low capital formation, etc., the less developed countries are classified into two groups. On the one hand, there are the older colonial countries, where the low development syndrome has led to massive growth of population, depressing per capital incomes. On the other hand, there are the newer, as yet not fully opened economies where though population density is not very high, the level of economic activities is very low, yielding low per capita incomes.

It is well-known that this is the neo-classical theory of development, which, in the process of extension of Keynesian macro economics, on the one hand, led to the growth of mathematical models of development (based on manipulation, extension and intensive exploration of the relationship between capital and income at various levels of aggregation) and, on the other hand, through the development of the theory of vicious

[17]Young, O.R. makes a plea against the "collection of empirical materials as an end in itself and without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria of selection". Prof. Russett, "Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor", *World Politics*, April 1969, pp. 489-90.

[18]For references see, Notes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

circle of poverty branched off into various theories of balanced and unbalanced growth.[19] A massive volume of literature developed which, despite its ostensibly diverse preoccupations, basically sprang from the neo-classical theory of development. In the ultimate analysis, the basic starting point of these theories was to identify less developed countries or regions on the basis of per capita income and also to pin down the phenomenon of underdevelopment to low per capita incomes arising from sustained structural inability to push up the rate of savings and capital accumulation.

There was, thus, a perfect co-mingling of the aetiology of underdevelopment and the identification of underdevelopment. It also provided a very concise, crisp and readily available yardstick which is also regularly updated with a fairly reasonable degree of accuracy. Since this piece of statistics is available for almost every country, other difficulties notwithstanding, it becomes convenient to undertake across the board comparisons and overall ranking of all the countries' level of development on the basis of per capita income.

The serious flaws of such a single indicator are too well-known to require recapitulation.[20] As a united Nations research study states, "We assume that the national accounts system, including the per capita national income (per capita gross national product or gross domestic product) is not adequate to the analysis and measurement of socio-economic development as a whole .. We assume that the process of development, involving both economic and social variables, is not a uniform linear progression of a set of variables but rather a changing complex of factors which move at different rates in relation to each other and move in and out of importance at different levels of development and in different types of country."[21]

There are many sharp, urgent and pungent critiques of per capita national income and other national income categories. The effective and valid criticisms which have been made of this indicator, however, are rarely traced to the theory of development from which this indicator emerges. The economics of development has moved a great distance from the initial neo-classical theory, though the pervasive influence of the neo-classical framework remains to be counteracted. The basic limitations of national income based indicators are related to the theoretical framework of neo-classical analysis. Its historical nature, its neglect of the role of national and international power equations in determining the differential nature and pace of development, its exces-

[19]See for some select references Notes 4 and 5.

[20] For a recent overview, see Sadhu, Urmila, "Identification of Backward Regions: A Brief Critical Review", *Margin*, New Delhi, Jan. 1977, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 50-57.

[21]McGranahan and others, *Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development*, UNRSID, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

sive preoccupation with a narrow range of economic factors and subsuming of other economic and social factors in the chosen factors (and their implicit change through some trickle-down and spread effects) etc., are the factors which explain how the mistakenly neat and precise models of development and the reflections of the outcome of the effect of intervention strategy so devised in some kind of magical national income figure are responsible for the wayward distortions which have crept into the bulk of development efforts of the last three decades or so. Since the shortcomings of the national income indicators are not traced to their source, it is understandable that merely by replacing such indicators by a more complex and realistic set, the problems basically arising from basing one's understanding of a deceivingly simple theory of development cannot be got rid of. Since the process of development is not "a uniform linear progression of a set of variables" but is "rather a changing complex of factors which move at different rates in relation to each other and move in and out of importance at different levels of development and in different types of country",[22] it was widely recognised that a more complex and multiple set of indicators alone can prove equal to the task of portraying and measuring the level of development.

SEARCH FOR MORE REALISTIC INDICATORS

Based on such realisation are a large number of efforts at evolving a more suitable, more realistic and more comprehensive set of indicators of development. These can broadly be put into two categories.

The first relates to a more satisfactory measure of the standard of living, welfare and overall economic performance like Net National Welfare (NNW), which takes the form of instituting optimum regimes, capable of yielding optimum social welfare.[23] These exercises fall in the domain of welfare economics with its scope extended to cover dynamic development phenomena. Similarly, predominantly sociological and political theory based concepts like social change, modernisation, westernisation are also of the same species, which are grounded in empiricism and are designed to propagate an ethnocentric view of development.[24] A whole complex of social indicators have been built up around these concepts. Despite the fact that such schemes of indicators are based on these partial and narrow 'theories' of social change, the weaknesses of these theories to reflect the complex relaionships between

[22]McGranahan and others, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[23]Tinbergen, J., Bergson, A. and others, *Optimum Social Welfare and Productivity : A Comparative View*, New York, 1972.

[24]Forrester, D.B., "Western Academic Sophistry and the Third World", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay, October 5, 1974.

development factors in a historical perspective reduce these indicators to an idiosyncratic descriptive level.

Since the concepts like Net National Welfare (NNW) are based on welfare economics which is widely suspected for its apologetic, non-objective tendency even in the static equilibrium framework in which it originated, its extension to a dynamic development context is methodologically rather weak, over and above being sterile.[25] Its predictive as well as socially compulsive prescriptive value is so little that none of its enthu siastic promoters has, to my knowledge, tried to apply it to the present reality of development and produce a ranking of various countries on this basis.

The fact that these exercises are ahistorical, while theories of development providing the basis for evolving a scheme of indicators of development must of necessity be historical theories capable of throwing hypotheses covering various historical epochs, makes these welfare-cum-modernisation centred schemes of indicators so narrowly focused as to miss some of the essential elements of the phenomenon of underdevelopment. For example, as Andre Gunder Frank has pointed out, before there was development, there was no underdevelopment. That is to say, modern development and under development are both in the nature of ongoing inter-connected processes. In fact, "they were and are both part of the same process".[26] As there takes place development of development in some parts, there simultaneously takes place development of underdevelopment elsewhere. The welfare based approach (which sums up individual subjectives to arrive at some 'collective' figures) is ill-suited to take account of the phenomenon where an upward movement for one group is organically related to a downward movement for another. It is on this account that there is now talk of 'anti-developed' or 'over-developed' societies.[27] Though these concepts are currently deployed with reference mainly to the menace of pollution, etc., the concepts are capable of application to all those phenomena of parasitism which are basic to those growth processes which are inherently uneven and centripetal.

The second group of exercises at multiple indicators of development are the ones towards which a really considerable amount of research effort has been directed both by individual researches and many research organisations. A complete survey of such exercises is beyond the scope

[25]See, Dobb, M., *Welfare Economics and the Economics of Socialism*, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

[26]Frank, Andre Gunder, *On Capitalist Under-development*, Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 1.

[27]Such trends are described by Narinder Singh in his review of Frank A.G.'s "On Capitalist Under-development", *Indian Book Chronicle*, New Delhi, July 16, 1977.

of the present paper. However, some selected exercises of this kind can be scrutinised to bring home the point that in the absence of rooting these exercises in a theory of development sufficient generality, these indicators are descriptive exercises for a briefer statement of underlying data, which throw up neither policy guidelines nor theoretical propositions not known already and make it difficult to make consistent purposive choices between such alternative schemes of indicators owing to their *ad hocism*.

For example, the Overseas Development Council, Washington has put forward a composite indicator in terms of how a country satisfies the basic needs of its people.[28] The index is composed of three factors: literacy, life expectancy and infant mortality This is based on the assumption that these three elements enter into a man's concept of good-life and hence can measure the qualify of life. According to this index, India gets a rating of 41, while most other low-income countries have a rating of 39. Moving in a bold sweep across the frontiers of inter-temporal and inter-national comparisons, it is suggested that since at the beginning of the present century, the rating for the USA was 63. the level of development and quality of life in India today is way behind those in the USA some 76 years ago. Apart from the naivete of pinning such a lot of faith on these three factors, it will be frustrating to draw either theoretical insights or practical guidance from the application of his complex, multiple index of development. In fact, on the basis of this composite index, it may not be possible to draw unequivocal ranking of countries, regions of groups of people. unless development is, tautologically defined in terms of these three factors exclusively.

The usual reponse to such exercise is to add a few more elements, replace some particular element by some supposed to be better ones and prepare through such combinations and permutations a new concoction. A large number of such exercises can be cited, particularly in the form of indicators for regional development.[29]

Among the indicators taken collectively and severally for ranking the level of development, one often comes across the rate of unemployment, labour productivity, extent of industrialisation, proportion of

[28]Quoted in Nabgopal Das, "Economic Front-I : Relatively Modest Expectations", *Statesman*, Delhi, April 6, 1977.

[29]To mention a few Indian studies only :

(*a*) Ashok Mitra, "Levels of Regional Development in India", *Census of India*, 1961, Part IA (i), New Delhi.

(*b*) B. Das Gupta, "Socio-Economic Classification of Districts—A Statistical Approach", *Economic and Political Weekly*, Bombay, August 14, 1971.

(*c*) Hemlata Rao, "Identification of Backward Regions and the Study of The Trend, in Regional Disparities in India", a paper presented at the seminar on "Regional Imbalances—Problems and Policies" organized by IIPA, New Delhi, March 1972.

graduates, particularly technically trained persons in the labour force, etc. The basic idea behind these variables to measure the level of economic activities and the degree of their effectiveness.[30] By examining such variables separately and compositely, a picture about the ordering of diffcrent countries, regions and/or groups of people is generated.

However, the most formidable difficulty faced in building a composite index of development is the assignment of objectively determined weights to the several indicators sought to be combined to form a composite index. It is obvious that simply combining a group of indicators, physical or synthetic, will not suffice to generate a composite index unless a methodology is evolved and applied to assign weights to the indicators.[31] Moreover, the scheme of weighing has to be free of subjective valuation. In order to discover such so-called value-neutral, objective schemes of weighing the *chosen* indicators, some statistical techniques particularly factors analysis and principal component analysis, are adopted.[32]

The idea behind the use of these techniques is to find out the principal components of the group of variables selected to represent the relative levels of development and derive the implicit weights based on the identification of the principal components. Thus, a composite indicator is evolved in which the weights of the components are non-subjectively arrived at. Since, there is no exhaustive, natural or objectively

[30]Many economists have laid, notwithstanding problems of measurement, a good deal of stress on the indicative role of productivity. For example, Hans Singer maintained that more important than the creation of wealth was the creation of the *capacity to produce wealth* because production can be consumed and/or wasted. "The Notion of Human Investment", *Review of Social Economy*, March 1966, pp. 1-14.

[31]A very simple procedure for assigning weights is to give the same weight to all the variables. In such a case overall ranking can be obtained for various countries, regions or groups by first assigning ranking according to each variable and then adding them up. It is obviously that this is a procedure of convenience without any justification for it. The study of Ashok Mitra (*op. cit.*) was in essence based on such a procedure avoiding giving differential weights.

[32]A brief account of this methodology is given by Urmila Sadhu (*op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.) She says, "Briefly this procedure involves a reduction in the number of original indicators of development to a smaller number of indices, each of which is a linear combination of the original indicators. These indices reflecting a cluster of original indicators are known as factors. The set of coefficients forming a linear combination of the original indicators are known as factor loadings, which are nothing but maximum correlations between the factors and their constituent indicators. These factor loadings are, in fact, weights which reflect the relative importance of individual or clusters of indicators of development. Using similar procedure, one can derive another composite index of all individual or clusters of indicators which in continuation with the first one can be used for identifying relatively less or more developed regions. It should be noted that this method ignores the differences in the variance exhibited by the distribution of indicators, which are, in a sense, explanatory variables..."

given listing of all the development-related variables, one has to make the *initial choice of* groups of variables out of which the principal components are to be found out. Hence one does not really get an objectively built up composite index simply by finding out the implicit weights of the principal components out of the initially subjectively chosen groups of variables.

The limitation of the principal component analysis relates to the fact that generally the choice of variables for an exercise at building a composite index is not based on a theory of development. Explaining why factor analysis has not developed as expected, Dennis J. Palumbo says, "Perhaps this is partly a result of the fact that the use of factor analysis cannot proceed *without the development of a theory to explain the factors we might extract.*"[33]

Moreover, since the principal component analysis is used to reduce the original number of explanatory variables to a smaller number of factors in terms of which the whole set of variables can be understood, the chosen variables have to be based on a theory explaining development and the chosen independent variables must be explanatory variables. In explaining development, many propositions and theories are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the proposition that development today is a function of development yesterday. In this kind of a framework, the explanatory independent variables of yesterday are also the explained, dependent variables of today.[34] Since development has to be perceived in terms of some physical observable patterns (the performance or objective indicators of development), it may lead to a fusion of explanatory, independent and performance-indicating (explained or dependent) variables. That is to say, a 'theory' of development which fails to make a choice of the critical explanatory variables and the form and extent of their inter-relationship is no theory. but is either a tautology or a description of the phenomenon of development. That is to say, the explanatory variables and performance indicators need not be the same. In fact, it would be better to measure development in terms of variables (*i.e.*, make a choice of performance variables) in such a way that they do not, as far as possible, coincide with the explanatory variables. This is essential in order to avoid circularity which is caused when the explanatory variables and development-measuring variables (explained variable) happen to coincide. That is to say, such an approach is essential if each and every theory of development is not to be reduced to some specific form a vicious circle. It means that exercises undertaken

[33]Emphasis added. Dennis J. Palumbo, *Statistics in Politic l and Behavioural Science*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1969, p. 271.

[34]In sum, such propositions imply that underdeveloped countries are underdeveloped because they are/were underdeveloped. Nurkse, R. (*op. cit.*) is a better known exposition of such a vicious circle of underdevelopment.

in order to evolve a composite index of development must, as far as possible, distinguish between explanatory and performance-measuring variables and should confine choices to the latter and avoid the former.

Many applications of the principal component analysis for building a composite index of development are so obfuscating for the reason that they do not avoid choosing the explanatory variables as performance variables.[35] In a number of studies, dozens of indicators are chosen in an arbitrary and descriptive manner, combined on the basis of endogenously or exogenously given weights and no distinction is made between explanatory and performance-indicating variables. The result is that no scientific measurement of development is possible; each one can find a ranking which, according to a different choice and weighing of indicators, can be found to be misplacing, from each other's point of view, countries, regions or groups of people on a development scale.

A really formidable problem left almost untouched in these exercises is that of the method of finding a cut-off point for marking out the developed from the un-or underdeveloped countries. After all, it has to be decided when does a quantitative change add up to a qualitative change ! Or, does it?

Taking this point further, a question has particularly been raised whether "the obverse of development is backwardness and all backwardness is qualitatively the same."[36] Since development and backwardness both leave ample scope for some important differences between those countries which are 'statistically' found to be similarly developed or backward, and these differences may be basic to the fact of development or backwardness, it is essential that the indicators of development based on a general theory of development should also provide a means for identifying and reflecting the specifics of each situation. This point has only limited validity and relevance because common composite index of development is not the only tool available for understanding the phenomenon of development or its absence. Hence despite qualitative differences between developed and backward societies and the admittedly greater need for understanding the nature of backwardness "because without it an effective programme of development cannot be worked out",[37] it does not follow that rather than obtain a common index of development and mark-off the developed societies from the less-developed ones on the basis of a theory of development from the contiuuum of ranking, one should obtain separate indicators for development and backwardness. A common indicator of development and backwardness may well discharge its limited role without, of course, providing answers to all one's questions.

[35]This may, for example, nearly apply to all the exercises cited in Note 29.
[36]Sadhu, U. *op. cit.*, p. 55.
[37]*Ibid.*, p. 56.

The foregoing methodological critique of the numerous individuals' research in the area of composite indicators of development may be supplemented by a critique of some official attempts in India at the choice of indicators for backwardness. The Report of the Working Group on Identification of Backward Areas,[38] Government of India, 1969 suggested the following indicators of backwardness:

1. total per capita income, together with the contribution by industry and mining;
2. number of workers in registered factories per lakh of population;
3. per capita annual consumption of electricity;
4. length of surfaced roads in relation to population and the area of the state; and
5. railway mileage in relation to the population and the area of the state.

Since the weights given to the indicators are not specified, it seems likely that they are all given equal weights. Then, apart from the general, synthetic index of per capita income, the other indicators suggest that development is related to the role of the secondary sector and the development of infrastructure facilities like power and transport. The development of the organised industrial, power and transport sectors are presumably proximate, independent, explanatory factors of the level of development and are not the basic, causative factors. Since they do not relate to the objectives of development, they cannot reasonably be taken to be performance-indicators, measuring the extent to which the process of development has met its objectives. Use of such a composite index of backwardness is, of course, based on an implicit assumption that the allocation of resources for the development of these sectors is likely to ensure development. However, even here there is a snag. It is likely that some areas show divergent levels of development of industries, power and transport owing to factor endowment and historical antecedents, though they may broadly have the same level of per capita income. After all, it is possible to overcome these bottlenecks through trade, policy interventions and other institutional devices. If their ranking is also very close, how will one draw guidance *from this ranking* about the overall rate of differential allocation between these regions and about the sectoral composition of investment; obviously, answers to these questions will require much more information about economic, institutional structure and the nature and range of economic activities.

Furthermore, differential allocation to areas showing backwardness

[38] *Report of the Working Group on Identification of Backward Areas*, Government of India, Planning Commission, 1969 (also known as Pandey Committee).

in these dimensions may, on the one hand, fail to trigger off a process of development on a sustained basis. Even if it did, it may be a process taken advantage of primarily by those sections of the population who are already better off in terms of income, skills, command over resources and placement in the socio-political hierarchy. That is to say, under the best of assumptions concerning the response to differential allocations of various investments based on these indices, there may occur a certain rate of overall development which may fail to cover, under the net of its multiplier and trickle-down effects, the peripheral groups and classes of people. In the sense of showering the benefits of development on the already leading central points, the outcome of such a process may well be regarded as anti-development.

Sensing that the quantitative orientation of these descriptive, eclectical schemes of indicators come under fire owing to the neglect of the factors which relate more intimately to the qualitative dimensions of development (at least in the sense that they are not amenable to quantification), the search for a composite index of development is replaced by, or supplemented by, the delineation of the *styles of development or patterns or paths of development*.[39] Of a large number of such exercises, a relatively recent one may bring out the essential nature of such exercises.[40] Ralph Pieris lists the following areas of choices or restraints which will yield a characterisation of styles of development as tools for the analysis of unified development in different countries[41]:

(*i*) the extent and nature of national autonomy;
(*ii*) the nature and extent of popular participation;
(*iii*) the emphasis given to the production and control over the means of production;
(*iv*) income levels and public services on the farm and non-farm sectors;
(*v*) the distribution of the fruits of development in terms of income, goods and services reflected in changing patterns of consumption; and

[39]A good many of such paths, models, or patterns of development, *e.g.*, the Western capitalist model, the dependent neo-colonial model (also called the Brazilian Model), the independent capitalist model, the non-capitalist path of development, the socialist model with its various variants, are discussed in the contemporary political economy of development. For a theoretical background to many of these paths or patterns, see, *The Political Economy of Development* (eds.) Uphoff, N.T. and Ichman, W.F., University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972. For an excellent exposition of the Non-Capitalist Path, see, *Developing Countries on the Non-Capitalist Road*, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, 1974.

[40]Pieris, Ralph, *Asian Development Styles*, Abhinav Publications, New Delhi 1977.

[41]*Ibid.*, pp. 10-14.

(*vi*) the nature and extent of the protection of human relationships contributing to solidarity, security, self-realisation and freedom influencing the quality of life.

On the basis of empirical investigations concerning these six areas of choice, four development styles are spotted, *viz.*, the post-industrial, welfare statism, mixed development and the socialist. Apart from the difficulties associated with the elements of choice, the extent of choices available and the arbitrariness of the classification into four styles, the basic question is that even if one can identify the development styles or patterns of various countries, all the question which motivate the search for a composite index of development still remain unanswered. Patterns of development are ill-suited to rank the countries on a development scale or to capture the qualitative aspects of development in a comparative manner. They are useful in explaining the differential perfo rmance of different countries and can ascribe them to the basic institutional-systemic factors. But levels of development differ within the same styles or paths of development as also between various styles or paths. Before attempting to explain these differences, it is first essential to obtain a ranking on the development scale. Hence, the attempts at finding patterns of development, while do succeed in taking into account some qualitative aspects of development, do not succeed in producing a comparative picture of development.

The review of a cross-section of various types of attempts at devising a composite index of development is intended to bring out the essential point of such exercises as well as to highlight the limits to which they are subject. At the close of this exercise, it may be useful to round up the picture by discussing the considerations which emerge from the preceding discussion.

CHOICE OF VARIABLES

A composite indicator of development, it has already been discussed, is designed to answer many practical and theoretical needs. Our discussion has also brought out some of the considerations which should guide the choice of variables. It often came up during the preceding analysis that without basing the exercise on a theory of development, which is general and historical, neither a consistent nor a functional set of indicators can be identified. If 'the laws of motion of society' are used to throw up a methodology for identifying the stages of development and the process of such evolution, two important guidelines emerge:

(*i*) a next stage of development can be considered to represent a higher level of development;[42]

(*ii*) on the basis of the interplay of various factors, there takes place a maturing of conditions for the transition to the next, higher phase of development; such a maturing of conditions can be considered to manifest a higher stage of development.[43]

Thus, we get two bases for finding out a cut-off point in the ordering of societies on the scale of development. First, transition from one stage of development to another will provide clues about a distinct break of some countries, regions or societies from other countries on the scale of development. This will also represent a movement for a particular society from one pattern, path or style of development to another, over time. Second, within a particular pattern of development of countries, societies or regions, gradation can be made on the basis of the extent of maturing, non-maturing or blocking of the conditions for transition to a higher stage; a higher stage, *inter alia*, enables a society to obtain greater capacity to meet social wants, creates conditions in which the potential is actually used for meeting the wants and the organisation and system of meeting these tasks is conducive to the aforesaid ends. Situations leading to facilitation of transition to a higher, harmonised stage of development may be ranked higher than those where contradictions are so developing that they tend to block the process of transition. That is to say, the process of development is considered to have moved to a higher level when the factors opening up new vistas are stronger than those holding up further advance.[44]

It goes without saying that simplistic stages of growth type of characterisations are not a theory of social dynamics and hence cannot be used for helping the choice of indicators of development.[45] To date, it is the broad scheme of evolution of modes of production as initially developed by Karl Marx, which is the only available scientific way of explaining social dynamics.[46] A lot of theoretical and empirical work is needed to further enrich and develop the theory, which was developed by the originators, let it not be overlooked, in broad strokes only.

[42]This certainly needs a historical judgment to exclude a next stage which emerges as an aberration as a result of some forced departures which may occur on account of a variety of factors.

[43]Even if it involves a transitory resolution of some contradictions, especially of the non-antagonistic variety, through policy intervention, planning or some kind of institutional restructuring provided it fosters a further development of productive forces.

[44]Advance here is identified with the development of productive forces within the framework of smoothly operating social relations in terms of realizing and improving the society's capacity to meet social wants.

[45]The reference here is to Rostow, W.W. (*op. cit.*) kind of works.

[46]For a good introductory exposition, see, Lange, *Political Economy*, Vol. 1, Macmillan, New York, 1963, Chaps. 1 and 2.

Designing of a system of indicators is one such area in which further developments of the Marxist theory of development, particularly in the field of explaining and categorising developments within a specific mode of production, should be an urgent part of agenda of further work. Naturally, such theoretical attempts may also go a long way in concretising the specifics of inter-systemic transition, which, even today, remain broadly confined to very wide generalisations.

It has already been argued that there should be an intimate correlation between theories of development and indicators of development. However, often the relation is left implicit and the 'theories' of development used with varying degrees of consciousness to derive a set of indicators are of eclectic descriptive variety, lacking critical abstraction, historical perspective and reasonable generality. A meaningful breakthrough in evolving a set of indicators and their merger to generate a composite index requires on the one hand, grounding in a theory of development (which can explain the phenomenon of uneven, centripetal development, accumulation of backwardness and throw up both short-run tactical choices and long term strategies of development) and on the other, a clear exposition of the purposes for which one needs to prepare a composite indicator of development (which have been discussed earlier in the present paper).

Another consideration, briefly brought out earlier, which nonetheless requires emphasising, concerns the nature of the variables chosen. Though these variables may be either policy-variables, instrument variables, independent explanatory variables and/or performance variables, apart from their critical significance, they should preferably be performance-indicators linked to the underlying processes and their inter-connections. If the factors of critical significance and their relation to underlying organic processes are given adequate attention, the operational significance of the composite index is assured. This will also indicate the weights attached to its components, though a transition from theoretical criticality to operational quantification, it must be admitted, is easier said than done.

Over and above these general considerations it may be worthwhile to analyse some specific postulates which can help the process of setting up indicators. A large number of economic processes and socio-economic relations collectively impinge on the process of development. Just as a theorist has to undertake a process of abstraction in order to choose the critical variables, an exercise in evolving a set of indicators must similarly select the key variables. An important conceptual aid in this respect is the distinction, popularised by J.Kornai, between autonomous functions and higher functions, both inreal and control spheres.[47]

[47]Kornai, Janos, *Anti-Equilibrium*, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1971, pp. 181-187.

The autonomous functions being simple repeating of real processes controlled by standard decisions constitute a considerable part of socio-economic processes. While they certainly reflect the level of development of a socio-economic system and provide the basis for its development, they are mainly and basically the outcome of the higher functions over time. As Kornai puts it, "Autonomous functions, by themselves, can secure only the stationarity of the system. Development of the system depends on the success of the higher control processes."[48] Needless to say, the outcome of higher control processes operates through higher real functions like investments, major technical developments, introduction of new products, radical changes in the pattern and volume of production and similar shifts in consumption.

This type of categories, it must be realised, do not give a theory of development. Nevertheless the significance of such categorisation lies in limiting the range of observation and analysis to critical variables; it enables one to distinguish between the static repetitive and dynamic development processes and variables. The moment one moves to the interplay between social production relations and social production forces, viewed in terms of the higher function in control and real spheres, one gets the macro and micro level elements and their interaction which, combined with superstructural elements, give a theory of development, meeting almost all the major properties needed for constructing a powerful engine of analysis for problems of development theory and planning. It is a pity that not many successful attempts have been made to follow the leads inherent in these theories, concepts and categories.[49]

Not only that such a task can hardly be attempted within the confines of a paper like this. More important, this is a task for a team of researchers and, that too, to be accomplished as a result of a long and sustained enterprize. If the analysis of the present paper is valid, it is well worth it.

Looking back, then, it appears that the exercise for evolving indicators of development, despite a lot of work being done, has got derailed. It has been attempted to explain why and how the derailment has occurred. Retrospectively, it can be concluded that the single indicator in terms of per capita income, its serious flaws notwithstanding, has better analytical basis and utility than the *ad hoc* multiple indicators

[48]Kornai, Janos, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[49]So few and exacting are such exercises that it is difficult to come across any attempt of this kind. Kornai, J., (*op. cit.*, pp. 210-213), *e.g.*, while discussing how to evaluate the performance of an economic system, gives such an extensive list of the criteria of evaluation that one tends to think that the exercise neglects the principle of critical, meaningful selectivity in preference to thorough comprehensiveness. The result is a non-operational, puzzling mosaic in lieu of a theoretically-grounded operational choice of some select variables.

without a consistent theoretical base. The latter group of exercises can be carried on *ad infinitum* by attempting various combinations and permutations of diverse kinds of variables related somehow or the other to socio-economic processes concerning development. What follows from our discussion is that it is futile to pose any one such exercise against the other, because in the absence of the analytical bases and considerations we have been able to show as relevant for such a composite index, any random strong points of any of such schemes of composite indicators is fortuitous. Moreover, such merits are unable to erase the basic limitations we have ascribed to such schemes of indicators. Hence the task ahead lies not in manipulating and tinkering various variables but in undertaking systematic exercises based on a clear perception of the purposes of the indicators which, moreover, fulfil the criteria discussed in the preceding. □

Bureaucracy and Development: Some Reflections*

B. K. Dey

DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION is one of those few sophisticated silhouettes of administrative concepts whose broad shadow outlines are widely recognised, though its inner details admit of no ready and precise identification. The outpouring of profuse writings on the subject has not been commensurate with the understanding in depth of all the ramifications of development as a dynamic process directed towards transforming the entire society, enmeshing together its socio-political and economic aspects, and the bureaucracy's role in regard to these major societal systemic changes. This article attempts to analyse the multi-dimensional characteristics of such a development-oriented administration and how they impinge on the structural and functional aspects of bureaucracy, as part of the same organism. Before we get bogged down to the dense smog of issues, which do not lend themselves to easy solutions, let us steer clear of some of the definitional difficulties.

Bureaucracy we may define as a systematic organisation of tasks and individuals into a pattern which can most effectively achieve the ends of collective effort. It is a regulated administrative system organised as a series of interrelated offices.[1] Bureaucracy has certain structural features like rules, hierarchy, differentiation, etc., which display certain behavioural characteristics like objectivity, discretion and formalism for the achievement of certain determined goals.[2] From the structural aspect, it is obviously value neutral ("neither hero nor villain") ; it can be treated as a phenomenon associated with any large-scale, complex organisation. From the behavioural angle, bureaucracy may be thought of as showing some functional or pathological symptoms. From the achievemental or purposive point of view, it can be regarded as an "organisation that maximises efficiency in administration or an institutionalised method of organised social conduct in the interest of administrative efficiency".[3]

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XV, No. 2, 1969, pp. 228-48.

[1]E. N. Gladden, *Essentials of Public Administration*, Staples Press Ltd., London, Third Edition, 1964.

[2]Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration : A Comparative Perspective*, Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, Ch. 2, 1966.

[3]Peter Blau, *Bureaucracy in Modern Society*, New York, Random House, 1956.

This 'accordian-like conceptualisation' of bureaucracy or its afore-described three dimensional definition is useful for understanding its fundamental features and basic elements but it provides only an abstract, conceptual perspective. For establishing a positive correlation between bureaucracy and development, it is necessary to physically identify as to what 'bureaucracy' really denotes—who or what are they—rather than what, in abstraction, it connotes. Does it refer to all persons, at whatever level, who are on the public pay roll? Does it make much sense to cluster under the same generic category a postal peon and a high level policy maker, planner or a technocrat, a village level worker and a director of a ministry ? Undeniably, for most people in most countries, government is scarcely more than the specific public officials with whom they have opportunity of need to come in direct contact. Thus, for rural people a village social worker or a BDO may be a much more significant bureaucrat than the top level officers of the ministry he represents. As La Palombara very succinctly puts, "the upper reaches of public administrative hierarchy may constitute a paragon of skill, rationality and humaneness, but all this will go relatively unnoticed, if those who deal directly with the public are arrogant, aloof, arbitrary and currupt in their behaviour. Those at the centre of administration may spin out beautiful and extremely insightful national plans, but these will appear not very meaningful—or even bizarre—to the population, if field administrators do not have the talent for translating what exists on paper to meet the requirements of human situations."[4] But there are certainly other occasions, like, formulation of public policy, where public servants at a relatively high level in the hierarchy constitute the relevant bureaucracy. By and large, for development administration, the bureaucrats of major interest are those who occupy managerial roles, who are in some directive capacity in either central agencies or in the field, who are concerned, in somewhat intimate or direct fashion, with the policy and plan formulation, programme implementation and evaluation, etc. The lower levels are of no consequence in such a developmental situation but, generally, those who are described in the language of public administration, 'middle' or 'top' management, *i.e.*, the effective managerial group, have mostly to bear the developmental brunt and their activities, behaviour and roles are likely to have more direct and decisive impact on different kinds of national development. This restrictive definition will be seen to have some operational significance.

Let us, now, bring our viewing lens closer on development administration, Edward Weidner, whose was the pioneering attempt to clarify some of the conceptual meanings of development administration, con-

[4]Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University, 1963.

ceived it as "an action-oriented, goal-oriented administrative system".[5] In other words, it is concerned with achievement of definite programmatic goals; indeed, it is these programmatic values which go to transform the 'routine' administration into 'developmental'.

One could also view development administration as a carrier of innovating values—those connected with modernisation and industrialisation. Indeed, the functional dimension of such an administration often provides the 'differentia'—the administration for change will be known by wide and varied 'array of new functions assumed by developing countries embarking on the path of modernisation and industrialisation'.[6] This new activity charter, its significant kind and character impart a different meaning to the administration itself. It is, further, possible o envision development administration from the angle of bringing about a well-balanced and synchronised sectoral growth. So viewed development administration is "carrying out planned change in the economy (in agriculture or industry, or the capital infrastructure supporting either of these) and, to a lesser extent, in the social services of the state (especially education and public health). It is not usually associated with efforts to improve political capabilities"[7]. However, as discussed further below, at some earlier stages of development, engagement in at least quasi-political activities becomes development administrators' partial, often important, pre-occupation. It will be a truism to say that administration in developing countries is more politically or ideologically oriented and influenced to a great extent by a socio-political elite group than that in advanced countries where it is more functional and participative in nature.

The general consensus amongst scholars is that development is a total plan of action to bring about a directed or guided change in all aspects of social activity geared to national progress, with a heavy import of achievement of programmatic goals. Indeed, if development is defined, in short, as mobilisation and direction of scarce resources for achieving constantly rising national objectives formulated by the national political machinery, development administration would

[5]Edward W. Weidner, *Development Administration : A New Focus for Research*, in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), "Papers in Comparative Public Administration", Ann Arbor, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, 1962.

[6]Merle Fainsod, *The Structure of Development Administration*, in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), *Development Administration : Concepts and Problems*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1963.

[7]John D. Montgomery, "A Royal Invitation: Variation on Three Classic Themes", in John D. Montgomery and William J. Siffin (eds.), *Approaches to Development : Politics, Administration and Change*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.

imply that the administrative structure, procedures, staffing pattern, techniques of planning, personnel policies and practices and even relations with citizens, all should be attuned and harnessed to the goals and process of such national development.[8] In other words, it should have more managerial and programmatic overtone, apolitical so far as the resource planning and utilisation is concerned but functioning within the frame of an ideological milieu.

Inevitability of State Positivism

The reasons for permeation of government into the deep soils of society or heavy public involvement in the phenomena of economic, social, and political change are as myriad as the kinds of development actually underway. In many places government is the only significant social sector willing to assume the responsibility for transformation. In others, the bureaucracy husbands the vast majority of whatever necessary professional, technical, entrepreneurial resources that may be available to a society committed to change. In still other areas, the primary—even monopolistic—involvement of public sector in programmes of social and economic developments may be a manifestation of fierce ideological commitment.[9] When our focus shifts from economic to other areas of activity like eradication of illiteracy, revitalisation of village-level governments, removal of ancient social barriers, etc., the presence of government is revealed in even sharper relief. In making a society 'modern'[10] in the totality of this term, state must be accepted as 'regulator', as mediator, as underwriter, as provider of service, as source of subsidies and loans, as promoter of national standards of 'decent living' and as economic and social diagnostician and repairman. True enough, the new liberal's faith in 'positive government' is a far cry from the ealier liberal's ideal of government restricted to the role of 'night watchmen'.[11] Indeed, the compulsions of quick development, and, where socialism has been accepted as the national goal, framing of policies to achieve targets such as full employment, satisfactory rate of growth, stable prices, a healthy balance of payment, more production and equitable distribution, etc., need a more positive state penetration and, *ipso facto*, bureaucratic intervention.

Bureaucratic Model-Making

The inescapable nature of this deep and all-round involvement of the

[8]J. N. Khosla, "Development Administration - New Dimensions", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 1.

[9]La Palombara, *op. cit.*

[10]Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States*, The Hague, Monton and Company, 1962. Shils says, "Modern means dynamic, concerned with people, democratic and equilitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign and influential."

[11]F.M. Marx, "The Administrative State", Ch. 1, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957.

bureaucrats into the affairs of the state and its vital significance from the point of development make bureaucratic model-making, suited to the development needs, a very interesting and worthwhile exercise. Building a general model of developmental bureaucracy is by no means an easy job—there are so many variables, imponderables and situational differences to be catered to in different developing countries that one 'do-all' prescriptive framework often borders on absurdity. No particular pattern of adaptation can be considered optional for development. Indeed, the developing countries present such a wide variety of 'crises configuration' and the context of 'challenge and response' is so different that a 'cure-all' bureaucracy can only be reality in the realm of concepts.

Weber's 'Legal-Rational' or 'Ideal Type'

It will be worthwhile here to have a look into the classical model of 'legal rational' or 'ideal type' of bureaucracy developed by Max Weber (1884-1920) if only to see how some of the traits or elements held valid in the Weberian exposition hold good today, what value do they command and what deviations are necessary in the new context. Weber's bureaucracy, 'the leading institution of the modern complex society irrespective of its political complexion, capitalist or socialist', has some significant characteristics like hierarchy, differentiation, written rules, closed career system with no lateral entry, etc.[12] It is apparent that Max Weber's was a scientific concept and his description of the bureaucratic characteristics was 'formal' and 'institutional'. The Weberian model can be regarded basically as a "theoretical construction, an abstraction from reality, which serves as a frame of reference for social research into bureaucratic reality".[13] It is "virtually synonymous with rationality and objectivity in the administration of large scale organization".[14] This does not mean, however, that a rigid uniformity, even of structural and other features, should be assumed. Bureaucratic adaptation and innovation should be anticipated; in fact they are inescapable, in different political settings of both developed and developing countries.

It is well to remember that Max Weber's 'ideal type' or 'classic' model applies primarily to countries of western Europe. Even as an analytical 'construct', Weber needs to be modified when applied to the American scene. American public administration is characterised by considerably more 'politics than that of western Europe, in that legislators and interest groups shape American administration processes in many ways by establishing direct communication—and—contact

[12]Max Weber, *Essays in Sociology*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.

[13]A. van Bram, *Bureaucracy* (mimeo.).

[14]Wallace S. Sayre, "Bureaucracies : Some Contrasts in Systems", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, 1964.

channels with the bureaucrats. This gives American system a dynamic political character that challenges Weber's view of bureaucracy as a passive neutral instrument. Moreover, Weber does neither take into account the 'dysfunctional' aspects of bureaucracy which may hinder the 'rational pursuits of organisational objectives' nor does he emphasise bureaucracy's informal character. Bureaucracy's 'other face' and the extra-bureaucratic values like individual needs for security, status, power, etc., which go to 'bend' rules, programmes, and goals of organisations did not form part of the Weberian design. The other points of criticisms of Max Weber's model are that it does not visualise, insofar as American system is concerned, emergence of career alternatives for public bureaucracy which affects Weber's concept of 'tenure for life' for bureaucrats. The concept of 'trained incapacity' (Veblen), the concept of 'occupational psychosis' (Dewey) and the concept of 'professional deformation' (Warnotte) have not been thought of by Weber, whereas they are so true to any developed bureaucracy.[15]

Bureaucratic Changes in Response to New Needs

Similarly, bureaucracy in operation in developing countries has also undergone a good deal of change in response to the new needs. Structurally, procedurally and even from the point of view of its own functionality, it has moved quite a bit from its classical purity. But that has been more in the shape of marginal adjustments or peripheral adaptations rather than fundamental changes directed to achieve a break-through into the developmental goals. Whatever changes in bureaucratic structures and functions are in evidence in developing countries are all mainly due to the compulsion of developmental assumptions, ideals and goals, based on society's revolution of rising expectation and the magnitude and scale of dynamic programmes of comprehensive political, social and economic modernisation.

Generally speaking, when the major need of the society is creating a sense of 'nationhood' and national solidarity, the bureaucracy has to play, willy-nilly, what can be called an 'integrative' role, and not merely an instrumental one. If prior to the acceptance of developmental goals by administration, bureaucrats were primarily employed on 'watchdog' or 'apparatus' functions and they were wedded to 'status quoism', in a developmental era, with a none-too-well developed political sector, the bureaucrats being one of the powerful elite-groups, have to participate, in a big way, in the predominantly political functions. The degree of bureaucrats' involvement into the activities of political sector or output functions, like interest articulation, interest aggregation, political socialisation, and political communication[16] varies in inverse

[15] A. van Bram, *op. cit.*

[16] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *Politics of Developing Areas*, Prince-

(*Continued on next page*)

proportion to the level of political development, and hence, will differ from country to country.

In the social sector, modernisation process must take into account tasks like inculcation of rational values, building up dynamic individual or group attitudes, refurbishing age-old, moth-eaten social institutions, creating and channelising, along constructive lines, new citizen-responses to absorb change and accelerate its pace, etc.

When, however, economic modernisation is the overriding goal, the bureaucracy has to engage in the "goal-gratification and allocative sectors". Gigantic operations in the field of economic planning have to be undertaken by the government in order to bridge the gulf between the high national goal targets and low actuality level, to achieve which the governments, and hence bureaucrats, have to assume, quite often, leadership role as industrial entrepreneurs, have to enter the commercial and business field, construct an adequate and effective infrastructure, build up varying types of organisation-forms like manifold para-state agencies, public sector undertakings, autonomous corporations, etc. The public administrators have, of necessity, to become managers.[17]

(*Continued from previous page*)
ton, Princeton University Press, 1960. Ferrel Heady also emphasised this multifunctional character of bureaucracy in developing countries, though he would not do the same for developed countries where bureaucracies "resemble the diffracted model with its more restricted functional activity". According to him "there is a relationship between political modernity and bureaucratic specificity of function." (Ferrel Heady, *op. cit.*, page 106). Almond and Powell would go to the other extreme and aver that bureaucracy displays even in developed countries the characteristics of 'multifunctionality'. They say, "while all political structures are multifunctional, the specialised officialdoms and bureaucracies of differentiated political systems are more multifunctional than almost any of the other types of structure" (Gabriel) Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics : A Developmental Approach*, Boston, Mass: Little, Bown, 1966, pp. 157-158.

[17]At the start of the Journey, it is under development all over or as Maddick described it "misery-go-round" Henry Maddick, *Democracy, Decentralization and Development*, Asia Publishing House, India, 1963. The social structure of most young developing countries is dominated by tradition bound institutions like caste, communalism, linguism, sectarian narrowism, or regional parochialism which set the tone of group behaviour; there is often class conflict between middle-class and other classes; there is the gap between the educated and the uneducated, and so on. Traditional bonds of authority still wield great influence in the matter of legitimacy of government. Economic structure is predominantly agricultural; there is little or no infrastructure like communications roads, etc.; industrial or entrepreneurial class is generally absent and the whole economy is consumption-oriented. A close-up of political sector reveals that policy making institutions like electorate, legislative bodies, interest associations, occupational or pressure groups, competing political parties, etc., or popular participation in the affairs of the state are either very much weak or absent. As against this, however, in most new states, because perhaps of long period of colonial rule, administrative or bureaucratic sector is comparatively well-knit, organised and strong.

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The Concept of Confluence

Thus, in development administration, there has to be confluence of different types of development objectives and programmes—political, social and economic, and underpining all these, the managerial revolution. The regulatory 'input functions' like rule making, rule application and rule adjudications have also an important place in development administration. Government in developmental administration must necessarily cope with a series of significant major tasks, such as achieving security against external aggression and ensuring internal order, establishing and maintaining consensus on the legitimacy of the regime, integrating diverse ethnic, religious, communal and regional elements into a national political governmental units and between public authorities and private sector, displacement of vested traditional social interests, development of skills and institutions, etc.[18]

All these functions call for an appraisal of the type of functions that development administration would badly need. If, in terms of broad fields, development administration can be grouped under general administration, social administration, economic and financial administration, agricultural administration and so on,[19] it will enable making a realistic and pragmatic assessment of the requirements of different types and categories of administrative generalists, technical specialists (like engineers, doctors, scientists, etc.) professional experts (like economists, statisticians, planners, agronomists, specialised social workers etc.) and so on.

What categories of personnel are required in a particular country will, however, depend upon the level of development there as also the emphasis that is placed for developing a particular sector. For instance, if the emphasis is on industrial development, then the personnel

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For a good close-up on this, please see Edward Shils, "Political Development in New States", *op. cit.*

[18]Milton Esman, "Politics in Administrative Development", in Montgomery and Siffin (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 60-65.

[19]The French have broken these areas into the following four areas: General Administration, Economic and Financial Administration, Social Administration, and External Affairs: Please see Herman Finer, *Theory and Practice of Modern Government*, London, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965 (Reprint), p. 825.

The Administrative Reforms Commission (India) in their Report on Personnel Administration has broken the governmental activities into 3 main groups : 'general administration', 'specialised administration', and 'technical and/or scientific administration'. The Commission has made further sub-groups between 'functional' and 'outside functional' services, posts, specifying the following specialisation in areas not falling within the province of 'functional' services, namely, (*a*) economic administration, (*b*) industrial administration, (*c*) agricultural and rural development administration, (*d*) social and educational administration, (*e*) personnel administration, (*f*) financial administration, (*g*) defence administration and internal security, and (*h*) planning.

categorisation will be one that will be different when agricultural development is the focus. Each category, in turn, may need to be further broken down into sub-sector specialisations in order to fit it into the total developmental plan-frame. While analysing the bureaucratic categorisation, sectoral requirements, and training needs, etc., it would be worthwhile to adopt a more professional yardstick, for determining the kinds and levels of personnel-mix and skill drills.

What are the implications of such a romantic 'rendezvous' with developmental adventure for bureaucracy in general and the concerned 'action group' in particular? The 'management of change' demands certain fundamental changes in the structure and character of developmental bureaucracy.

Political Role of Bureaucracy

The most important change of foundational nature takes shape in the political role of bureaucracies in development administration which blurs the dichotomy between the policy and the administration. Though, traditionally speaking, it may be considered 'contra-rational' political commitment of the bureaucracy and its policy-making and other political functions are often the critical ingredients of development itself. In the context of development, public administrators have to be "in political limelight" because they tend to be injected into the policy-making activities as against mere policy implementing functions. Time is evidently past when the public officials are expected to sit on the developmental sidelines, limiting their role to the fixing of general rules and to providing certain basic services and incentive for those private entrepreneurs who are the major players in the complicated and exciting game of fashioning profound changes in economic and social systems.[20] Even in the peak of developed polity, not to speak of developing societies the bureaucracy cannot completely be 'aseptic' to politics—it is difficult, indeed impossible, for a top bureaucrat to be totally apolitical or to extricate himself from political-cum-policy cob-web. It is but natural that the political functions tend to be appropriated, in considerable measure, by the bureaucrats in a developing society, though perhaps with non-political motives.[21] For, when there is no possibility of vigorous political activity in general in society, an elitist bureaucracy with a guardianship orientation must be the principal initiator of change.[22] In fact, the major decisions regarding national development, even assuming good amount of overall political direction or control,

[20]La Palombara, *op. cit.*

[21]Fred Riggs, "Bureaucracy and Political Development" in La Palombara, *op. cit.*

[22]Ralph Braibanti, "The Relevance of Political Science to the Study of Underdeveloped Areas" in R. Braibanti and Joseph J. Sprengler (eds.), *Tradition, Values and Socio-economic Development*", Durban, NC, Duke University Press, 1961.

involve inescapable authoritative rule making and rule application by the bureaucrats. The whole concept of 'delegated legislation' is based on the closer association of bureaucracy with legislative processes, not merely from structural-procedural point of view but also from the angle of policy initiation and formulation. This is not the same as to bypass the political top. The entire gamut of relationship between the public bureaucracy and political executive (or minister) assumes a new complexion when bureaucrats are shot into the outer space of political activities. In an one-party system, political commitment of the bureaucrats is not only possible but may, in fact, be encourged. But in a two or multiple party system, where the political structures are normally more developed and where the possibility of regime change is real, no salaried bureaucrat will like a particular label to be attached to his chest, which might involve him in job risk in case of a regime change.

Bureaucracy and Regime Variation

It is but natural that the functions and characteristics of bureaucracy will undergo basic changes under different political regime-variations amongst the developing administrative system. It is (however) not necessary to go into the details of these various regimes[23] but suffice it to say each bureaucratic system has to adjust its relationship (with the political top) and its functional role in the light of a particular prevalent ecology. Obviouly, bureaucracy under a stable liberal democracy will be functionally different from that in a single party polity with charismatic leader on top. This can be represented in the form of a chart which appears at p. 87 for facility of ready analysis.[24] Structure apart, even its functional and rationalistic characteristics will vary widely under, varying types of 'apparat'. Some general trends can, however, be indicated here; for example, under a mature liberal public democracy, for public servants, there will be no high degree of political commitment, no high social representativeness, no deviation from merit system but high degree of autonomy, internal checks and external accountability, whereas, under unstable liberal democracy, there is likely to prevail high degree of autonomy internal checks, some degree of political commitment and deviation from merit system, but not much

[23]For details, please see Ferrel Heady, *Public Administration Comparative Perspective*, Prentice Hall Inc. Eaglewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966. He examines bureaucratic characteristics under six different regimes such as traditional autocratic system; bureaucratic elite systems—civil and military; polyarchal competitive systems dominant party semi-competitive system, dominant party mobilisation system; communist totalitarian system.

[24]Acknowledgement here is due to Richard L. Harris whose analysis of the "Effects of Political Changes on the Role sets of the Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria", *Administrative Science Quarterly*, December 1968, is illuminating.

CHART SHOWING

ROLE SETS FOR BUREAUCRATS UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Types of functions		*Complete Combination of multi-functional role set*	*Great Britain*	*In Ghana under Nkrumah Regime 1957-1959*	*In Ghana and Nigeria under Military Regime*	*In Nigeria before 1966-Military Coup*
Rule making	Policy Making	yes	—	—	yes	—
	Policy Advice	yes	yes	—	yes	yes
Rule Application	Programme Formulation	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Programme Management	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Programme Execution	yes	—	—	—	—
Rule Adjudication		yes	—	—	—	—
Interest Aggregation		yes	yes	—	yes	—
Interest Articulation		yes	yes	—	—	—
Political Communication		yes	—	—	yes	—
Political Socialisation		yes	—	—	—	—

of external accountability on social representiveness. Similarly, in a single party communist regime, high social representativeness, political commitment and internal checks are expected, but no great measure of autonomy or external accountability or contra-rational behaviour like partiality or corruption, etc., whereas in a single party non-communist regime, there is sometimes social representativeness, often deviation from merit system and some internal checks. These generalisations, based on a survey made by Prof. S. E. Finer of certain emerging patterns in some developing countries of Africa and South America should be taken as indicative of some broad trends. It is admittedly true that the content of tbe goals (national and personal) as set by the top leaders, the method adopted for piloting them through, the total environment of a particular political system including the genius of the people functioning in that system would influence the bureaucratic model in its basic structural frame and its style of functioning.

Even making allowance for all this, general hypothesis about bureaucracy remains, however, that it is the means of carrying 'community action' into 'rationally ordered societal action'. Therefore, as an instrument of societalising relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is a powerful instrument of the first order for the one who controls bureaucratic apparatus.[25] This shows that in a normal situation, bureaucracy is not 'usurpative' in nature as it does not have any independent political design of its own though it does a number of politico-social functions on behalf of its political master. Indeed, one can aptly view bureaucracy, in this context, as an organisation of personnel "bossed by a political control group made up of each departmemt's top command supported by hand picked aids . . . all administrative structure is linked to political structure as a door is held to wall".[26]

Rather than sitting in the driver's seat themselves, the bureaucrats would like to look for support from political leadership; civilian career officials are primarily motivated by "prudential neutrality" rather than by an urge to take over direct political power.[27] It is a doubtful point, however, if neutrality in the strict Weberian sense of 'instrumentality' to political top is really conducive to the dynamic role carved out for development administrator as a change-agent. The widely held view in many quarters now is that a fully committed and well-motivated bureaucrat, identifying himself with an end-objective, will be far more effective as a catalyst of change, as commitment to a cause generates almost a religious response in the officials and helps stimulating role-playing by them within the frame of national goal.

[25]Max Weber, "Essays in Bureaucracy", Ch. VIII, Section 10.

[26]Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Administrative State", Ch. I, *op. cit.*

[27]F. M. Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development" in La Palombara, *op. cit.*

Some Deviations

Perhaps some degree of deviation from a purely passive bureaucracy by introducing, at least, a limited kind of 'spoils system' for some top layers, may be necessary though its extent will depend on the willingness or capacity of working the political system with only the long-range interest of the country in view, availability of qualified personnel and also, to a great extent, on the alternative employment opportunities open to the personnel dislodged on regime change. Making top-jobs 'political appointments' is likely to attract available qualified people into the politico-bureaucratic system which may, in the ultimate analysis, give fillip to the political sector itself if it is not very strong already. But this obviously requires a careful assessment of all the implications of such a choice. Another alternative may be to allow civil servants to join politics for limited periods on the expiry of which they would return to their old posts but with all their service rights protected. This, however, depends, for its success, on the political maturity of the society and its acceptance by the political system. Still another idea in this context could be to make certain key posts elective. As is apparent, the crux of the development administration, particularly in a democratic set-up, is how to harmonise the political goals with the genuine developmental objectives. That is, the real ingenuity would seem to lie in discovering a device and organising a *modus operandi* through which the ideology of the political top can be matched and balanced by the effective managerial competence at the bureaucratic level. To what extent this competence can or should be activated by a commitment similar to the one of the top executive is of course a matter which will naturally depend upon the total culture in different developing societies.

One limiting factor to the question of political commitment is, therefore, the frequency of change in the government through either peaceful transition of power or violent overthrow of an established authority. In a situation of political instability, or even stable developed democracy politicisation of bureaucracy may result in frequent 'chopping-off' of top layer which may hinder, not help, developmental aims and, in such a case, it may be a better idea to advocate responsible or 'prudential' neutrality. This will enable bureaucrates to suggest the most rational feasibility alternatives and so sober the political executive by setting achievable targets, devising pragmatic methods for modernisation, more realistic decision-making, programming and execution of developmental activities.

Bureaucracy for Development

It is not that the Weberian characteristics of an ideal type of bureaucracy, namely, hierarchy, specialisation and training, professional-

ism, tenure for life, merit system, emphasis on rules, forms, etc., are not present in development administration. Development administration being basically nothing more than a planned change in administrative structure and processes consequent on new assumptions and orientations of developmental objectives, its focal interest is administrative development defined as "a pattern of increasing effectiveness in the utilisation of available means to achieve prescribed goals."[28] It necessarily includes "both qualitative and quantitative changes in bureaucratic policies, programmes, procedures and methods of work, organisational structures and staffing patterns, number and quality of development personnel of different types and patterns of relations with clients of administration."[29]

What is actually required, in the developmental context, is that its bureaucracy must be a rationally structured, more functionally oriented (dysfunctions of classical bureaucracy need to be reduced if not eliminated) and should be achievement-centred (through acceptance of different sets of norms). Bureaucracy will be there—it is the inescapable ingredient in any large organisation but it has to be imparted a new meaning, a new rationality ! It means that the bureaucratic organisation must be goal-oriented and action directed, streamlined and well-dressed up for performance and achievement—it should have its eyes fixed on the horizon of result. The over-devotion to hierarchy, and strict superordination and subordination relationship may not be quite conducive to the new tasks which require, for their fruition, healthy team spirit, collaborative problem-solving approach, collegiate decision-making process, and collectively shared programme-responsibility. The hierarchical levels, where they exist—and they must exist only on functional considerations and on none else—may need to be drastically cut by the adoption of what has come to be known as 'level jumping,'[30] It should

[28]Montgomery, *op. cit.*, p. 230. In his paper on "Modernisation and Development Administration" (Prepared for the conference of the Comparative Administration Group, University of Maryland, USA in April 1966). Riggs also writes: "Development administration refers both to the administrative problems which arise as governments seek to promote agricultural, industrial, educational and medical progress, and also to the reform of governmental organisations and bureaucratic procedures which necessarily accompany these processes."

[29]Dr. J.N. Khosla, "Development Administration—New Dimensions", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIII, No. 1.

[30]It is pertinent to refer here to the recommendation 14 of the Administrative Reforms Commission *Report on Machinery of Government and its Procedures of Work*, Government of India, New Delhi, 1968, which states:

> 14(1)(a) There should be only two levels of consideration below the Minister, namely: (*i*) Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary, and (*ii*) Joint Secretary/Additional Secretary/Secretary. Work should be assigned to each of these two levels on the lines of 'desk officer' system. Each level should be required and empowered to dispose of a substantial amount of work on its own, and be given the necessary staff assistance.

be possible to go in for more horizontal collaboration, where necessary, rather than fruitless vertical consultation all along the long line! The conventional 'organisation-chart' builders may be asked to forget for the time being, their old theoretical sophistry. Indeed, it may be necessary to juxtapose the order and build up the bureaucratic structure, in a development situation, from the top instead of from the bottom. If our purpose is to have a device for ensuring sound but quick decisions and also effective implementation, what is needed is a band of decision-makers and managers, the former framing the policy and the latter managing the programmes. They, in turn, would no doubt, require staff aid, but the 'aides' should not outnumber the real functionaries. Indeed, there is little justification in having a large underground base of ill-paid, frustrated and disgruntled public servants, as no super-structure can stand on such layers of sand! The emerging structure would, thus, not be pyramidal, though the top will remain more or less pointed and narrow. The base will be relatively small as against disproportionately broad as now and in the middle level, the span would be wide. It should be possible to think of a brigade commander (in the administrative sense of the term, (of course) without a full brigade. Seemingly absurd but perhaps worth a thought and try! The much-discussed officer-oriented pattern of bureaucratic arrangement reinforced by expert staff-aid of various kinds like personnel, finance, etc., and at different levels, both at the headquarters and the field, will go a long way to eliminate some of the age-old problems of delayed decision-making and implementation.

There should be, as the Administrative Reforms Commission says,[31] "maximum possible rather than minimum necessary" delegation of authority. Excessive centralism, based on lack of trust for others, may be ruinous for development. A rationally ordered dispersal scheme will involve trusting a man, whatever may be his station, with commensurate responsibility and expecting him to produce result independently as much as he can, without a parasitical reliance on the higher and superior bosses to execute everything for him. There must be better communication throughout the organisation about its objectives and all functionaries must be imbued, and indeed positively motivated, with the organisation goals. Not merely intra-organisational relationships but also inter-organisational behaviour patterns, and more so, the relations of administration with public must be structured and reshaped on much more constructive and sound lines. This obviously involves a stupendous exercise in human relations approach within the organisation and a bold imaginative public relations campaign outside to sell the developmental 'hard ware'.

[31]Administrative Reforms Commission, *Report on Delegation of Financial and Administrative Powers*, Government of India, New Delhi, 1969.

Unless there is adequate training of officials for development of personnel potentialities and faculties, or inculcation of correct attitudes towards work and the organisation objective, no experiments in structural and methods-innovation are going to succeed. There may be enough vegetative, better still weedy, growth of structural forms and procedural norms, but they will not bloom and flower at all. All structural 'explosions' and procedural boom will be drowned by the sheer weight and complexity and will ultimately reduce the system to next-to-nothing. Developmental bureaucracy to be effective must needs solve these stuctural-functional problems—though proper recruitment, well-oriented training and executive development programmes, and periodic 'spring-cleaning operations', etc.[32]

Irrelevance of Some Traditional Concepts

In this context, advocacy for jettisoning of some of the traditional and almost 'ritually' accepted 'concepts' connected with government service becomes awfully relevant. The whole business of 'security' of government employment *i.e*, the principle of 'once in, never out' requires a close critical look; indeed, a more purposive and a simpler method of 'hire and fire' but operated in cases of gross failure to deliver the goods may be tried with profit. Indiscriminate use of this 'fire' power may have 'boomerang' effect on the civil service which is already showing signs of strain in the matter of inducting good material into the public services. Even then there seems to be no logic at all in a taxpayer being forced to bear the burden of 'inefficiency', or in administration's tolerating a terrible load of proven incompetence! The whole chapter of employment-character and discipline and 'separation' may need to be redrafted. Another concept of dubious importance is the hierarchy and status connected with such hierarchy, both in a service or among the services. Over-emphasis on this hierarchy, even when it displays malfunctional traits, cannot obviously be justified. Another phenomenon which, according to many, has done incalculable harm to the development of 'democracy in bureaucracy', is the stultifying immobility in the services. Once one is 'born' in any service, whatever may be the initial circumstances of that birth, one has inevitably to flourish or suffer extinction in that service. A system in which late flowering of 'merit', competence, aptitude or even individual excellence must have to be subordinated to only a service 'label' can by no means be called rational or achievement-oriented, and, hence, must be counted as contra-developmental in character. A much more flexible and a much freer movement among the services on the criteria of merit,

[32]*Report of the Study Team on Machinery of Government and its Procedures of Work*, Ch. VII, Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of India, New Delhi, 1968.

aptitude, etc., perhaps should be the order of the personnel management system. As a minimum programme, the unification of the civil services with uniform conditions, pay and prestige, with no 'casteism' recognised or practised, should be attempted to salvage the lost morale of good many services! Class distinctions, wide differences in the conditions of service, and violent variations of norms in the matter of promotion and other vital service matters do exist, which go to seriously undermine and demolish the very concept that all sectors and functions of administration are equally important and, hence, all functionaries should be treated as equal role-players in the developmental drama. Apoplexy of privileges in one and anaemia of opportunities in others may one day lead to a complete collapse of the bureaucratic edifice. One may cite a simple illustrative example of adopting different norms for different services: in some superior services, 'good', as the yardstick for promotion, is good enough, whereas in other not so superior services, even 'very good' is treated as 'good-for-nothing'; in some, seniority is, for all practical purposes, the basis for promotion, while in others, outstanding merit is the criterion! Indeed, if 'meritocracy' has any merit in it, it is this that merit, wherever it is, must have to be watered, nurtured and allowed to flower!

Some other structural alternatives could also be thought of; one may be to experiment with two parallel 'developmental' hierarchies – one official and the other elective as in India's panchayati raj system or, as in some communist countries, the government bureaucracy can function side by side with party-hierarchy, one balancing the other as also complementing each other's inadequacies. The point taken here is that 'development' demands, administratively speaking, an inevitable de-emphasis on excessive centralism, cutting out too many competitive compartmentalised services, taking developmental decision-making down to the base-line through trusting as well as entrusting the lower levels or field officers with real, as distinct from 'paper', power to take on-the-spot decision, and, finally, shortening the length of the pipeline for consideration and case-handling and so on. This will vitally affect all three aspects of public bureaucracy, namely, structure, methods of working and the character of the personnel.

A New Look Bureaucracy

In short, a development bureaucracy must have a new look, a new spirit, different attitudes and professional skill in a technologically dominated age. To quote Fulton Report:

> Technological progress and the vast amount of new knowledge have made a major impact on these tasks and on the process of taking decisions. Siting a new airport, buying military supplies striking

> the right balance between coal, gas, oil and nuclear-powered electricity in a new energy policy—all these problems compel civil servants to use new techniques of analysis, management and coordination which are beyond those not specially trained in them.[33]

What is true in an advanced economy and a developed society like Britain, is also basically true in any developing and modernising community. In fact, leaving aside the technological sophistications, or some of the concrete problems of the west as such, the fundamental frame is the same: the administration working for change, a change accepted by the national policy-framers and bureaucrats master-minding the whole transformation-process. And in the process, the bureaucracy must also change so that it is not outpaced, outflanked or outmanoeuvred by the velocity of total societal change—technological, economic, political, and international.

The Need for Professionalism

This underscores the urgent need for professionalism in civil service and acquisition of appropriate skills, namely, conceptual, technical and human relations.

After dilating on the new tasks of the government, the Fulton Report talks about the qualitative aspect of the civil service as under:

> Even this brief and impressionistic description is perhaps enough to make it clear that, as a body, civil service today have to be equipped to tackle the political, scientific, social, economic and technical problems of our time. They have to be aware of interest and opinion throughout the country and of many developments abroad. In short, the civil service is no place for the amateur. It must be staffed by men and women who are truly professional.[34]

The professionalism in the civil service is an inescapable 'must' for the developing society can be disputed by none. To quote Administrative Reforms Commission's report on Personnel Administration:

> The three Study Teams dealing with Personnel Administration and the one on Machinery of the Government of India and its procedures of work are unanimously of the view that the future administration has to be increasingly oriented towards specialisation and that an important objective of personnel administration should

[33] *The Fulton Report—The Civil Service*, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1968, p. 10.

[34] *Ibid.*

be to create and nurture the needed specialism.[35]

Some Qualities of Development Administrator

This brings us to the qualities of development administrator, at least at the higher levels. There is no denying the fact that at lower and middle levels, the public servants must be 'functional' or, shall we say, a kind of specialist, either through pre-entry vocational or professional education or through post-entry specialisation in any branch of administration. As one moves up the steps of the responsibility ladder the qualities that become significant are not so much the practice of specific technical skills but certain sound general traits like balance, perspective sense, judgment, coordinative approach, far and foresight. Paul Appleby suggested the following three qualities as desirable in the high civil servant, namely:

(*i*) "The quality of philosophy"—the capacity to see public policy in terms of thousands of different actions and to relate these actions to each other in terms of public interest.
(*ii*) "The governmental sense"—the ingrained disposition to put the public interest first, etc.
(*iii*) The public relations or political sense![36]

The essential virtues that can be cited as critical in a development administrator are, thus: (*a*) 'culture', which gives him a liberal and balanced frame of mind and opens before him a healthy constructive perspective of men and matters, and (*b*) 'skill', and 'expertise' which equips him in the efficient discharge of professional functions.

These apart, a development administrator must be action-motivated; committed (not merely from a rational angle but emotionally as well) to developmental ideology as his article of faith should be "more free wheeling, less adhering to administrative forms, less attached to importance of hierarchy and status";[37] should have a problem solving approach and not an unduly legalistic and routinistic precedent-bound attitude; should be concerned more with result and achievement than with mere rule application; and must never be a prisoner of indecision. As Hoover

[35]The Administrative Reforms Commission, India, *Report on the Personnel Administration*, Government of India, New Delhi, April, 1969, Ch. III. It is not possible to go into the details of the four Study Teams' recommendations referred to above, for lack of space. The author proposes to do a full article on "Professionalism in the Civil Service", where the various parameters of this problem will be tackled.

[36]Paul H. Appleby, *Big Democracy*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Inc. 1945, p. 43.

[37]La Palombara, *op. cit.*

Commission's Task Force said;[38] "his foresight must equal the insight of a host of critics". The development administrator, being the captain of a team, must be a dynamic coordinator of a group effort, and not an individualistic leader: the symbol 'leader', in the words of Fritz Redl,[39] has become "anachronistic and should be replaced by the terms, central or focal person". In short, the developmental bureaucrat has to be "analytical as a thinker, creative and dynamic as a goal setter; pragmatic as a planner, and innovative as a programme."[40]

CONCLUSION

In any scheme for developmental bureaucracy, structural refabrication is indeed necessary; so are the methods and procedures of work. Unless these two are tailored to the particular needs, and reformed to conform to the newer norms of changed ethos, it is impossible to move the 'machine' towards the determined goal and achieve desired level of development! But much more significant, from the angle of model-making for a developmental bureaucracy, is the man, the bureaucrat, the raw material! Unless this man is made to look different or asked to think differently or motivated to function more purposively, no amount of investment in structural sophistication or modernisation in machine-procedure will be in a position to hit the jackpot by way of raising the level of developmental productivity. The critical ingredient, the bureaucrat himself, must, therefore, be freed from the existing conceptual orthodoxies, age old affiliations and narrow mental grooves so as to be the fitting torch bearer of a new and bright development order! □

[38]The Hoover Commission, *Report of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Services.*

[39]Fritz Redl, "Group Emotions and Leadership", *Psychiatry*, November 1962.

[40]Taken from a paper presented by the author to a seminar on *Development and Bureaucracy* in the Institute of Social Studies, the Hague, 1968.

Bureaucracy's Response to New Challenges*

R. N. Haldipur

ANY ORGANISATION, big or small, has rules of procedure and a machinery to implement the prescribed objectives. This goes by the name bureaucracy. A bureaucratic organisation has certain well-defined characteristics, such as the assignment of specific duties and responsibilities to every member of the organisation, distribution of adequate authority for the effective performance of duties, the fashioning of the administrative structure on a hierarchical basis and the formulation of rules and procedures for the transaction of business. Such a bureaucracy, in a wider sense, could be a force of conservatism or one which would usher in modernisation since it is an instrument of a political system. Bureaucracy cuts across all politico-administrative systems.

We, in India, are still in a transitional society, moving from traditionality to modernism. We had "a long tradition of authoritarianism and institutionalism". The caste, class and the feudal heritage still dominate our social fabric. In the words of Nirad Chaudhuri[1], "An extraordinary thing about all the civilisations of India is that they have been superstructures imposed on a primitive, peasant, labour, and artisan community which itself has hardly changed since the end of the neolithic age in western Asia. This basic community has supported successive cultures by supplying food, land revenue, goods, and services; it has also been partially influenced by the cultures; but it has never made any positive contribution to any culture, nor been the active enemy of any." While one may not fully agree with this judgement on our past heritage, the fact that time stood still till the advent of the freedom movement is very evident from the recorded history where wars were earlier fought to exhibit personal prowess and later for accumulation of wealth and power, leaving the large mass of population insulated to remain as bystanders at the fringe of history. Not that there were no bright patches of enlightened rule encouraging culture, arts and good administration.

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXII, No. 1, 1976, pp. 1-15.

[1]Nirad Chaudhuri, *The Intellectual in India*, New Delhi, Vir Publishing House, 1967, pp. 27-28.

During the freedom struggle, a clarion call was given to oust the colonial ruler. The mutiny of 1857 showed up the crack in the British armour for the first time, but it took along time after that to articulate the 'protest' in a meaningful way and to make people realise that the system imposed on them did not meet their basic needs. This was brought home to the intelligentsia, which in some cases reacted violently and in others sought intervention through the very liberal thought which was inherited from the 'home country'. While such efforts on the part of many great leaders remained as isolated events, they gave a sense of direction to the freedom movement. Such protests, however, became a continuous struggle under Gandhiji's leadership. His charismatic role not only tried to 'disorient politically' the erstwhile collaboration of the colonial power from among the educated elite and the business-men, but stretched its magic charm through meaningful symbols to transform society and reconstruct the rural areas. The 'Dandi March' is a classic example, using salt which is a ubiquitous symbol, to fire the imagination of the masses. In his inimitable style, he addressed himself to every segment of the population—tried to persuade the masses, to ridicule the rich, to cajole and influence them. He wanted every one to be in this struggle. He thought of a total revolution to transform the quality of life and the basic attitudes of people who had been groaning under the colonial rule and a caste-ridden society. If this silent revolution had continued to spread its spell after independence, probably both bureaucracy and the political system would have had a different complexion altogether. His thought and the emphasis that he laid on the value system where ends do not justify means but both are an integral part of the process of growth of a society were of such relevance to a developing country like ours that this would have enabled us to seek and achieve an identity of our own, lending dignity to our people and developing the vast human resource within our country.

The crux of his philosophy could be summarised thus:

1. Addressing the power elite, he said, "I will give you a talisman. Whenever you are in doubt, or when the self becomes too much with you, apply the following test. Recall the face of the poorest and the weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself if the step you contemplate is going to be of any use to him. Will he gain anything by it? Will it restore him a control over his own life and destiny? In other words, will it lead to Swaraj for the hungry and spiritually starving millions? Then you will find your doubts and your self melting away."

He was afraid that the bureaucrat and the politician, who, when com-

bined, represent untrammelled power, need to be kept under check by a group who can get the people to exercise what Etzioni calls "normative and social power". He wanted to minimise the dichotomy between the elite and the masses. This would have resulted in the deemphasisation of the hierarchy in our social, political and administrative structures. The elite would have been both responsive and socially responsible. It would have enabled them to know the people better. They would have spent more time in solving urgent problems of the citizen. "The apathetic discontentment and pathetic contentment" of the masses had given place to a growing ennui and lack of faith in some of our institutions. Through this talisman mentioned above, Gandhiji wanted to energise the people and wanted to do something similar to what Mao Tse Tung had done when he declared to Andre Malraux that "we must teach the masses clearly what we have received from them confusedly."[2]

2. On the prevailing social system in which the more educated we were, the less cultured we tended to be, thus contributing towards a process of alienation, Gandhiji said "such a society is necessarily highly cultured in which every man or woman knows what he or she wants, and, what is more, knows that no one should want anything that the others cannot have with equal labour."[3]

To Gandhiji no job was too small. At his ashram at Wardha, the great leaders of India did scavenging with as much gusto as they planned for the struggle to evict the British. This is something similar to what Mao has been saying "...a high degree of passion and zeal should be generated for even the most mundane tasks,...school quizzes, selling pork or spreading manure, as objects of revolutionary struggle."[4] This is possible if the above aphorism of Gandhiji is incorporated in our value system and if we do not get alienated and firmly believe that one should not ask for anything more that the others cannot have with equal labour.

3. In his succinct words "one step is enough for me"[5], he stressed the need for the identification of the vital needs of the people, and poined out how important it is to concentrate on them

[2]Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1972, p. 82.

[3]B.N. Ganguli, *Gandhi's Social Philosophy: Perspective and Relevance*, Delhi, Vikas, 1973, p. 157.

[4]Martin King Whyte, "Bureaucracy and Modernization in China: The Maost Critique", *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, April 1973, p. 155.

[5]R. N. Haldipur, "Ambivalent Society", *Kurukshetra* (Republic Day Number), January 1963.

instead of embarking on a series of widely diffused efforts in several directions. The main objective would be the substantial satisfaction of the large majority of the people. Pareto's law of the vital few and the trivial many, if modified to apply to projects and programmes, would become not only relevant but of a compelling nature in a country of scarce resources. If the political parties were to accept a minimum programme and strain every nerve to implement it, we shall be going very far indeed, because the material is good and people have exhibited time and over again that they can work hard if there is a sense of urgency built up and the goals are clearly defined.

4. His emphasis on local self-government, creating leadership at all levels, decentralisation of power and building up of self-reliant village communities has a lot of relevance to a large country of ours which is multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and has people of all centuries living together at the same point in time. To him development meant a fuller participation of people in the achievement of the essential goals. Gandhiji used to talk of 'concentric circles' in which smaller villages were linked with others in bigger circles. He conceived of them in terms of 'oceanic waves'[6] and talked of villages being connected to a larger periphery around, in satisfying their needs for goods and services. The same thought was once expressed by Aneurin Bevan, when he said: "The whole art of local government is to estimate catchment areas for dealing with particular services before deciding where boundaries of these services should be drawn." Gandhiji wanted to restore confidence in the masses—make the ordinary man feel that he matters—and thus build up what Gunnar Myrdal calls 'upward pressures'.

But our society has instead reached a stage which is best characterised by the words of Eric Hoffer: "When a mass-movement begins to attract people who are interested in their individual careers, it is a sign that it has passed its vigorous stage; that it is no longer engaged in moulding a new world but in possessing and preserving the present. It ceases then to be a movement and becomes an enterprise."[7]

One cannot visualise what kind of bureaucracy would have been formed as a result of the non-violent revolution that Gandhiji dreamt of. Certainly it would have been different, attuned to the value-system which he provided and in tune with the ideals and urges which inspired the freedom struggle. Probably it would have had the Indian ethos.

[6]R.N. Haldipur, "Relevance of Community Development", *Kurukshetra*, Vol. 20, No. 1, October 1971.

[7]Eric Hoffer, "The True Believer", *New York Time*, Incorporated, 1963, p. 13.

The inter-elite and intra-elite conflicts which are visible today, whether between the so-called generalists and the technocrats or between various classes in a hierarchy, the administration by alibi where both the politicians and the bureaucrats level charges of failure against one another and the confrontation between management and labour, would not have presented the dilemmas which we face today. Now, it would probably require a very great transformation to enable people to identify their individual interests and local needs with the national goals. In the words of Shrimati Indira Gandhi: "only that society is truly socialist in which the feeling of being exploited has given place to a willing and cheerful participation in national tasks and personal and social objectives are not in conflict."[8] Unfortunately, this transformation has so far not taken place.

The values which Gandhiji disseminated implied duties rather than rights, austerity, discipiline, hardwork and a grave social and personal responsibility. The British protective umbrella, however, had softened us and we had started with the baggage of the past in our anxiety and genuine compulsions to solve the problems created by the transfer of power. We wanted to keep the wolf away. Very few countries have started out with greater initial difficulties of political, economic and administrative character. We had to handle phenomenal problems of law and order caused by the sudden division of the country and the creation of Pakistan, a theocratic state. The migration of population, intermittent violence, the integration of the princely states, the rehabilitation of refugees, the surfacing of elements whose vested interests independence had shaken off, had all to be talcked with great determination and speed. In this task, there was hardly any escape from getting the best out of the existing structure rather than tinkering with it. It was a Hobson's choice and the post-independence leaders had to make the best use of available tools so that the new State, whose life had been estimated to be short-lived by the erstwhile rulers, could be stabilised and given a shape and character. Whatever the inheritance was, it had to be fully utilised. In any case, the resources were scarce and the problems many. Since then, there has been no time or opportunity to look back. The three wars, swelling streams of nearly a crore of refugees from Bangla Desh, the periodical famines and floods, each had to be tackled firmly and speedily. And, for what they were worth, the bureaucrats did meet these challenges.

If we look at our country's development from this angle, one does not know whether, in this short period of its existence, one could say that it has failed; since we were able to telescope all that was done in developed countries over a couple of centuries. We could certainly be proud of our Constitution, enshrining the values of secularism and

[8] "P.M. for New Spirit in Administration", *Patriot*, New Delhi, May 31, 1971.

democratic socialism, the freedom that we enjoy, the vast infrastructure in terms of transport and basic industry, the forward looking idealism of Nehru which set the pace and gave a sense of direction in almost every field, from science and technology to art, culture and tribal development. In the words of Gunnar Myrdal,[9] "The glory of India's heritage from the liberation struggle and the first decade of its political independence was its firm adherence to the ideals of the secular State and in foreign policy and its renouncement of power politics which is the deeper meaning of Nehru's policy of non-alignment." In this creative adventure, could we say that bureaucracy played no part? In the given circumstances, bureaucracy has sought to influence policy decisions and implement the mandate given to it, from time to time, with hard work, and understanding, though lacking in a long-term perspective and flexibility. The latter has been so because it has been riding a tiger throughout these years, going from one crisis to another.

In the life of a nation, particularly a developing country with feudal overtones, centuries of tradition, a colonial past and a complex social structure, the very fact that there has been continuity and stability, with democracy surviving in spite of several shocks and upheavals, shows that the heart beat of the nation is sound and that bureaucracy has assiduously done its maintenance and remedial tasks. The credit for this, to some extent, can certainly be given to the framers of our five year plans who provided for the infrastructure of power, irrigation, heavy industry, public sector undertakings and the transport network. There was also the community development movement which, in spite of an investment ranging only from Re. 1 to Rs. 3 per capita per annum, attempted to make an over-populated, poor society viable in the midst of structural and cultural contradictions. Nevertheless, it gave a new orientation to the bureaucrats and brought them closer to the people.

The task of any government is complex. It is far from being that of selling a particular brand of chocolate, soap or cigarettes in an ever consuming market. In our country, it is all the more challenging "India is an old society but a new nation. There are paradoxes of modernising situations . . . There is a vast hinterland of tradition. It has a split-image of the future. The links between its modernising elites and tradition-oriented masses are tenuous. Its macro and micro-politics do not always move in unison."[10] Most of us have been scratching the back of the macro system while suggesting a panacea for the evils. We often seem to forget that the cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity, though

[9]Gunnar Myrdal, *The Future of India* (mimeo.), adapted from two articles, one "India's New Role Following Victory" published in the Indian press for the Republic Day, January 26, 1972 and the other "Growth and Social Justice", *The Economic Times*, Annual, October 1972, the latter published in *World Development*, 1973.

[10]S.C. Dube, *Modernisation and Its Adaptive Demands on Indian Society* (mimeo.).

rich and colourful, has in-built problems which lend themselves to inner contradictions on the unfolding canvas of economic and social development. On this canvas, we have superimposed a political system, a mode of economic planning and modern industrial culture which is alien. It takes time to absorb this transplant into the body of the nation ".. as a practical matter, all of the bureaucracies of the developing areas are likely to be dual in character, reflecting the transitional nature and the conflicting needs of societies themselves. In such a setting, the 'primitive' will be juxtaposed with the 'modern', the traditional with the legal-rational. If, as Hoselitz hypothesises, economic development requires a streamlined and highly rationalised bureaucracy, many of the structures of a dual society will tend to undercut this goal. Whether, in order to push ahead economically, the political elite should seek to eradicate the traditional structure or seek somehow to harness it to developmental plans is not as easy a problem to resolve as we might assume."[11] We are prone to ride roughshod over the traditional elements but "traditional ways have amazing survival power; they are capable of adapting to even the most radical changes in the formal organisational structure. And, as national bureaucratic planners in India are learning, the implementation of developmental schemes will have to occur as modified by traditional and parochial influences or it may not take place at all."[12] We shall, therefore, have to ask whether a system is technically appropriate, culturally compatible and economically sound.

Since bureaucracy has a pivotal role in the development of the country, it has also to do a lot of heart-searching from time to time. While it is true that the political elite and bureaucracy had to face serious challenges and much hard work in the decades gone by, both will have to ask themselves a number of questions. As a matter of fact, the entire elite-group will have to pose these questions to themselves if they mean serious business. Margaret Mead,[13] in her inimitable style, quipped: "In each age, there is a series of pressing questions which must be asked and answered. On the correctness of the question depends the survival of those who ask; on the quality of the answers depends the quality of the life of those survivors who lead." There are few things as useless—not dangerous—as the right answer to the wrong questions.[14] Some of the vital questions in the Indian context are:

1. What sort of a society do we want to live in?

[11]Joseph La Palombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1963, pp. 12-13.

[12]*Ibid.*, p. 13.

[13]Margaret Mead, *New Lives for Old—Cultural Transformation of Manus*, Gollancz, 1956.

[14]Peter Drucker, *The Effective Executive*, London, William Heinemann Ltd., 1967.

2. What does modernisation mean to us or should mean to us?
3. What system of organisation will work well in the social, economic and political context of our society?
4. What weight do we give to the rights and wishes of the providers of service as against the users?
5. How do we make administration responsive to the fast changing needs of Indian society and democracy?

Power is the life-blood of any bureaucracy. How well and appropriately can this be used to achieve the objectives of the State? We shall have to seek a balance between maintenance of democratic values, participation of the people, optimum use of our scarce resources and the full involvement of the technocrat whose professional skills and expertise are necessary for the growing complexity of administration along with those of the generalist who can retain his broad approach to the social and economic aspects of our system. The problem of decision-making is not merely a problem of expertise, it is also a problem of restoring confidence in the people. Professional education has remained narrow, static, sterile and ill-adjusted to the challenges of the future. It suffers from a lack of value-orientation. Similarly, general education is not pragmatic in character. It does not build up entrepreneurial skills. It is generally the elite who have failed to rise to the occasion. They have become prophets of doom and despair. In the past, they were happy because they were able to create conditions of investment for economic growth and keep enough surpluses for themselves. Today, the elite are in disarray as they are unable to both satisfy themselves and also have enough surpluses for economic growth and distributive justice. This has led to growing confrontation and the different elite groups are in search of an alibi. The elite are in this state of health. Our diagnosis and prescriptions are like the curate's egg—good in parts. Either they are the offshoots of an imported model true of an affluent society of a perception based upon our urban-oriented training and style of life. The challenges at the micro-level are growing with the passage of time. However, fortunately, rural India has great resilience and power of recovery. We cannot judge it by the violence and unrest that we see in the metropolitan cities and university campuses. The average Indian has borne the brunt of a hard and difficult life with tolerance, fortitude and confidence.

Bureaucracy cannot be viewed in isolation. It is an integral part of a political process and social structure and derives its strength and weakness from them. It is " . . . a social system immersed in an external environment, and is closely inter-related with numerous forces ordinarily considered external to the system."[15] In his article, *A Dirty World*?,

[15]Harry Cohen, *The Demonics of Bureaucracy*, Anes, Iowa, The Iowa State University Press, 1965, p. 223.

Haksar,[16] invites our attention to "the grim reality of the lack of inner coherence in our entire social, economic, political and cultural existence. No dominant value system has yet emerged and the past broods heavily on the present. Some day, perhaps, the imperatives of modernisation of our economy and our society will create the new value system."

He pleads for a three-fold transformation of ". . . secularism in thought and action, honesty, integrity and hard work as ethical compulsions, austerity, national pride, sustained by intellectual and spiritual self-reliance and some regard for the scientific temper. Only when such a value system dominates our social life and sustains our educational processes can we talk meaningfully about commitment."

While bureaucracy assiduously attends to the day-to-day tasks, the essence of what Gandhiji said about having a coherent value system in tune with our ethos has escaped our attention. In the words of Gunnar Myrdal,[17] "If Indian planning has not been more successful than it has actually been, the main explanation is that they have not kept so close as they should to the fundamentals of the teaching of the Father of the Nation."

Public administration today impinges upon the citizen at every point. This puts a premium on value-sensitivity, as against mere marshalling of facts and use of techniques. "The concept of decision is a compound of both fact and value. The politician and the public administrator are expected to decide on other's values and expectations. They have to develop a propensity to discover many complex values. A decision in Delhi could influence the subcontinental events and the destinies of millions. Where there is a low degree of vocal organisation of interest, much care is needed in taking into account all the values involved and the politician may be thankful for the help of a politically acute and anonymous administrator in spotting the multitude of values involved."[18] The position is easier in countries where nearly all values have their local advocates. Where such a situation does not exist, the political parties do fill in this gap to some extent. "For society at large and for general public interest, there are no brokers so skilful, so widely exposed, so accountable, as the party politicians."[19] In our country, while we have what M. Weiner called 'politics of scarcity', we also

[16]P.N. Haksar, "A Dirty World?", *Seminar*, 168, A Committed Civil Service, August, 1973.

[17]Gunnar Myrdal, *The Human Dimensions of Economic Growth—The Challenge of Stagnation in Underdeveloped Countries* (mimeo.). Opening Address to the Second One Asia Assembly, February 5, 1973.

[18]V. Subramaniam, "The Fact-Value Distinction as an Analytical Tool", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January-March 1971.

[19]Paul H. Appleby, *Public Administration for a Welfore State*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1961.

have a scarcity of politics since political consciousness, ideologies and programmes have yet to percolate down to the village level. This lacuna will have, at present, to be filled in by the officials. It is, therefore, necessary for the administrators, at various levels, to be alive to the urges prevailing in society and respond to them. We need, therefore, a bureaucracy which has a blending of sensitivity to the value-system of society in which it operates, along with professional skills. It has to be socially responsible, it has to be responsive to the many diverse urges of people and the complex nexus of values which beset a transitional society.

This is particularly urgent today because the growing disparity between the developed and the under-developed world, the haves and the have-nots in society, the sprawling cities and the gaping countryside, the increasing tempo of technological development and the lack of the spread of distributive justice have created such a chasm that there is a feeling of deprivation. This has created an inner "contradiction of the co-existence of the non contemporaneous".[20] This gap has been exacerbated by mass media and is bound to be felt increasingly in the rural areas, resulting in an impatience to close the gap.

It is true that bureaucracy is more concerned with form than substance. It is attracted by the magic of the written word. It is depersonalised. Rules chase evasion and evasion has a way of finding a break-through. This has led to cumbersome rules and a long pipe-line of case-handling. The best brains in bureaucracy are held to ransom by all knowing people who are experts in rules. At the same time, its virtue lies in its value-sensitivity and ability to work in a pluralistic society. Long ago, Gandhiji warned us about the elitism of the new oligarchy of the technological era. Such an oligarchy is bound to come one day, whether we like it or not. Maybe, it has a rightful place and it is desirable to have it, but a bureaucracy which can function in a democratic polity and a pluralistic society has its own place. Such a bureaucracy has not only some of the Weberian characteristics but in the Indian context. it has to be alert and responsive, with a tolerance of ambiguity. It has to be pro-active than reactive and see the various segments of growth in a totality. In this context the confrontation between the generalists and the technocrats is irrelevant. Similarily, the sharp distinction between the regulatory administration and the developmental administration is irrelevant in a developing society, as both are mutually interactive. If there is perpetual threat and violence and lack of stability, development becomes impossible. Similarly, if an area is neglected and remains in the backwaters, the imbalance could result in lawlessness and disaster. We cannot polarise civil service attitudes into developmental and non-developmental. The developmental process itself creates new dimensions of law and order

[20]Paulo Freire, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

while the latter could pose a problem when there is an absence of development.

One does not know what kind of bureaucracy would suit the future challenges. Some have predicted that in the not too distant future, many countries will be catapulted into a space-age, living in a 'throw-away society', of paper wedding gowns and portable play-grounds, with 'the modular man'—a new over-stimulated nomad—roaming about on the globe, seeking, all the time, zones of personal stability.[21] With the organisational upheaval and the collapse of hierarchy, rigid rules, regulations and pre-determined systems might become irrelevant. In his *Future Shock*, Alvin Toffler has predicted the death of permanence; man's very existence will have to be integrated into a technological era, foreboding a concept of transience with inexorably fast changes demanding speedy answers through suddenly summoned task-forces which will disappear as soon as the problem is solved, giving place to new ones. That will be the end of bureaucracy as we know it now and we shall begin 'looking behind' for something which can solve the problems of such a neosociety of robot-like men who are neither loyal to an organisation nor to a profession or society. Professional loyalties become only short-term commitments in an interdisciplinary world, where one is uncommitted except to the changing enviroment, where one "can play with problems, have exotic intellectual mergers the 'organisation man' becoming an 'associate', moving from slot to slot".[22]

However, one is inclined to believe that man will always be in search of his identity and would like to have peace with, on the one hand, his ethos and collective sub-consciousness and, on the other, with the environmental pressures which impinge on him. His siprit will revolt against this concept of transience which would make him feel that he is a part of a 'perpetual flux'.

Nathan Pusey, an ex-President of Harvard University, once said: "Solutions to difficult situations do not come quickly outside fairy tales. They never have and they never will. They require patience and knowledge, determination and conciliation." Though bureaucracies have been damned, condemned and satirised as if they were a forbidden fruit eaten by our ancestors, yet they continue to be a part of any system of organised living. One has to seek conciliation between flexibility on the one side and the rule of law on the other. The advocates of the thesis that there should be a complete overhaul of the government system tend to ignore that innovations do not come by the dozen. Further, for translating new ideas into action, hard and systematic work is necessary. It is easy for people to suggest radical change in a system, but it is evident that whether in the capitalist world or in the commun-

[21]Toffler Alvin, *Future Shock*, London, Bodley Head, 1970.
[22]*Ibid.*

ist world, a bureaucratic structure has emerged out of the ideological moorings with more or less the same face and same inhibiting factors caused by structure, and procedures. It is easy to talk of a brave new world and suggest putting 'the house on fire' but to obtain results one cannot behave like the wise old owl which advised a centipede to get rid of its surplus legs that were afflicted by arthritis, but when asked how to go about, it said that it was responsible only for giving 'policy decisions' and it was up to the centipede to find ways and means of implementing them. Most of us are like what Dr. Peter said in his book, "they saved the others, themselves they could not save". Mere talk of 'enterprise' could result in "confusion, lack of follow-through and a disregard for system that approaches anarchy."[23] Both stability and change have to be blended together if one has relentlessly to attain the objectives of the state.

This certainly implies a clear perception of our social structure, value orientation, the strengths and weaknesses of our society, the leadership pattern and from this anatomy of the present we should work out the direction in which we should move so that changes could be brought about which are relevant to our life style and which could be effected within the resources at our disposal. Administrative practices cannot be imported and applied without adapting them to our own situations.

This, however, is not a plea for the *status quo*. Any cosmetic treatment would not be enough to solve the problems of the morrow. Gandhiji, who was a 'radical leveller', started with the value framework as the first essential step, stressing the ends and means nexus. All events and programmes could be fitted into such a framework. Unless we, as a nation, agree on the fundamentals, replacing conspicuous consumption by austerity, collective bargaining by hard work and discipline, removing disparities between the private and the public sectors, having a national-income-wage-and-price policy leading to productivity, land reforms, ceilings on urban and rural incomes and the mopping up of surplus money, a minimum needs programme in the rural areas and the creation of agro-based industries using, as far as possible, intermediate technology disbursed and diversified all over the countryside so that there are a large number of centres which could function as magnets to take the surplus population from nearby villages and usefully employ them in secondary and tertiary activities—there is no hope of tangible achievement. In a country of our size and diversity, decentralisation and delegation of power—so that shared power could generate more power at various levels and enable the building up of leadership by people participating in administrative and developmental activities—should unleash the energies of the faceless millions into

[23]Frederick C. Dyer and John M. Dyer, *Bureaucracy* vs. *Creativity*, Coral Gables, University of Miami Press, 1965, p. 27.

constructive channels. This does not mean that bureaucracy should abdicate its responsibility in providing its hand in policy-making. In any decision-making process and policy formulation, there is always a need to work out, in detail, the strategic programmes and suitable administrative organisations and operational steps. Administrative planning begins where economic planning ends. It is a conveyor system where there is no dichotomy between planning and implementation, but there is always a feedback from the implementation to make planning much more purposeful. From time to time, we have seen how in moments of crisis bureaucracy has risen to deliver the goods. This sense of urgency has to be created which could result in hard and sustained work. India has been described as a 'soft state' and to belie this charge, bureaucracy can and will have to lend its hand in ensuring that the policies are conceived in such a way that they are relevant to our conditions and that they are implemented with patience and conviction. It is necessary to build up a coherent policy, bereft of inconsistencies, by substituting departmental contests by an inspired social purpose so that people belonging to different sectors of the economy and departments can work in unison to achieve the objectives set before the state. We have often seen how our dialectical way of thinking has unhinged the planning process and where the seed of destruction is sown within the plant itself. We seem to thrive on these contradictions. We talk of austerity but our mass media blare out consumerism day in and day out. Our newspapers highlight violence and lack of discipline when creative endeavours and the peaks of excellence in our society need to be publicised, instead of leaving them buried under the bushel. We talk of hard work when ceremonies and functions take most of the time which could be devoted to purposeful work.

Bureaucracy, while it has faced many a challenge in the past, will have to be forward-looking, human in content and flexible enough to lend stability while moving forward to keep the momentum of change—going fast enough to see that every tear from the faces of the millions is wiped out and the hungry man gets at least one square meal per day. Here Gandhiji's talisman could serve as a guiding light to the bureaucrat in his day-to-day and moment-to-moment functioning.

The dream of an administrator should be that some day he would find a way to the potential of the people and mobilise their dormant energies for the fulfilment of the tasks in hand and share with his associates a mutually deep vision of what a truly inspired human organisation can achieve. Each of us has some distinctive and individual contribution that he can make in the realisation of this dream. One should be inspired by the epitaph: "For their tomorrow, we shall give our today." Then only we shall be leaving behind a safe world. □

A Uniform Organisational Pattern for Developmental Administration*

Abida Samiuddin

NEARLY TWO decades are over since the inception of panchayati raj in the country but it is still in a state of flux. However, its functioning has also supported the belief that it is not a complete failure. What is required is to judge the whole system in its proper perspective. It will be no use trying to stop a leak here or plug a hole there. The grassroot institutions need structural reforms, revised administrative techniques, and adequate financial resources matching with their responsibilities, in order to be fully geared to undertake the challenging task ahead. This study is confined only to one aspect of the problem—the organisational pattern of developmental administration at the district level.

It was in 1957 that the Balwant Rai Mehta Committee made the revolutionary recommendation of a three-tier system of democratic decentralisation—village panchyat, panchayat samiti and the zila parishad—entrusted with the entire developmental administration. The block was recommended as the main unit of planning and organisation on the basis of the Aristotelian principle of being neither too large to defeat the very purpose of creation, nor so small as to militate against efficiency and economy. At the district level, a new body—zila parishad—was to replace the then existing district boards. It was primarily to perform the functions of supervision and control.

While advocating an advisory body at the district level, the Mehta Committee had left the pattern to be evolved, by each state, giving due consideration to the viewpoints of UP and Bombay states, and had remarked that a very strong executive body also be created by some States according to their local conditions. The team observed: "These recommendations give an overall picture of the machinery which is considered essential for democratic decentralisation, which alone can lead to effective rural development. Some of the state governments have, however, expressed the view that in the circumstances obtained in their states they consider it advisable and convenient to devolve power on a local body whose jurisdiction is as large as a district. While we are

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convinced that devolution to a smaller body would be the most effective method of democratic decentralisation, we do not refuse to visualise similar devolution to a district body indeed."[1]

Endorsing the views of the Mehta Committee and taking into consideration the possibility of different organisational patterns in different states in the context of their economic, social and political set-up, the Central Council of Local Self-Government observed in 1959: "In fact our country is so large and panchayati raj is so complex a subject with far-reaching consequence that there is enough scope for trying out various patterns and alternatives. What is important is the genuine transfer of power to the people. If this is ensured the form and pattern may necessarily vary according to conditions prevailing in different states."

Accordingly most of the states appointed committees to recommend suitable patterns for them and the result was a bewildering variety in the different states.

The emerging patterns in spite of many local variations can, however, be classified under two broad categories: (*a*) the Rajasthan pattern, the original model, as devised by the Mehta Committee, with a strong panchayat samiti and an advisory and coordinating zila parishad, and (*b*) the Maharashtra pattern, the subsequent model, based on the recommendations of the Naik Committee, with a strong zila parishad and a weak panchayat samiti acting simply as the executing agency of the former. The detailed features of the two patterns are given below.

RAJASTHAN PATTERN

Rajasthan was the first state to introduce panchayati raj in India in 1959. As envisaged by the Mehta Committee, panchayats at the village level, panchayat samitis at the block level and the zila parishads at the district level constitute the pyramid of the panchayati raj in the state.

The village panchayats are constituted directly. They are made responsible for the improvement of agriculture; cattle preservation, public health, maternity and child welfare, construction and repair of village roads, markets, warehouses, bridges, drains, spreading of education, watch and ward, etc. They are also supposed to organise cooperative and voluntary labour as well as to assist in the implementation of land reforms. The *sarpanch* of a panchayat works as its executive officer.

The panchayat samiti, the most powerful link of the the three tiers, is constituted indirectly. The *sarpanchas* of all the panchayats within a block area are its *ex officio* members in addition to representatives of

[1]*Report of the Study Team for the Study of Community Projects and National Extension Service*, 1957, p. 22.

special interests, who are coopted, *e.g.*, agriculture, women folk, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and cooperatives. Local members of the Vidhan Sabha are also members of the panchayat samiti, without the right to vote. The chairman (*pradhan*) and vice-chairman (*up-pradhan*) of the samiti are elected by the members of the samiti itself.

The samiti is responsible for all development work at the block level. Acting through panchayats, the samitis provide services covering almost every aspect of life of the area. They supervise the activities of the panchayats, specially the execution of all developmental programmes relating to agriculture, animal husbandry, cooperation, industries, public health, sanitation, medical relief, relief of the distressed, welfare of the weaker sections, supply of drinking water, primary education, etc. The object is to hand over gradually more and more activities related to the block sphere (and undertaken at present by the various departments) to the panchayat samitis. They are expected to make full use of the administrative and technical assistance provided by the various state departments. In technical matters, the decision of the technical department is final. Panchayat samitis enjoy full freedom in framing the budget and formulating the plans for development. They function through functional sub-committees, their minimum number being three. They have to look after the production programmes, social services, and finance, taxes and administration.

Once a decision is taken by the samiti, its implementation becomes the responsibility of the executive, headed by the *vikas adhikari*, who plays the most important role in the whole system. He has to deal with different groups of people and is expected to make available his administrative skill to the non-official members, without influencing their decisions. The *vikas adhikari* is assisted by a team of extension officers.

The zila parishad consists of the *pradhan* of the panchayat samitis in the district, members of parliament and state legislators of the area, the collector as the *ex officio* member of the parishad (without the right to vote) and such other district level officers as are nominated by the government. The president of the Central Cooperative Bank is also an *ex officio* member of the parishad. Like the panchayat samiti the parishad coopts two women, one scheduled tribe member, one scheduled caste member and two persons of adequate administrative experience. The officers of the development department are entitled to attend its meetings and participate in the discussion. It elects its own chairman (*pramukh*) and vice-chairman (*up-pramukh*).

The zila parishads are given the responsibility of coordination and supervision of the activities of the lower rungs of the tier. They approve the budget of the samitis, without modifying proposals. If the zila parishad fails to return the budget of the samiti within the prescribed time, the Collector is authorised to allow the samiti to follow its budget.

The zila parishads work through four or five standing committees, each consisting of 7 members, 5 elected and 2 coopted.

The special features of the scheme are that no supervisory body is authorised to modify the budget proposals of the lower body.

Zila parishads have no executive functions of their own.

Local politicians are associated with the samitis and the parishads.

District level officials of the samitis and the parishads participate in the proceedings and though without the right to vote (in the order to ensure the democratic functioning of these bodies), their presence is likely to influence the decision-making process.

The Collector or the District Development Officer is to play a dual role. In his capacity as the district development officer, he has to see that the district plans are properly drawn up, and as a representative of the state government, he has to see that the decisions of the parishad are duly implemented. He exercises control over the district level officers of all development departments to ensure coordination. The result is that his powers as well as influence have both increased.

MAHARASHTRA PATTERN

The Maharashtra pattern is based on the recommendations of the Naik Committee,[2] appointed by the Maharashtra Government immediately after the formation of the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra, and came into existence in 1962.

Technically the pattern consists of only two tiers, *i.e.*, the zila parishad and the village panchayat. The samiti is discarded. On the other hand, the Naik Committee suggested that a vast majority of the schemes and functions handed over to the local bodies could effectively be performed only at the district level. Determining the contents of decentralisation, the Committee divided the schemes of the local bodies into district, taluka/block and village schemes, on the basis of their economic content and efficient implementation by the different local bodies.

District level schemes	—Rs. 29.9 crores
Taluka level schemes	—Rs. 5.9 crores
Village level schemes	—Rs. 0.8 crores

The Committee further examined the problem of the staff available to these local bodies and concluded that "Both administrative and technical staff which could be available at the taluka/block level would not by itself be adequate for the proper implementation of the schemes." Therefore, the Committee felt that the district body was the best

[2]The Committee on Democratic Decentralisation, Cooperation and Rural Development, Government of Maharashtra, 1960.

operative unit of local administration as that body alone would be capable of providing the requisite resources the necessary administrative and technical personnel and equipment required for a properly coordinated development of the district. If decentralisation was to be real and effective, it would be imperative to establish a strong executive body at the district level. Contrary to the recommendations of the Mehta Committee, the Naik Committee suggested that the samiti should have the status of the executive committee of the parishad, instead of acting as an autonomous body at the block level. Thus the Committee chose to concentrate powers at the parishad level, which enjoyed a high status, as compared to the samiti, in terms of powers, finance, tax and administrative structure. The administrative structure at the district level, according to the Naik Committee, is that of a miniature state. All the development departments work under the parishad. The chief executive officer of the zila parishad usually belongs to the IAS cadre and exercises complete administrative control over the staff of the parishad, as well as over all the district level officers of various development departments, facilitating cooperation and coordination in the implementation of national plans and policies.

The idea of the association of MPs, MLAs and MLCs with the panchayati raj bodies did not find favour with the Naik Committee; they, therefore, do not find a place anywhere in the system. The legislators have, however, been associated in some form or other, whenever necessary by setting up planning and review committees.

For the composition of the zila parishad also, the Naik Committee did not endorse the system of indirect election as suggested by the Mehta Committee. On the other hand, it recommended that the district body should be constituted on the basis of direct election and the intermediate body in an indirect manner. The Committee pointed out that there was a tradition of direct elections to the higher local bodies in this State (Maharashtra) and hence it would be more advisable to continue the practice rather than depart from it. The zila parishad has about 40-60 members elected on adult franchise. To link the intermediate body with the district, it is provided that the chairmen of the samitis should also be the *ex officio* members of the district body. Thus the system of indirect election is not completely abandoned. Representatives of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are appointed on the basis of reservations made by the government. The chairmen of five federal cooperatives are associated members of the parishad and two women are coopted, if not already elected.

The intermediate body, *i.e.*, the samiti, consists of all the directly elected members of the district body, who have been elected from within the jurisdiction of the samiti. A corporate councillor residing in the block and chairman of the marketing society are associate members of

the panchayat samiti, The chairman of the cooperative society, a member of the scheduled caste or scheduled tribe and one woman residing in the block, if not already elected, are coopted members. To link the intermediate body with the village panchayat, the panchayat members elect two *sarpanchas* to sit as members of the panchayat samiti.

The village panchayat which is the basic unit of the panchayati raj structure is directly elected from the village.

Thus the main features of the Maharashtra scheme may be summarised as follows:

1. Exclusion of the members of parliament and state legislature, both from the samiti and the zila parishad.
2. Exclusion of the collector from the zila parishad.
3. Cooption of members has been scrupulously avoided.
4. There is a clear demarcation of the district administration into two spheres—development administration under the administrative control of the chief executive officer of zila parishad who is from the IAS cadre and the regulatory activities under the control of the collector.
5. Maximum devolution of powers at the district level, and with the intermediate body without any corporate status of its own.
6. Devolution of functions is followed by devolution of resources also. The zila parishads and panchayats have powers of taxation, the resources of the parishad varying from about Rs. 15 lakhs to Rs. 52 lakhs. The entire land revenue has been allotted to panchayati raj bodies, apart from the financial assistance through a rationalised system of grants—equalisation grants, purposive grants, deficit assistance grants, matching grants, incentive grants, etc.

Rajeshwar Dayal in his *Panchayati Raj in India* has treated the Andhra Pradesh pattern also as a separate one, different from that of Maharashtra, in the sense that the Raju Committee which was appointed to re-examine the working of the panchayati raj in Andhra Pradesh in 1967, has evolved a new body called zila development board, consisting of the collector, who should be the chairman, the zila parishad chairman, a member, and the secretary of the zila parishad, the secretary of zila development board.

ANDHRA PATTERN

It suggested that the board should be responsible for the overall economic growth of the district and has to formulate as well as imple-

ment the programmes. Thus the key-role has been assigned to the collector for better coordination and close watch on the implementation of the programmes. The powers that the zila parishad at present enjoys are in no way curtailed. At the district headquarters a complete data of plans and targets of achievements are to be kept and revised by the minister concerned frequently. This pattern of developmental administration closely resembles the Malaysian. To assist the collector in the revenue and other matters, a senior scale IAS officer, to be called additional collector, has been recommended, The zila parishad and panchayat samitis will be responsible for the implementation of the schemes included in the district plan falling within their purview. It would mainly relate to agricultural and industrial production. The other subjects handled by the zila parishad such as education, health and social welfare, etc., do not fall within the purview of the development board. Agriculture, cooperation, panchayati raj and the industries departments at the district level will be functioning under the collector as the head of these departments.

To relieve the collector of revenue, civil supplies and other matters, the post of a district revenue officer has been created to be manned by an IAS officer working under the administrative control of the collector.

Here it will not be out of context to mention in brief the controversy about the effectiveness of the Andhra Pradesh pattern *vis-a-vis* the Maharashtra pattern. It is argued that the creation of a development board is an attempt to harmonise the traditional pattern of administration with the new panchayati raj pattern. It brings back the collector into the centre of the picture making him a key functionary in the entire pattern of developmental administration in contrast to Maharashtra where the collector is reduced to a complete non-entity as far as development work is concerned. Also, the emphasis under the new scheme is on implementation of plans rather than on their formulation. It is also argued that the powers at present being exercised by the zila parishad or panchayat samitis have not been taken away from them but that a new institution has been created to supplement their efforts in the district.[3]

The criticism levelled against the system has also some weight. Instead of being a step towards democratic decentralisation, it would tend to introduce an increasing degree of official and centralised control over the parishads and the samitis.[4] Moreover, it has been pointed out that though the Andhra Pradesh system has worked reasonably well,

[3]Ram K. Vepa, "New Pattern of District Administration in Andhra Pradesh", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January-March, 1968.

[4]G.C. Singhvi, "District Administration in Andhra", *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, April-June, 1968.

there have been instances of friction between the chairman of the zila parishad and the collector.

As for Maharashtra, where the chief executive officer of the zila parishad (for integrated planning and its effective implementation) is to operate as the development head of the district, it has been argued that the cardinal principle of the system introduced two centuries ago at the district level is the unity of command. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the Maharashtra system of having two functionaries of equal rank at the district level would in practice work smoothly.[5] But in support of the system it may be reasonably argued that this problem can be solved with the division of the district administrative system into two sectors—one concerned with regulatory functions and the other with developmental functions as suggested by the Administrative Reforms Commission (1969). which further explains: "The District Collector should be the head of the former and panchayati raj administration should have the responsibility of the latter." For better coordination between the two sectors the commission has rightly suggested frequent meetings between the collector and the president of the zila parishad.

But with all these differences of opinion about the two systems, it is to be noted particularly that as far as the position of the zila parishad is concerned, both the Maharashtra and the Andhra Pradesh patterns, in spite of differences in their details, share a trend in common—a strong and active type of executive body at the apex level.

As a matter of fact, since the inception of the panchayati raj institutions, opinion has been divided about one of its crucial problems: to determine the areas of its three tiers. It must be remembered that in most of the states the weight of opinion is in favour of the zila parishad as the basic unit of planned development.

At the third meeting of the Central Council of Local Self Government, 1959, Shri V.N. Sharma, the then Minister of Local Self-Government, Uttar Pradesh, argued: "In my State there will be nearly 866 blocks. Now, if I were to deal with these blocks, I do not think I will be able to guide them and really give them that kind of education which they require. We shall, therefore, have to evolve another agency between the state and these blocks, because these blocks would be too many and we will not be able to get sufficient good personnel to correctly guide and admini ter these units. We are thinking that the district boards should be made more effective, the name may be changed, that is immaterial, but the district board should be made more vital. It should be given greater powers. The work of planning must be entrusted to the district boards In fact, many other things which we are doing today at the state level may perhaps be safely handed over to them." Similar views were expressed by spokesmen of some other states,

[5]Ram K. Vepa, *op. cit.*

specially Maharashtra.[6]

When the Naik Committee chose to adopt a strong body at the district level with the panchayat samiti working merely as its executive agency and the parishads were given power and functions, with complete administrative machinery, which would result in eliminating, the overlapping, duplication and diffused responsibilities of the various district level departments, the idea caught the imagination of several other states.

THE PAREKH COMMITTEE

The Parekh Committee of Gujarat, 1960, also recommended the establishment of a strong popular body at the district level with duties, responsibilities and resources of all the then existing bodies at that level and delegation of adequate powers and necessary financial resources. The stand with reference to district level bodies was endorsed again by the Darji Committee[7] on the basis of whose recommendation the Gujarat Assembly amended the Panchayat Act in 1973.

The Konda Basappa Committee of Karnataka took more or less the same view in 1963 about the position of the zila parishads in the state.

Even in Rajasthan, the Sadiq Ali Committee, 1964, which was to analyse the functioning of grassroot democracy cited specially the example of the zila parishads in Maharashtra and Gujarat and advocated that adequate resources and powers should be entrusted to the zila parishad for certain original executive functions and, for this purpose, district level officers should be transferred under the zila parishad. A survey of these institutions was made again by the Vyas Committee appointed by the Rajasthan Government in 1971. The Committee suggested radical conceptual, structural and procedural changes in the system. Zila parishads would be made more effective agencies for taking up development work. On the basis of the Maharashtra and Gujarat pattern, the Vyas Committee also advocated that zila parishads should have direct representatives—three from each panchayat constituent. Scheduled tribes and scheduled castes would also find representation for the first time through elections from the reserved constituencies. Another important feature would be that the MPs would neither have a voting right, nor a right to hold any office, while bigger *gram* panchayats would become financially more viable. The Committee thought, "The financial viability alone should not be the decisive factor for the size of *gram* panchayats." Both economic viability and easy accessibility or both area and population should decide the size.[8]

[6]For details see the proceedings of the third meeting of the Central Council of Local Self Government, 1957. (Government of India Publication).

[7]*Kurukshetra*, May 16, 1973.

[8]*Hindustan Times*, November 2, 1973.

The Rammurthy Committee, 1965, for the appraisal of panchayati raj institutions in Uttar Pradesh recommended enlarging the powers of the zila parishad so as to include agricultural activities and promotion of small scale industries. It felt that the power of disbursement of loans should be solely given to the zila parishad. It was in favour of entrusting the executive functions completely to the officials. It also held that the chief executive officer should be an IAS officer. For resources the committee suggested powers to the zila parishad of levying taxes. The Rawat Committee[9] of UP appointed a few years ago and dissolved before submitting the final report, also appeared to be in favour of replacing the existing pattern with that of Maharashtra.

Then it was in 1967 that the Raju Committee examined in detail the pattern of democratic decentralisation in Andhra Pradesh and the result was the establishment of a new district level body—the zila development board, responsible for the overall economic growth of the district.

Advocating the abolition of panchayat samitis in Punjab, a high power study team appointed by the state government[10] felt that instead of panchayat samitis there should be an advisory and coordinating body known as the block development board at the block level with the block development and panchayat officer as its convener. This board should consist of members directly elected to the zila parishad from the block area.

As a result of the study team's visit to other states, the report said the team was of the definite view that proper planning and execution of development schemes was not possible at a level lower than a district. Two autonomous executive bodies at the district and block level with their own funds, establishments and functions which could never be clearly demarcated, would inevitably lead to overlapping of functions, duplication of staff with the likelihood of conflicts.

Abolishing panchayat samitis would mean a reduction in the number of elections in the panchayati raj institutions, which were a major cause of internal quarrels and faction fights in the rural community. It was felt by this team that a zila parishad on the Maharashtra pattern suitably constituted and invested with adequate powers and personnel and provided with necessary funds would have all the advantages of an autonomous executive without its disadvantages. It recommended that *gram* panchayats should also be strengthened both financially and administratively.

What do the recommendations of these various committees suggest? With enough experience of a variety of patterns of panchayati raj in different states, a new consensus seems to emerge. From the point of view of coordination, planning, precise definition of activities and distinction between developmental and non-developmental administration,

[9]SOURCE: Panchayati Raj Office, Aligarh.

[10]*Kurukshetra*, March 16, 1971, p. 12.

the Maharashtra pattern of panchayati raj, with a strong and active executive body, has attracted the attention of official and non-official opinion all over India.* It is extremely doubtful if any state in future would like to experiment with the type of zila parishad envisaged by the Mehta Committee.

A UNIFORM PATTERN

It is significant to note why most of these committees have recommended strong body at the district level. The main arguments put forward by them are that the district provides as much better, viable unit than the block which is regarded as too small to be entrusted with planning responsibilities. Its proper implementation is also possible if at this level an IAS officer is in a position to exercise complete administrative control over the staff of the parishad as well as over all the district level officers of the various development departments facilitating coordination and cooperation of all those connected with developmental projects. It would also facilitate the division of district administration into developmental and non-developmental sectors, clearly demarcating their responsibilities, thus avoiding friction and overlapping of functions and jurisdiction. Moreover, historically, local bodies have been in existence at the district level; therefore, it would be easier to replace them only by a district level body. These arguments assume greater significance in the context of the new concepts of 'area planning' and 'integrated approach' towards rural problems.

Therefore it would be highly desirable to have a uniform administrative pattern at the district level so far as the main framework is concerned, subject to the flexibility allowed in case of structural details, suiting local conditions. We have a uniform administrative system at the state level, irrespective of their physical, social, economic and political variations; then why not have it below the state level? The Maharashtra pattern may be accepted as the model for this purpose and a central committee consisting of highly experienced administrators and academicians may be appointed by the Government of India to plug the loopholes after a thorough examination of the pattern. Our main problems of rural uplift are more or less the same throughout the length and breadth of the country, namely, economic revolution through agricultural development and rural industrialisation, provision of employment and equal opportunities to the rural masses, protection and uplift of the weaker sections of the rural community and thereby secure a social change. To

*The only opposite trend is found in Orissa where the panchayati raj system is being sought to be reorganised with samiti at the block level and panchayats at the village level without zila parishads at the district level. Madhya Pradesh has also expressed a similar view.

achieve the desired objectives, disciplined effort and a uniform national policy is required, and this can be effectively implemented only if the broad features of developmental administration are also the same.

The broad features of developmental administration may require direct election of panchayati raj bodies, exclusion of MPs and MLAs from it, district as the main unit for planning, execution and coordination purposes, maximum devolution of power and financial resources at this level and senior IAS officer (subject to the final authority of the zila parishad) acting as its chief executive officer, with a complete administrative control over all the district level officers related with the various development programmes. The lower levels especially the village panchayats, may continue to enjoy maximum freedom in the day-to-day administration of their allotted fields of activities. Strengthening of village panchayats is most important, because they are the representative institutions nearest to the people. People's reaction to the panchayati raj is largely determined by the performance of the panchayats and their performance has also a vital bearing on the functioning of the higher tiers of panchayati raj.

A uniform system of developmental administration would also facilitate its constitutional recognition, an essential prerequisite for its vitality and confidence to shoulder the new responsibilities, as well as to enhance its prestige. Grassroot institutions, in spite of being considered a pillar of rural democracy in India, unfortunately lack constitutional protection and neither any individual nor any committee for constitutional amendments has given a serious thought to it. There is no reason why a uniform broad structure of developmental administration with specific autonomous powers, and with equal partnership of mutual inter-dependence with the state government, cannot be ensured by the constitution, so that the country's grassroot democracy gets firmly rooted in the soil. □

Implementation—The Problem of Achieving Results*

Ram K. Vepa

ONE OF the important lessons most developing countries are learning painfully is the fact that planning does not always guarantee a successful development programme. Even India, where the techniques of planning had reached a high level of expertise for over two decades had to learn, in the words of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that "we are not so expert at implementation as we are at planning". More recently, Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister reminded the high level National Development Council that "any plan is only as good as it achieves". Albert Waterson has stated in his analytical study on *Development Planning* that planning *per se* and the existence of a plan do not by any means ensure effective implementation. In many cases, national plans are little more than assumption or even just wishful thinking. It is, therefore, no great surprise that the net impact of many of the grandiose plans is often limited and planning itself is no longer looked upon as the talisman for curing the ills of society, as it used to be regarded some years back.

It was because of this growing dichotomy between planning (on paper) and implementation (in the field) that the General Assembly of the Eastern Regional Organisation in Public Administration (EROPA) at its Manila session held in May, 1971 authorised its executive director to look deeper into this problem and see whether case studies on the subject could be compiled which might give a fresh insight into the process of implementation. Accordingly, experienced administrators or distinguished scholars in the member countries of EROPA were contacted and a research format worked out by a coordinator designated for the purpose. The case studies were discussed at a preliminary stage in a workshop at Jakarta in September, 1972, and in a final form in March 1973 at Bangkok on the basis of which they were finalised for presentation to the General Assembly of EROPA in Tokyo in October, 1973.

The case studies cover a wide range: they deal with the housing problems of Hong Kong and Singapore, the paddy production programmes of Nepal and Philippines, a major multipurpose project in

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XX, No. 2, 1974, pp. 257-292.

Indonesia, rural industrial estates in India, land colonisation schemes in Sri Lanka and Malaysia and so on. But what was being sought in all these development programmes was not so much the technical content of the programme as the accompanying administrative process—how was it formulated and how was it implemented? It is with these aspects that the case studies concern themselves so that something of the problem of implementation in developing countries, particularly in the Asian context, could be learnt from them. The case writers themselves were a varied lot: some were academicians who looked at the programmes from the outside; some were practising administrators who had an inside track of the programme; some were research scholars and some were technically trained persons. In all cases, the framework of the study was similar, though inevitably each brought to bear on his particular study something of his own background and experience—which makes the case studies particularly rewarding.

The Tokyo Conference on Implementation (held at the same time as the General Assembly Session in Tokyo in October, 1973) discussed the papers broadly and suggested certain broad guidelines which seemed to emerge from the case studies as a whole. These may briefly be summarised as follows:

(*i*) Implementation is but one aspect of a larger process of society and is, therefore, affected decisively by the environment in which a particular programme is implemented.

(*ii*) An important facet of the environment is the political milieu at the national, regional and field levels which can be either beneficial or counter-productive.

(*iii*) Programme administrators need to develop skills for 'playing the political game' so as to optimize political support for the programme. This can be done through frequent consultation and helps to sustain the programme through timely budget releases.

(*iv*) Suitable organisational framework is essential for effective implementation: this involves rational allocation of resources, both material and human, recruitment of suitable personnel and allocation of meaningful responsibilities to them.

(*v*) Consultation with, and involvement of, the beneficiaries of the programme is essential and needs to be built consciously into the implementation machinery.

(*vi*) Accurate data and timely information must be compiled and fed back to appropriate levels for effective monitoring of the programme during implementation. Field reports should be simple and direct and should be acted upon at the headquarters.

(*vii*) Programme leadership is an important criterion for the success of a programme; but mere charismatic leadership of a single individual is likely to be transient and ephemeral. What is needed is competence and commitment at all levels of the implementation hierarchy. This implies not merely technical skills relevant to the programme, but also managerial expertise in implementation, human skills in personnel management and motivating people to achieve results and, lastly, political skills to obtain and sustain cooperation and support from leaders of public opinion in the community and country.

The Tokyo Conference also suggested that the broad guidelines enumerated above may be applied to the individual case studies to see how far they are, in fact, applicable. Further, since some were success stories, and others not, it was felt that it might be possible to compare two programmes of a similar type to see why one had failed and the other had succeeded. While it is true that, in practice, there is no absolute success or failure, it is undoubted that the achievement levels tend to vary widely in the developing countries. Based on such a comparison, it may be possible to formulate a strategy that will make more probable the success of a development programme. If the elements of such a strategy can be identified, the collection of case studies compiled with so much effort would be invaluable to administrators and planners in the developing countries.

For this purpose, the case studies were studied in depth and it was decided to classify them into six sets of two studies each in the following manner. The Housing Projects of Hong Kong and Singapore obviously, of one type and implemented under fairly similar condi-

The Paddy Production Programmes of Philippines and Nepal similar as also the Land Colonisation and Development Schemes of Lanka and Malaysia. The Metropolitan Water Supply Project of Bangkok and the Port Improvement Schemes of Osaka are those dertaken in metropolitan areas. One can also compare the Family Programme of Korea and the Literacy Campaign of Iran both which are social welfare projects; while the Industrial Estate Program- of India and the Multipurpose Jatiluhur Project in Indonesia could looked at together.

HOUSING PROJECTS IN HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE[1]

Hong Kong and Singapore are both islands with a high density of pulation which after the war had a sudden rush of immigration from

[1] Case Studies listed as items 2 and 3 on p. 292.

mainland China. But while Hong Kong tried to solve the problem through a housing project programme that has been going on for almost two decades, Singapore has been spectacularly successful in providing new multi-storeyed flats to its citizens, which are today the 'show pieces' of the island republic. One must also mention that while Hong Kong continues to be a Crown Colony administered by the British, Singapore had, for more than 12 years, the benefit of self government under a dynamic Chief Executive.

In Hong Kong, the magnitude of the problem became known with the big fires of 1953 and 1954 which rendered thousands homeless and yet a survey of the problem was not taken up till 1957 and a White Paper on the subject was presented only in 1964. In other words, it took almost a decade for the administration to realise the full gravity of the situation and to come out with a specific plan to meet it. On the other hand, in Singapore almost immediately after the present government took up office in 1959. a Housing and Development Board was constituted to deal with the problem and initiated a massive programme of house building by 1961.

The Hong Kong programme had suffered, prior to 1963, through a diffuse machinery for implementation which was not fully coordinated. The Resettlement Department looked after squatter control and the Public Works Department for building construction. Even after the White Paper, the machinery for implementation remained unchanged, although there was better coordination between squatter control and resettlement and an advisory Housing Board was constituted consisting of prominent citizens and senior government officials to review the housing situation in the colony and to propose adjustments in the programme. It is significant, however, that the reeommendations of the Working Group to locate all functions relating to housing in a single government department was not accepted by government.

But this is precisely what Singapore did in setting up statutorily the Housing Development Board (HDB) with generous funds and wide legal power to deal with public housing, urban renewal and other related problems. 'Consequently' says Dr. Stephen Yeh, the case writer, "in the relocation process, the public housing programme provides the alternative accommodation, the resettlement programme undertakes clearance and the urban renewal redevelops the central area".[2] The Board which had, as its head, influential member of the ruling party was able to view the problems of housing not as an isolated measure, but as an important element of a socio-economic and political whole which would have a direct impact on development.

One may also note the significant differences in the leadership provided to the programme in the two places. In Hong Kong, the leadership

[2]Dr. Stephen Yeh, *Public Housing in Singapore*, p. 9.

came from the governor—and while colonial regimes can be able and conscientious, they can never be a substitute for dynamic self-rule. In Singapore on the other hand, there was a highly effective leadership of a young Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, for whom no detail was too small to be considered. The HDB itself had as Chairman a senior minister, Lim Kim Sen, who had close linkage with the prime minister and the cabinet. Naturally, the HDB was able to initiate several policies which demonstrated government's keenness to make the public housing programme a success.

The leadership at the administrative levels is also significantly different : while the Hong Kong administration is manned by competent officers, they are more in the colonial tradition while the younger cadres of the Singapore administration brought a new sense of national pride and commitment to their jobs. Their competence was made more effective because of the adequate salary levels provided and the feeling that rewards will be based on merit and not on seniority or political patronage. Under these circumstances "job satisfaction becomes more important than ego satisfaction and pride in contribution of national well-being as important as that of personal well-being".[3] It is this committed leadership *at the middle levels* that makes all the difference in implementation; since it is inadequately recognised that "innovative measures may be conceived at the top but actual implementation depends on the middle level personnel".[4]

Another important variation is the technology aspect : in Hong Kong, the design of the flats underwent several changes and four types were built with changing specifications. It was not till Mark IV type was evolved that a multi-storeyed flat construction was taken up which could accommodate a large number of persons. In Singapore also under the colonial rule, a similar attempt was made to transfer British experience to the colony which was obviously unsuitable; the new government and the HDB, however, quickly standardised the floor plan for efficient utilisation of floor space and suitability to local needs. Standardisation helps to reduce administrative costs and technical overheads and HDB flats are rented or sold according to a simple fixed scale, which is easily understood.

The HDB has also undertaken responsibility for the supply of building materials by establishing quarries, brickwork and piling plants to supplement local production in view of the vastly increased demands. This had a double advantage in stabilising the prices of these essential materials and in generating sizable profits for its operations. This had also the effect of rationalising and mechanising the construction industry as a whole and to pioneer the introduction of new techniques such as

[3]Dr. Stephen Yeh, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
[4]*Ibid.*, p. 32.

pre-fabrication and the use of hallow blocks for the inner walls. The HDB also undertook training programmes for technical personnel such as draftsmen, works-clerks, maintenance instructors which provided new technical skills to the community.

It is significant that while in Hong Kong resettlement had met with resistance from the squatters—sometimes resulting in violence—in Singapore, 80 per cent of the relocation was voluntary. Largely, this must be attributed to the fact that the ruling party lent its support to the programme which gave it considerable prestige. Even in Hong Kong, site clearance was comparatively easy when squatters were given alternative accommodation; in Singapore, this was always so. But mention must also be made of the imaginative policies the HDB had adopted: in allocation of new flats, a 'first come, first-served' principle was adopted which is easily understood and accepted by the public. Again, the decision to use the provident funds of government employees to finance purchase of flats was imaginative and welcome to many persons. This close liaison with the public also enabled the HDB to set for itself realistic target figures and it is expected that, by 1975, almost half the population of Singapore will be living in HDB flats. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, achievement has always fallen short of the target and needed constant readujustment and the number of relocated persons has dropped from 137,000 in 1964-65 to a mere 23,000 in 1970-71.

Significantly, neither the Hong Kong nor the Singapore programme has suffered from lack of funds since in both cases the importance of the programme was adequately realised. This is contrary to the popular impression that finance is the biggest stumbling block in the execution of development programmes and that paucity of funds has handicapped their execution.

Thus a comparison of the Singapore and Hong Kong programmes reveals that while there was competence in both cases, the former gained through a dynamic political leadership and committed administrative cadres at the top and the middle levels. This, in turn, has resulted in providing a coordinated approach in Singapore where a clearly defined organisational framework was set up for the purpose. In Hong Kong, on the other hand, a benevolent colonial regime attempted to do the same but with much less success. Their implementation of substantially similar programmes under almost identical conditions has shown strikingly different results because of the political and administrative milieu under which it has operated.

INCREASED RICE PRODUCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES AND NEPAL[5]

The increased rice production programmes in the Philippines and

[5]Case Studies listed as items 4 and 5 on p. 292.

Nepal represent a type of programme that is familiar to most developing countries. Such projects are nation-wide in their scope and involve large numbers of people scattered all over the country. They are dependent for their success on a combination of administrative and political leadership as well as the ability to motivate a large number of farmers who are traditionally conservative to follow instructions from the top. They also involve coordination of a large number of agencies to provide the right inputs—credit, seeds, fertiliser, water and power—at the right time in order to make it a success. Thus, in an administrative sense, they are complex and ultimate success can elude due to any one of a number of factors.

Looking in retrospect, the Philippine story is one of success—by 1968, within two years of the launching of the programme, the country had attained self-sufficiency in rice, which was the immediate objective; it is quite likely that the initial momentum was not maintained later due to a variety of reasons and an assessment over a longer time-span might not be so favourable. But in a limited sense, the programme achieved the target set for it—to do without any import of rice—and in fact was able to export a sizable quantity (3 million tonnes) to neighbouring countries. Nepal, on the other hand, failed to achieve the more limited target it had set before itself—a 7.5 per cent increase in the production of paddy during the Third Plan (1965-70), the actual increase being barely a quarter (1.8%) of the target. There is no doubt, therefore, that while the Philippine case study was one of success, the Nepalese experience was essentially not so. It is, therefore, instructive to compare the two and draw conclusions useful for other countries embarking on similar programmes.

Undoubtedly, there are many differences between the two countries which may have had some effect on the quality of performance: the Philippines has an American style of administration where free enterprise—almost unbridled and to an excess—had flourished while Nepal, land-locked and insulated from external forces—has a constitutional monarchy with representative institutions still at an early stage. Philippines has also a greater administrative and technical expertise at its disposal, although Nepal too employed the benefit of assistance from a number of international agencies. Although in some ways, the two countries are apparently dissimlar, they are not so far removed as to make any comparison between them irrelevant.

In the Philippines (as in all Asian countries) rice has strong political overtones; both Garcia and Macapagal, the former Presidents of the Philippines realised its importance and had tried to tackle the problem of self-sufficiency. Under President Garcia, the Rice and Corn Production Control Council (RCPCC) was established but suffered from the fact that it was headed by a civil servant which severely limited its scope

and authority. For this reason, the necessary coordination with other agencies such as the National Rice and Corn Administration was never effective and political support was lacking. Under President Macapagal (who succeeded Garcia in 1962) the priorities in the programme became confused and the emphasis shifted to extension work. A new authority was created but the field level problems associated with resources inputs were never really solved. This is a typical situation in many developing countries, where programme 'sights' get diffused in attempting to do too many things at the same time and taking no effective action to solve the small, but important, problems that arise at the field level during implementation.

It was Marcos who realised the full implication of the rice self-sufficiency programme and even before becoming President had involved the country's leading specialists in an attempt to formulate a coordinated plan to deal with it. By the time he assumed office, the report of the experts (Umali Committee) was available to him to enable important decisions affecting the programme to be taken. In this very first address to the Legislature in January, 1966, President Marcos had highlighted the problem in unmistakable terms: "Self-sufficiency in the production of food, especially rice, must be attained in the shortest possible time".[6]

It was this simple, easily understood and in a sense dramatic target of achieving self-sufficiency in the near future that electrified the entire programme. It invested it with a sense of high purpose, and national priority; it made the persons involved in it have a feeling of justifiable pride. One may compare it with the situation in Nepal where no target was even set during the first two plans except the purely prosaic ones of opening new demonstration farms—which can hardly enthuse the people. In fact, it was not till the Third Plan (1965) that a quantitative target of 15 per cent was provided for the increase in grain production (including rice, wheat, maize, millets, etc.) but, even so, it lacked the magic of the slogan of self-sufficiency.

But slogans, however, useful, are not enough; and President Marcos moved with speed to translate the objective into a live-action programme. By June 1966, barely five months after he took office he was ready with a four year programme that represented "the total integrated efforts of all the agencies that will be involved in the implementation of the programme". A distinguishing feature of the programme was the new perspective it envisaged for implementation on three fronts—production, marketing (and distribution) and organisation. "Rice self-sufficiency was viewed not merely as a problem of improving marketing and distribution; not only a problem of consolidating, integrating and

[6]Dr. G. Iglesias, *Implementation of the Philippines' Four Year Rice Self Sufficiency Programme*, p. 51.

concentrating resources of governmental agencies in a limited area but also the involvement of the private sector in production as well as marketing and distribution".[7]

In Nepal, even the target of 15 per cent set by the country's top planners was not based on a realistic assessment of the country's resources —both human and material. The targets set under the programme differed widely from those formulated at the district and field levels by the Coordination Committees at these levels—but no attempt was made to adjust the targets. In other words, the target represented more an estimate of what *ought* to be done rather than what *can* and, therefore, *must* be done. The coordination between the different agencies at the district level was never effective; in agriculture itself research and extension were bifurcated owing allegiance to different departments. The coordination of the two departments was left to the Central Co-ordinating Committee, which was too large a body to effectively look after such an activity. Even at the top, the Ministry of Agriculture was bifurcated into that of Food and Agriculture and Land Reforms. The Chairman of the Central Committee was a minister which made it difficult to meet regularly and also its role became a cross between policy formulation and executive decision-making. No attempt was made to bring all the inputs such as credit under one agency nor was any effort undertaken to train the required manpower for the programme. The junior technical assistants who were the 'cutting edge' of the programme were poorly paid and weakly motivated. It is, therefore, no wonder that the programme as a whole suffered in implementation and could never achieve remotely the target given to it.

In the Philippines on the other hand, the administrative structure was immediately reorganised to bring all activities bearing on the problem under a single agency—the revitalised Rice and Corn Production Control Council (RCPCC). Close linkage with the field personnel was established by the regional directors constituting the Review Performance Board. Three technicel staff units were set up for Plans and Programmes, Survey and Evaluation and Action Coordination. The RCPCC was given "the sole power and responsibility of implementing the Rice and Corn Production Programme" under an executive order issued in October 1966. The post of an Executive Director was created to serve as a vital administrative link between the centre and field units. Evaluation surveys were conducted in 1966 and 1967 "to assess the impact of the programme and to gather relevant information useful in future programming". A massive training programme of technical personnel in the new agricultural practices for effective cultivation of the high-yielding variety strains was undertaken. Private credit agencies as well as international assistance was built into the programme as an additional resource input.

[7]Dr. G. Iglesias, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

It was, at this stage in 1967, that Rafael M. Salas took charge of the programme and galvanised it into an 'action' programme from what was, till then, basically a government effort. It is quite likely that President Marcos decided to give Salas wide powers to produce dramatic results with an eye on his own re-election due in 1969. Whatever the reason for the move, the active association of Salas with the programme gave it a new prestige and authority. The effect was almost dramatic: "Salas immediately transformed the RCPCC into a more effective instrument for coordination and control."[8] He persuaded the agency heads, including the Budget Commissioner, to attend the meetings themselves which enabled important decisions to be taken by the Council. "Salas introduced a number of innovative changes such as creation of *ad hoc* specialist sub-committees within the Council and the practice of inviting experts, local Government officials, and interest-group spokesmen to attend Council meetings".[9] He made frequent and unannounced visits to inspect the progress of implementation and to get first-hand the views and opinions of the farmers and local officials. "I believe" he was quoted as saying "that you cannot supervise the rice programme sitting in Manila—you have to visit the fields"—advice which may well be emulated by all programme administrators who often rely on reports from subordinates and later feel let down that they have not been told the full truth.

In any case, the results achieved were remarkable: the Philippines registered, for the first time in 1968, a dramatic increase in production per hectare of land and a complete stoppage of imports that had marked the previous years. There were actually exports to other countries such as Indonesia, Taiwan, Burma and South Korea which indicated the success of the programme. That Salas played a role in this success is undoubted: "the effectiveness of Salas is based on a distillate of many factors including formal and informal power and personal leadership style...the manner in which he wove the various strands of authority into a potent factor programme control and coordination."[10] It must, however, be conceded that the subsequent performance of the programme has underlined the weakness of the style of charismatic leadership that depends unduly on the personality of a single individual—and the need to institutionalise such leadership at various levels so as to provide continuity.

It must also be admitted that an important factor in the success of the programme was the fact that the International Rice Research Institute at Los Banos, in the Philippines had at the same time come out with new strains of high yielding varieties—popularly known as the

[8]Dr. G. Iglesias, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[9]*Ibid.*, p. 43.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 43.

'Miracle Rice' which was capable of three instead of two croppings. This technological 'break-through' undoubtedly helped in the success of the Philippines Programme.

It is significant that in both Philippines and Nepal lack of funds was never a serious handicap; in the former, budget allocation and fund releases were done speedily due to the high prestige of the programme while Nepal enjoyed support from bilateral and multilateral agencies for its programme—but whether undue dependence on foreign aid tends to distort the programme and, in fact, acts as a hindrance is a matter for some thought. Internal credit, organised through cooperative societies in Nepal, never functioned effectively because of the lack of involvement of the farmers in this activity.

The success of the Philippines experiment (limited as it is) seen against the comparative failure of the Nepalese programme seems to indicate that "while a good programme plan is in a way a coordinative and control device, the translation of the plan into an effective programme of action is largely a function of leadership"[11]—both at the political and administrative levels. It is only when this happens that development programmes involving large masses of people can o btain the willing cooperation of those whom they are intended to benefit.

IMPLEMENTATION BY CIVIC AUTHORITIES IN THAILAND AND JAPAN[12]

The next two case studies to be analysed are basically those implemented by local authorities for meeting civic needs: at Bangkok, the Metropolitan Water Works Authority (MWWA) had undertaken to improve the City Water Supply System while in Osaka City, in Japan, a project was undertaken to improve the port facilities. In the former case, the project was funded by the National Government of Thailand while in the latter, it was the City Government of Osaka that financed it. In both cases, however, the problems dealt with were local and metropolitan in character although in view of the magnitude of the projects they could both be considered as quasi-national. In the case of Bangkok, the problem was one which touched the lives of the common people as nothing—not even Power—can be said to be as important for human beings as adequate supply of water.

That this was so, could be gauged from the letters which appeared in the national newspapers. That the City Water Supply of Bangkok needed radical improvement there could be no doubt and a government committee had recommended the merger of the four systems of greater Bangkok including, Thonburi, Nonthaburi and Samutprakarn—into a single metropolitan authority. Significant as this decision was, it

[11]Dr. G. Iglesias, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[12]Case Studies listed as items 6 and 7 on p. 292.

did not provide that authority with the necessary finances, personnel or even independence of decision-making; although technically autonomous, and commercial in character its board was presided over by the General Prapas who was also at that time the Deputy Prime Minister and its General Manager was also the Deputy Director of the Budget Bureau. In other words, it functioned more or less as a department of the government.

In Osaka, on the other hand, the city government had a prestige of its own and its mayor had a ranking, technically equal to that of the prime minister of Japan himself. Since Osaka is a commercial city, the city fathers were both prudent and restrained and did not interfere with the South Port Development Division that was exclusively set up for implementing the project. The division formulated the South Port Development Plan in 1967 which was later incorporated into the plan of the Kinki region as a whole. In accordance with the general characteristic of the Japanese bureaucratic system which vests considerable administration in the hands of officials, the Development Division had complete authority to execute the development plans.

The calibre of the personnel available for execution of the Port Development Plan was also high since the wages paid to the city government officials were greater than that of the national government. The city administration itself was run on rational lines and was not marred by any scandals. In Bangkok, on the other hand, the personnel available for implementing the plans were of poor quality due basically to the paucity of well qualified personnel and also the fact that the persons recruited were paid poorly and temporary in character. The MWWA itself had been suffering losses year after year and was being sustained by subsidies from the national government.

Because of the lack of indigenous technical talent, the Bangkok project (unlike the Osaka one) depended heavily on foreign consultants. Although selected after careful and protracted screening, the consulting firm was not fully aware of the limitations of implementation in a developing country. Its interim recommendation for improvement consisted of four elements: improving surface water through water treatment plans, development of ground water, detection and repair of leaks from pipes and improvement of water metering. It is significant that not more than 30 per cent of the water was being metered which, in a sense, was responsible for the financial losses of the Water Authority.

The interim recommendation of the consulting firm envisaged that all the four steps could be taken simultaneously and that this would cost about 90 million baht ($4.5 million) and be completed in a period of 2 years—*i.e.*, by April, 1971. It is obvious, however, that this time frame and the cost estimates were unrealistic and were not based on any detailed knowledge of the actual conditions in the country. In practice, even

three of the four items took almost 2½ years and cost twice as much. Partly, this was due to the procedural delays in budget allocations; but, mostly, it was due to the fact that what was to be done simultaneously was taken up sequentially. The consultants themselves must take a fair share of the blame for this delay since no recommendation based on modern management techniques such as PERT charts seems to have been made which would have helped the implementing agency. Further, detailed planning was required for each of the projects which were entrusted to different agencies for implementation. Improvement of treatment plants and deep well systems were both construction projects and MWAA's expertise in this area was limited. Due to difficulties that arose in the construction, alternative methods for conveying water for treatment had to be devised. Further, the number of water meters to be replaced turned out to be much larger than what was anticipated which again delayed the implementation. In effect, therefore, the full impact of the four measures, which cumulatively were expected to relieve the acute gravity of the inadequate water supply position in the city, could not be achieved.

One wonders whether there was an undue dependence on the 'wisdom' of foreign consultants and not enough was done to build up technological abilities within the organisation. Surely, it should have been possible in a great city like Bangkok, to secure enough indigenous technical expertise to see through the project, even if broad recommendations are made by a foreign consulting firm. It is often noticed that such consultants are unaware of the cultural and administrative milieu of a developing country and the limitation it imposes in speedy execution of projects. Developing countries must learn to rely more on the ability of its own personnel taking the advice of the foreign experts more as a guideline than as a directive for execution.

In financing, it is significant that the metropolitan authority of Bangkok was dependent on the central government for funds; this, in turn, caused delay in allocation and releases—although it must be admitted that the national government lent its full support to the project. In the Osaka Port plan, funds for the project were met from the resources of the city administration as well as through floatation of bonds in Germany, approved by the national government. This indicates a more self-reliant system of administration instead of having to depend on the finances of the central government as in the case of Bangkok project. Unless local authorities are able to plan and execute projects on their own, which can only be done if funds are raised by them, they cannot hope to provide adequately basic civic amenities to the people living in them. In most developing countries, local administrations have not developed the capability to manage and execute projects and have not acquired the ability to raise finances on their

own for their improvement plans. This also requires a degree of autonomy for them and power to be delegated to raise resources through taxes. Even in Japan, Prof. Yoshitomi, the case writer has pleaded for greater autonomy in the following words: "As local autonomy is called grassoot democracy, it should accurately grasp the needs of the local citizens and while meeting the citizens' demand for administration it should develop and implement such plans to match the overall national plans, making individual municipal plan components of the national plans".[13]

It is obvious that execution of municipal plans requires greater citizen participation than in the national plans nor is this difficult since such plans are more closely geared to the basic needs of the people. In Osaka, close liaison with citizen groups was maintained, both officially and unofficially, in planning the reclamation of land and paying compensation for loss of fishery rights. Citizen's views were taken into account in preparing the housing plans and hence there was no resistance from the public for relocation. In Bangkok, there was a general feeling of corruption and administration in the MWWA which made its task more difficult and created a 'communication gap' between the authority and the public.

It is significant to note that the Board of the MWWA was packed with people who at that time wielded great power which, however, did not invest the MWWA itself with prestige or authority. Leadership is ultimately, not just 'big' names; it must permeate through the rank and file and must be vindicated by deeds, not words. The Osaka project was successful because of the quiet efficiency with which it was implemented and the calibre of the personnel at all levels; the Bangkok project was less successful because there was no inherent technical strength and the MWWA did not develop into an organisation which could coordinate the various plans into one coherent action-programme. There was no mobilisation of the resources of the community or utilisation of new techniques of management. It functioned merely as a limb of the government and the entire programme therefore suffered from the normal delays that are experienced in projects undertaken by government departments.

LAND DEVELOPMENT AND COLONISATION SCHEMES OF SRI LANKA AND MALAYSIA[14]

Land development and colonisation schemes are familiar exercises in many developing countries and involve a coordinated approach of many departments for successful execution. It is, therefore, instruc-

[13]Prof. Yoshitomi, *Osaka South Port Development Plan*, p. 25.

[14]Case Studies listed as items 8 and 9 on p. 292.

tive to compare two such programmes—one undertaken in Sri Lanka and the other in Malaysia. The former is an isolated exercise while the latter is a specific programme of an organisation expressly set up for the purpose. Both the case studies reveal many points of great interest that are useful to those planning similar projects.

Although the Rajangana Colonisation Scheme of Sri Lanka was part of a 10-year programme for the re-settlement in the Dry Zone, the project itself was sactioned without any detailed planning. In fact, the first report of the agricultural department about the suitability of the soil for cultivation, which was based on a superficial examination, did not evoke any serious interest in the concerned ministry. It was only the personal intervention of a minister who had just then taken charge of the department and whose constituency covered the project area that was responsible for the final decision. Even so, it is significant that funds were sanctioned by the Treasury without even a superficial cost-benefit analysis or the examination by a standing committee, as is normally done in such cases. While it is true that no systematic project evaluation technique had been evolved at that time, the Treasury, which is responsible for the financial allocation, made no assessment of the resources, both monetary and human, before embarking upon the project.

This is typical of the practice in many countries where projects are started under political pressure and token grants are allotted in the beginning. Once committed to a scheme, the project has to go through —even if it means a much longer span than was originally contemplated. As Mr. Rajendra, the case writer says: "It led permanent officers to assume that development projects were welfare schemes to justify political support and to over look the important fact that scarce national resources were being used on the project as investment to promote economic growth. When more work than could be reasonably undertaken was entrusted to the department in widely dispersed areas, a ready excuse for inefficiency was also provided."[15]

This failure of administration to exercise the normal prudence was well exemplified by the limited role the permanent secretary of the department played in the entire programme. It was this responsibility as head of the ministry and as chairman of the standing committee, to coordinate the work of several departments. This job was taken over by the director of irrigation who played a coordinating role without the authority to do so and assumed sole responsibility for the physical planning of land use, ignoring all recommendations that it be an inter-disciplinary exercise. What ought to have been an interdepartmental affair, was reduced to a departmental routine matter thus distorting the entire execution of the project.

[15]M. Rajendra, *The Rajangana Colonisation Scheme*, p. 22.

This lack of coordination extended to the field level also. "No single officer was personally responsible for implementing the project"[16] and no coordinated implementation programme of the work to be done by pre-determined dates by the irrigation, survey and forest departments was prepared. There was no project manager for the entire programme and no officer was given the leadership role of the project. Even at the locat level, there was a complete lack of coordination. Although attempts were made by the minister to set up a Joint Development Committee with the representatives of the various concerned departments, it was not effective. A local Coordination Committee with the Irrigation Engineer, District Land Officer, Land Development Officer and Senior Surveyor got bogged down on the procedural aspect of who should preside over the meeting, reflecting the increasing disinclination of the technical cadres to accept the traditional primacy of the 'generalist' administrators.

The case study dwells at length on the part played by the minister and is highly critical of his role in pushing through a project without adequate study and ignoring normal canons of administrative and financial prudence. But it would seem from the study itself that the minister really moved into the picture because of a vacuum created by the failure of the top administration itself. On the technical side, officers had been rapidly promoted bringing to the top persons without the necessary calibre or maturity for such posts. On the administrative side, neither the Permanent Secretary nor the Treasury played the role they were expected to do while at the field level, inter-service bickerings made it difficult for any effective action to be taken.

In these circumstances, it is only natural for a minister to have acted, particularly when he himself was an experienced administrator who had successfully implemented such programmes in the past. In such a situation, if a person wants to do something and the results are not entirely successful, he can hardly be blamed. This decision had to be taken by the minister without the normal support he was entitled to expect: at one point, when he decided to reduce the area to be allotted to each settler, the administration did not bring to his notice the discussions that had earlier taken place on the subject. In most developing countries, popularly elected ministers are genuinely anxious to 'do' things but will do so badly, if the administration does not provide the necessary infrastructure.

The fact of the matter is that administration itself is unprepared for the type of projects which suddenly have to be undertaken after independence is attained in many developing countries. As remarked earlier, most of such projects were regarded as welfare schemes that could be undertaken leisurely without specific cost-benefit studies nor

[16]M. Rajendra, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

were any of the modern techniques of management applied for their implementation. There was, therefore, an insufficient appreciation that time costs money and "when the attention of the engineers was drawn to these comments and to the significance of speed in construction, particularly in capital-intensive land development projects and to the economic viability of the project, they explained that they treated the provision of irrigation facilities as a welfare service and not as an investment on which returns were expected."[17] There was, therefore, "no appreciation of the time cost of money and awareness that delayed implementation increased the capital cost of the project and distorted its economic viability".[18]

In many respects, the Malaysian experience represents an advance over that of Sri Lanka. Having identified that land squatting was serious and could not be treated merely as a law and order problem, a Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) was established in 1956 on a statutory basis "to promote and assist the investigation, formulation and carrying out of projects for the development and settlement of land in the Federation".[19]

Its initial programme taken up in Blut Valley encountered many operational problems. The land clearing process was slow; turn-over of workers was high and many contractors left their jobs unfinished. Weakness in communication lack of rigid financial control and inadequate technical expertise were glaring defects. FELDA had the limited role of providing 'loans' to the settlers, while the physical work of clearing the jungle, the development of the land and management of the crop were the responsibility of the Land Development Boards in the states—which left little option to FELDA in determining the pace of development.

What is significant, however, is not this familiar pattern of dual responsibility but the fact that, once mistakes were identified, speedy action was taken to rectify them. Based on the recommendation of a Review Committee, the role of FELDA was redefined and it was integrated more closely with the Ministry of Rural Development. It was made directly responsible for the formulation and administration of all schemes financed by the authority. All areas of land over 2000 acres were henceforth to be developed by FELDA directly.

For this purpose, an organisation was set up—two federal committees, one for technical investigation and the other for Planning consisting of the representatives of the concerned ministries were constituted. A board of 13 members was constituted presided over by a senior person

[17]M. Rajendra, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 27.

[19]Tang Teng Lai, *Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), Its Creation, Development and Growth*, p. 4.

—either a civil servant or non-official. The head of the administration is the Director-General who was assisted by staff officers dealing with finance, engineering, budget planning, marketing, etc., and a line staff at the regional and field levels. What was really important was the decision to decentralise giving field officers the power to decide; and at headquarters, effective coordination was exercised with the other concerned departments such as agriculture, forests, land and mines, public works as well as the concerned welfare department through various committees. It must be stated, however, that such coordination was, in practice, successful because of the tolerance and resilience exhibited by the persons representing the various departments.

Another significant feature of the Malaysian project was the effective monitoring of the programme in its implementation stage. Periodic meetings at the head office as well as at the regional and field levels enabled officers to assess their own progress and also provide a feedback to their supervisors. Periodic visits of the Director-General, the heads of departments and area controllers were also useful for making on-the-spot assessments of the progress and resolving any bottlenecks that may have arisen in execution. Statistical information on the progress was centralised at the head office in the "operation room" made famous in Malaysian Rural Development Projects. Progress reports from the field to the various departments at the head office are summarised and posted on charts and score boards for scrutiny by the Director-general and other senior officers. The fact that development meetings are held in the same room enabled all members to see, at a glance, the progress achieved and take corrective action, if necessary.

An important bottleneck in the execution of such schemes is personnel of right calibre. Since large sums of money were involved the persons selected had to be men of integrity, and fraud, if it occurred, had to be detected quickly. FELDA operated its own crash programme for training the lower management personnel. Since the 'cutting edge' of any such programme is the lower and middle cadre staff, the decision of FELDA to undertake such training itself was a wise one. Foreign expertise was utilised, wherever considered necessary, but such experts also create problems not possessing adequate experience of the specific conditions in which they have to operate.

The leadership role in the successful execution of the scheme vested with the Director-General at the head office and the scheme manager at the field level. But, more significantly, FELDA encouraged a leadership role in everybody and made it possible for them to participate in activities, rather than talk about action. In the words of Mr. Tang Teng Lai, the case writer: "Good leaders generally seek out good followers. With leaders that would work many times as hard, would think twice as fast, are outright honest and ideally human, there is a

greater tendency for such traits to be expressed among the supporting staff. Suitable environment and circumstances are said to develop good leaders. The reverse holds true; that is, good leaders develop good environment and circumstances. With FELDA, the strategy is obviously starting with a good leader".[20]

What is significant in the Malaysian case as compared to that of Sri Lanka, is that faced with a fairly similar problem the former set up an organisation and improved it as it gathered experience, while in the latter, there was no attempt to institutionalise the programme and profit by its experience. Ultimately, it is in this respect that a clearly perceptible difference between the successful programmes and those that are relatively less so begins to emerge over a period of time.

SOCIAL WELFARE PROGRAMMES IN KOREA AND IRAN[21]

Two case studies refer to social welfare programmes in Korea and Iran—the former dealing with family planning and the latter with the speed of literacy. The administrative problems involved in implementing such programmes fall into a different category: their impact is not always obvious and immediate, although their long range contribution to economic growth, in both the countries, is now clearly apparent. Large numbers of people are involved and it requires considerable persuasion to change their attitudes or way of life. Motivating people to do so becomes the biggest single problem in the success or failure of such programmes.

The Family Planning Programme in Korea over the period 1969-70 has been rated as one of the more successful in developing countries; the birth rate declined from about 2.9 per cent in 1960 to about 2.0 per cent in 1970. Although it is not clear whether all of it is due to the programme itself, the purely statistical achievements make it clear that it was a contributing factor in a significant measure. The need for such a programme was obvious and Family Planning was incorporated in the Ten Year Plan of the country. This decision was made at the top by the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) and enjoyed the backing of the highest political leadership. This, in turn, enabled the implementing agency to mobilise resources, obtain authority for enforcement and coordinate the efforts required for implementation.

Once a basic decision was taken, it was quickly translated into a series of operational and quantified objectives: for instance, it was specified that at least 45 per cent of the child-bearing couples in the age group 20-44 must practise family planning. It was, in turn, broken down into the number of oral pills, contraceptive devices to be supplied

[20]Tang Teng Lai, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[21]Case Studies listed as items 10 and 11 on p. 292.

and provision of clinical services to be made at the field levels. An action programme was devised to reach these objectives but the quantification of targets enable field agencies and supervisory personnel to constantly check actual performance against targets. Of course, one needs to guard against the tendency noticed in developing countries where in a mania to attain targets, obviously incorrect figures are supplied by field agencies.

As regards the organisational structure, it was decided to integrate the family planning programme into the health services of the country. This was a wise decision but besides the purely governmental agencies—two other agencies were also pressed into service: a voluntary organisation for planned parenthood—PPFK—at a national level and the Korean Institute of Family Planning. The former worked closely with the health services but in well-defined areas such as the training of the staff, administration of foreign aid, dissemination of information and evaluation. This enabled an independent agency to keep track of the performance of the programme and tendency to give a too rosy picture by field personnel was curbed.

Equally significant is the fact that at the village level, the programme was integrated with the broader community development movement through the mothers' clubs formed in each of the 19,000 villages. The club consisting of 20-40 influential women in each village took the responsibility for pill distribution and exchange of information. This device enabled active participation of rural folk in the programme which is necessary in a movement of this type and also minimised administrative overheads through decentralising action at the village level. The failure of similar programmes in many other centres has been due to the fact that the village people were never adequately motivated to consider it as their own programme but regarded it as one more fad of the people at the national headquarters. Field personnel for the programme were recruited from the rural areas which enabled considerable rapport with those for whom the programme was intended.

Management of the programme was task-oriented and a schedule was laid down for all activities. In this respect, the programme has an advantage since in Korea, there was already widespread awareness and usage of the new management techniques in the administration of several ministries. By 1961, the Programming and Performance Budgeting system had been applied to all mini tries and agencies and Planning and Coordination units were established in each ministry. The schedule of performance required at each level was communicated to the field personnel who therefore knew what was expected of them.

Leadership function was exercised at various levels; by the supreme political body for laying down the broad objective, by the administrative organ, the ministry of health, for translating it into operational terms,

by the national voluntary agencies for evaluating and providing the training and by the village clubs to make the programme acceptable to the people. This enabled resource commitment and mobilisation of facilities available with other ministries and effective use of mass media such as TV, newspaper, cinema to propagate the message of family planning. What is significant is that each level had a distinct function to perform which was clearly spelt out and understood and which contributed to the final success of the programme.

In Iran, the problem of illiteracy was a major one with hardly 20 per cent of the people considered literate in 1966. Although a Compulsory Education Act was passed in 1911, hardly one child in six attended school in the rural areas by 1942. This position was worse in respect of girls with only 5000 schools in 50,000 villages. The basic problem was —as in the case of family planning—psychological; there was no awareness amongst the rural people of the need for and economic value of education. A UNESCO team which studied the problem in 1962 indicated that the expenditure required for complete literacy for each child would be enormous both in time—20 years—and money.

Faced with this problem, the Emperor of Iran announced in October, 1962 the establishment of an Army of Knowledge which would utilise the services of the country's young men and women, who had passed high school to teach functional literacy to the villagers. This was part of the White Revolution the Emperor had initiated in several other sectors and carried with it the tremendous authority and prestige of the head of the state. Thus a revolutionary plan to eradicate illiteracy—the scourge of all the backward areas of the world—was sought to be implemented with backing from the highest quarters; there were other benefits as well in bringing a fresh air of modernity to the villages and in developing empathy between the urban-oriented youth and the rural population.

In terms of organisation, it is significant that the programme was administered by the army and had a military flavour to it. Thus it was an Army of Knowledge and the young persons were given army ranks after a four month training period. This was a wise decision: in a country where the army enjoys traditional respect, it provided an added incentive to youth who may be otherwise reluctant to undertake such work. There was also the fear that disobedience would carry with it exemplary punishment as is the case in the army. However, the actual supervision of the programme was left to the ministry of education where a separate division under a director-general was set up to implement it.

In terms of monetary resources, budgetary allocation was made under the Village Primary Education Fund although the army also contributed since training facilities were provided by them and the

villagers themselves gave the lodging facilities as well as the school room. This made the villagers directly involved with the programme since they would be keen to obtain some tangible benefits in return for what they had provided; it also helped in reducing the overhead expenditure on the programme.

The evaluation of the programme was effected through superintendents of education but other aspects of it such as agricultural extension or public health or cooperation were supervised by their own departmental staff. At the country, regional and national levels, coordination committees consisting of representatives of several departments were set up presided over by a top ranking official which conferred considerable prestige on the programme. Cash prizes and awards were given on the basis of a merit rating and the highest awards at the national level were personally distributed by the Shahanshah himself which again indicated the importance attached to the programme. The results of the rating were also used for granting scholarships and promotions and thus had an impact on good performance.

The results achieved by the programme in the period 1962-72 have been impressive. In spite of the obvious discomforts of such a programme, there have been more volunteers than could be accommodated in it. In the ten year period (1962-72) more than 90,000 persons worked for two years each— implying 180,000 man-years for a worthwhile activity. Nor was the impact only in the field of education; since the corpsman was regarded as a multipurpose field worker, his influence was seen in an all-round development of the villages. For the young people themselves, it was of educative value in bringing them closer to their own rural population, and those who might have been dissatisfied and frustrated, were trained and employed to become agents of change. "In short" as Dr. Iraj Ayman, the case writer aptly says "the programme has served as a refining process for new generations"[22] and the impact of such a programme cannot be computed in purely monetary terms.

There have certainly been some failures in implementation; no programme of this type can be successful completely. What begins as a revolutionary programme has to be translated into mundane administrative terms; in doing so, it inevitably loses some of its revolutionary fervour, and has to reconcile itself to the routine bureaucracy of administration. There was no adequate feed-back system to provide corrections. The quality of personnel declined and the evaluation measures also lost their original impact. It is also significant that young people were allowed to buy off exemption from the service which is certainly not a desirable feature.

But looking at both the Korean and Iranian experiences in the difficult field of social welfare, it is obvious that the considerable success

[22]Dr. Iraj Ayman, *Army of Knowledge*, p. 17.

both had attained, were due in a large measure to the prestige associated with them by the support at the highest quarters. They were also part of a wider movement of national regeneration and hence had to be coordinated with a number of other departments and agencies. The organisation of the programme involved the local populations which also contributed to their success. Evaluation of the programme was undertaken—by an independent agency in Korea—and by an objective rating system in Iran. The case studies clearly bring out the need for translating the vague social objectives into a programme of action and targets which are easily understood by the field personnel. Most significantly, such programmes must have the willing support of the people for whose benefit they have been formulated—and this, in the ultimate analysis, is the hardest task of all in the process of implementation.

INDUSTRIAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN INDIA AND INDONESIA

The last two case studies deal with the provision of infrastructure facilities in India and Indonesia. In India, the Industrial Estate Programme is designed to provide ready-made facilities to potential entrepreneurs who are given worksheds with power, water and other necessary conveniences at subsidised rates. The Indonesian study deals with a major multipurpose project that was taken up to provide both power and irrigation water—a type of scheme that is common in many developing countries.

The Industrial Estate Programme of India is the largest in the world with more than 500 estates providing employment to more than 100,000 persons and involving an investment of $78 million. The annual production of goods on the estate is now around $ 11½ million. The study, however, focuses attention on the estates located in the semi-urban and rural areas and seeks to find an answer as to why such estates have not been as successful as those located in the predominantly urban areas. Thus the objective of using the industrial estate as a tool for balanced regional development has not been always fulfilled. By comparing estates which were relatively successful with those which are not, key points are sought to be identified as to the factors that determine the success or failure of such estates established in backward areas.

In terms of planning, although the Industrial Estate Programme is included in the country's five year plan, it is not organically linked with the regional or district plans. There is further a multiplicity of objectives for the programme such as development of entrepreneurship, growth of small and medium sized industry, creation of employment opportunities and balanced regional development—and no clear-

[33] Case Studies listed as items 12 and 13 on p. 292.

cut priorities are laid down. Sometimes, there is a conflict amongst the objectives themselves such as between rapid economic growth (which would favour location in a developed area) and acting as a focal point for further growth in a backward region. Even where location has been decided, the siting of the industrial estate itself is not often based on any techno-economic surveys but on political compulsions or 'hunches' of administrators. This has led in most cases to the industrial estates being situated in obviously unsuitable locations which, in turn, leads to indifferent performance of the units of the estate.

The supervision and construction of the estates does not conform to any time bound programme. There is no overall responsibility fixed on any individual or agency; coordination between the several departments involved—the Public Works Department for construction of buildings, the Electricity Board for power, the Department of Roads for roads and the Water Board for water—is done on an *ad hoc* basis although the Director of Industries is charged with administering the programme. This leads to time-lags at every stage—development of land, construction of buildings, provision of facilities, allotment of sheds, occupation and commencement of production. Modern techniques like PERT charts or CPM diagrams which ensure coordination of the several steps involved in the programme have not been utilised resulting in bottlenecks at every stage.

The management of the estate, after it is completed, is also a factor in the success of the programme. In the estates which were studied in detail, the most successful was the one where a cooperative society organised the estate and managed it. In fact, such local involvement seems to be a necessary prerequisite for the successful administration of a development programme. There is often a temptation in developing countries for over-zealous government agencies to attempt to do everything themselves without involving the beneficiaries of the programme at every stage. Thus the programme tends to operate in isolation without the necessary linkages with the community which alone can ensure its complete success. It is in the sense of stimulating the initiative of people that development projects contribute to nation building apart from their obvious economic impact. Government departments and agencies must be catalysts and not the sole implementors of development schemes—particularly where investments and managements skills are not high. In the words of Dr. Ram K. Vepa, the case writer: "It is desirable that there is a strong linkage between the local community, preferably through an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of the Industries Associations, local bodies, banking institutions, prominent individuals as well as the entrepreneurs and workers operating on the estate. Unless such active involvement is made possible through a systematic and carefully

worked out programme, the industrial estate will tend to be an isolated phenomenon making little impact on the growth of the region as a whole."[24]

Another important criterion is the flexibility of administrative procedures which tend to be rigid having been a carry-over from an administration, which largely dealt with regulatory activities such as collection of revenue or maintenance of law and order. While such administration provided a sense of uniformity and predictability, it has also become a procrustean bed; ironically, the more efficient the administration in the colonial sense, the less able it has become to adjust itself to the changing requirements of a development administration. In promoting development projects, the skills required in the field personnel are different and these need to be consciously instilled into them through suitable training programmes.

Technology is an important factor in determining the success or failure of individual units on the estate and, in turn, determines the ability of the estate as a whole to promote economic growth. All too often, small and medium units, even in the rural areas, tend to depend unduly on scarce raw materials, both imported and indigenous, which puts them at a disadvantage compared to those in the metropolitan areas; what is required is that such units should utilise the agricultural raw materials found in abundance in rural areas. Again, there is a tendency to utilise automatic machinery which would merely reduce the employment potential without increasing the profitability of the venture since both capital as well as maintenance costs of such machinery tend to be high. A more optimum man-machine mix is required in respect of production units situated in the semi-urban and rural areas where capital is scarce but labour is plentiful.

Ultimately, the industrial estate can be successful only if a number of other factors exist; it cannot be regarded as a magic wand for economic development and successful implementation of such a programme requires a coordinated approach of many agencies. It requires the necessary organisation and skills that can mould all these factors into a successful programme. Above all, it should be closely linked with the community in many ways and its success should be a "matter of pride for the entire community and not just the concern of one Government Department or a few officials".[25]

The Jatiluhur Project of Indonesia is a typical example of a massive multipurpose project which many developing countries had been implementing after independence. The project was intended primarily for generation of power and provision of irrigation for agricultural

[24]Dr. Ram K. Vepa, *Industrial Estate—A Tool for Development of Backward Areas*, p. 34.

[25]*Ibid.*, p. 37.

purposes but had a number of subsidiary objectives such as flood control, supply of drinking water and improvement of the sewage system of Jakarta as well as others such as fisheries development and tourist traffic.

Such projects always begin as the brain child of a few visionaries; they are dismissed initially as impractical till due to the new economic compulsions they begin to be slowly accepted. It was so in the case of Jatiluhur project; it began as an idea as early as in 1935, when Prof. Blommestein brought it up but it was a local engineer, Ir. Sediatmo, that really pushed it from about 1953, when he was appointed head of the State-owned enterprise for electricity business. It is interesting to see the role of the indigenous technocrats in the case study; again and again, it was they who took up an idea, pursued it and made possible the multipurpose project. It was, again, the power engineers belonging to a relatively modern profession, that were keen to implement the project as against the more conservative irrigation engineers who were more traditional in their thinking.

In fact, being a multipurpose project where power and irrigation are equally important, the conflict between the two sides became a feature of the implementation. The power side went ahead with the construction first; again and again, the conflicting requirements of irrigation and power had to be reconciled. Since they were under two separate ministries, this was not easy. Irrigation itself was not entirely the responsibility of the central government and the regional administrations like those of West Java and Jakarta Raya were also involved. For most of the time, the less enthusiastic partner in implementation was the irrigation and hence the necessary finance was not readily available in the mid-sixties, and the problem of increasing food production became a national priority. Even on the power side, it is to be noted that the emphasis on its end use was changing—at one time, it was for the urban areas of Jakarta and Bandung; later, it was for the Asian Games and, finally, its legitimate role as an infrastructure for industry was recognised.

A device adopted first in the USA, and later copied in many countries, was to set up a single agency to coordinate execution of such projects; the Tennesse Valley Authority (TVA) in the USA which was set up before World War II was the first of its type. It is not clear why this was not emulated in the initial stages of the Jatiluhur Project or even during the implementation ; if this had been done, there would certainly have been greater coordination between the power and irrigation sides. It was only in 1970, after the project was completed, that a single authority was set up which was located in the State Ministry for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs, rather than in public works, or power, or agriculture; if this had been set up earlier, it is conceivable

that much of the delay experienced in implementation might have been avoided.

That such delay meant greater expenditure is obvious; the implementation of the Jatiluhur Project spanned more than a decade and was affected by the changing economic situation and the severe inflation which was experienced in the country. It is, however, interesting to note that at no stage of the formulation or implementation of the project was an economist included in the inner team of policy-making which meant that the economic implications of speedy implementation were never fully recognised. There is a tendency in many developing countries to see such projects in purely administrative or, more recently, in technological terms; the fact that such schemes involving large sums of money, and large masses of people, have economic and sociological overtones is not always appreciated.

An important factor in the successful execution of the project was the consistent political support it received at the highest levels. In fact, the first decision to go ahead with it was made because the then Minister for Public Works, Mohd. Hassan—an influential member of the Cabinet —became sold on the idea and pressed for its adoption. Later, Prime Minister Ali Sastromidjojo and Djuanda and even the great 'Bung' Karno himself backed the project which, therefore, was allocated the funds, though somewhat tardily on the irrigation side. Thus the subport of the top political decision-makers for such massive schemes is an absolute necessity for successful implementation.

The role of technical personnel in pressing the scheme and executing it has already been mentioned. It may be pointed out that the young technicians involved in actual execution played a key role in adopting novel methods of construction to tide over the difficulty in procuring cement and steel. For instance, in place of concrete, a mixture of red cement, finely ground stone, limestone, chalk and sand was utilised. The idea of an integrated authority for administering the project was also put forward by a technical expert and slowly gained acceptance till it was finally adopted in 1970.

The effect of overall government policies on the progress of implementation of such major projects is also clearly in evidence in the case study. The policy of the central government in the period of execution varied from *etatism* in which government role was dominant to the post-1966 policy when government acted more as a coordinator and guide rather than intervening directly in every activity. However, it is evident that in such large schemes, which are multi-disciplinary in character, the central government must inevitably take a leading role in the formulation and execution of the enterprise. Once the project is completed, it was handed over to an autonomous authority which

could generate its own resources and plan further development to suit the specific requirements of the region.

AN OVERVIEW

What do all these case studies add up to? Do they reveal any new insights into the process of implementation of development projects in Asian countries? Such studies in a western 'culture' are relatively more abundant; but developing countries, in general, and those in Asia, in particular, have problems of their own—caused by the age-old traditions of the region and, in many cases, colonial legacies. It is, therefore, of special interest to see what lessons can be learnt from the stories of success (or failure) of these programmes which are typical of the development programmes commonly encountered in many Asian countries. Let it be said, however, that in programmes of this type, there are no absolute successes or failures; what seems, apparently, a success may in fact be less so, while that which seems to have failed may well be more significant in future. Even so, one can discern a pattern in the programmes which have fared relatively well and those which have not done equally well.

It is obvious that development programmes must be seen as part of a wider national plan of reconstruction. Sometimes, as in the case of the Indian Five Year Plan, the Korean Ten Year Plan or the White Revolution of Iran, there are well formulated, clearly defined, documents which set forth the overall perspectives of development. The increasing of rice production in Philippines is not part of any specific plan and yet, its need in the national context is obvious; so are the housing projects of Hong Kong and Singapore or the Water Supply Project of Bangkok. In all these cases, one can readily see that the programme has obvious linkages to the overall plans of economic growth.

Having said this, however, one must admit that the linkages at the lower levels such as the regional, district or local levels are not so readily apparent in most cases. The Industrial Estate Programme in India, for instance, is not organically linked to the state or district plans and its impact on the growth of the economy at these levels is not so obvious. This is also true of the social welfare schemes like those of family planning in Korea or the literacy campaign in Iran. Unlike the housing projects or the water supply schemes which have an immediate relevance, in the land colonisation schemes of Sri Lanka or Malaysia or the welfare schemes in Korea and Iran, there is need to persuade and motivate people through mass media to act in a manner desired. This imposes new problems of implementation which need to be clearly recognised, at the outset, by planners and implementors.

Another important aspect is the need to have a clarity of objectives and to translate these objectives into operational terms. The success of

the Philippines experiment in rice production was because it was linked to the ideal of self-sufficiency which has a tremendous appeal; while a similar programme in Nepal got lost in more prosaic terms of opening demonstration farms and barely achieved 25 per cent of the target. Targets, if they are to be meaningful, must be set in realistic terms; more often, they represent what *ought* to be done, rather than what *can* and *must* be done. In Korea, the broad objectives of reducing the birth-rate significantly in a decade, become translated into operational terms, which are easily understood by the field personnel and which can be monitored. On the other hand, the Industrial Estate Programme in India is burdened with so many objectives—some of which are mutually conflicting—that neither the planners nor the implementors are ever sure, whether they have succeeded or not.

The housing schemes of Singapore, the Jatiluhur Project in Indonesia, the rice self-sufficiency programme of Philippines or the literacy campaign of Iran had strong political support at the highest levels—Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, 'Bung' Karno, President Marcos or the Shahanshah. In Korea, it was provided by the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction (SCNR) but in others, there was no visible sign of backing at the highest political levels. Such a backing automatically assures a willingness of several agencies to work together and also governs the budget allocations and, what is more important, speedy releases. Such support is obtained when the man at the top either realises the intrinsic worth of the programme or has a shrewd sense that his own image is likely to impove by making a success of such a programme.

Without such support, it is often difficult to make a success—although the Osaka case study reveals that this can be done provided the administrative bureaucracy has attained a certain degree of competence and efficiency. In the case of Osaka, although it was the city administration that implemented the project, it had a tradition of prudence and shrewdness; the City Government set up the South Port Development Division, manned it with able, well-trained persons and allowed it to function without interference. In all successful cases. there is need for a unified agency to take an integrated approach to the problem. In Singapore, it was the powerful Housing and Development Board (HDB) whose Chairman was a senior Minister of Lee's Cabinet; in Malaysia, it was the FELDA which after an initial perod of hesitation was given full authority to implement and supervise the programme and in Philippines, it was only when Marcos revitalised the Rice and Corn Production Council, that the programme became a success. In the multipurpose project of Indonesia, the lack of a coordinating authority over Power and Irrigation made it difficult to reconcile the conflicting requirements of both sides leading to considerable delay in imple-

mentation. It was only later that such an authority was set up to administer the project. In Bangkok, although a Metropolitan Water Works Authority (MWWA) was set up, and the board was packed with 'big' names, the 'authority' did not in fact, have real authority—in power, funds or personnel. This was so in the programmes of Nepal where even at the ministry level, there was a bifurcation between Food and Land Reforms or in Sri Lanka where the Permanent Secretary who should have coordinated did not do so leaving the job to a lower official who did not, however, have sufficient authority to do it effectively.

The Sri Lanka case is of special interest because of the insight it throws on the complex problem of the delicate relationship between the minister and civil servants. The minister, in this particular instance, was a competent man seemed genuinely anxious to push through a project which had an obvious mass appeal; but in the absence of any strong support from the administrative cadres—went about it alone. There was no detailed scrutiny of the scheme and funds were allocated without the normal precautions. There was no coordination at the top or at the field level: at both levels, the coordination committees set up for the purpose failed to do the job because of inter-service bickerings and the lack of any focal point of authority. If the Sri Lanka scheme did not succeed as well as it should have, it must be attributed to the failure of the permanent civil service rather than the political executive.

On the other hand, in a similar scheme in Malaysia, a separate authority was set up which centralised policy-making at the national level but decentralised implementation at the field levels. Adequate delegation of authority makes the field personnel show greater initiative in their jobs but there is also need to infuse in them a 'sense of pride' as in Singapore. Salary levels also tend to be unduly low in many countries like Thailand, India or Nepal leading to a loss of morale and poor quality of personnel. However, through training programmes, it is possible to improve the calibre of personnel at the middle and lower levels, the 'cutting edge' of the programme. In the Singapore case study, as also in Philippines, Korea, Malaysia and Iran, systematic training programmes were used with great effectivess to make the projects a success.

There is need too for constant evaluation and monitoring of the programmes. Feedback of what is happening at the field levels to the headquarters so that adjustments are made in the plan itself or corrective action taken to remove bottlenecks is an important feature of successful implementation. In Malaysia, the Director-General of FELDA and senior officials made frequent visits for making on-the-spot assessment and reports from the field were displayed in an Operations Room to

provide information at a glance. In the Philippines, Salas made frequent and unannounced visits to the various project areas to keep the personnel in trim. In Iran, objective merit-ratings were given on the basis of which the corpsmen could hope for promotions, scholarships or other benefits. These features are important to ensure that field personnel do their work effectively and also that there is a built-in incentive for good work.

Finance which commonly is supposed to be the villain for poor implementation was not, in fact, a serious handicap in any of the programmes; in almost every case, adequate funds were allocated for implementation—in some, even without adequate scrutiny as in Sri Lanka. In Nepal, there was adequate bilateral and multi-lateral assistance although, one wonders, whether under dependence on foreign aid has a tendency to distort the priorities of a programme. But what is more serious is the fact that, quite often, no realistic assessment of the funds required for a programme is made: in the Bangkok case, for instance, the actual expenditure on only 75 per cent of the programme was twice the original estimate for the entire scheme. This is partly due to the delays in implementaion that take place at every stage which add to the cost of the project; although this is commonplace, there is insufficient awareness, both amongst planners and implementors, that time has a money cost—which can completely upset any cost-benefit analysis that might have been made at the stage of formulation. Even a major multipurpose project such as the Jatiluhur-Project in Indonesia had no economist either in its formulation or implementation. If only administrators in developing countries can be made to realise that delays in decision making have almost invariably a strong financial implication, they may perhaps act quicker in reaching decisions, even in comparatively simple matters.

Another parameter that is not often realised, but which can make a significant difference to the success or failure of a project, relates to the technological implications of decisions that are often regarded as purely administrative. In Hong Kong, there was little attempt to evolve housing designs suitable to the local conditions; in Singapore, however, the lesson was quickly learnt and standardisation of suitable designs was made, effecting savings in both time and money. In Philippines, the success of the Los Banos Rice Research Institute to produce new strains of miracle rice undoubtedly contributed to the success of the self-sufficiency programme. In Thailand, on the other hand, there was an undue reliance on the foreign consultants to provide solutions to the problem of the city's water supply; recommendations made by them were not always realistic and had to be revised leading to further delay and, consequently, more expenditure. In Indonesia, young technicians provided the inspiration both for the initial idea as well as the execution of the

project. The relatively poor performance of most of the industrial estates set up in the rural areas of India was due to excessive dependence on scarce raw materials—both indigenous and imported—which forced the units to work at low capacity; while all around were agricultural raw materials which could have been utilised. There is need for greater reliance on local expertise and to make technology more relevant to the conditions in which the programme is implemented.

All the case studies demonstrate that leadership is essential for the success of a programme. Such leadership can be either political as in Philippines or Iran; but, even more important, is the administrative leadership such as Sa'as provided to the Philippines Programme. There is no doubt that he galvanised what was, till then, a routine government programme into one of high national purpose. But it is also true that mere charismatic leadership, while useful to provide momentum over a short period, is not adequate and needs to be sustained by institutionalising it and instilling a new confidence into lower echelons of administration. Ultimately, it is the leadership at the middle cadres that will determine, in the long run, the success or failure of a programme; and as in the case of Malaysia or Korea, the personnel at those levels must be given a visible role in the process of implementation. Perhaps, it is true, as the case writer of the Malaysia study says that good leaders make good followers; in any case, it is important to build into the implementing machinery a pattern of institutional leadership which can survive even if the big names are no longer in the programme.

Finally, all development projects must build close linkages, with the community they are intended to serve. In the Indian programme, the successful estate was the one where a cooperative organisation of entrepreneurs had taken the lead and provided the stimulus for setting up the estate as also managing it; in most of the others, it remained a government programme with the beneficiaries largely indifferent to it. In Korea, the Mothers' Clubs at the village level helped to make rural women aware of the implications of family planning and to persuade them to use the contraceptives distributed under the programme. In Iran, since the villagers provided lodging facilities to the corpsmen and also accommodation for the school, they became involved in the programme of increasing literacy. In Thailand, there was a communication gap between the citizens and the MWWA since there was lack of credibility both in their competence and integrity. Osaka on the other hand, had a system of citizen consultation which made problem of relocation or compensation for fishery rights a comparatively easy matter. It is, therefore, of great importance to involve the people who are expected to benefit from the programme; and to consciously educate them. Such an effort, which apparently may seem a waste of time to over-enthusiastic administrators who want to get on with the job,

repays in the long run through meaningful involvement and support from the citizens and their representative associations. The colonial legacy of regarding good government as a substitute for self-government must give way to a more modern attitude of taking the people along in the process of implementation right from the start.

CONCLUSION

The several case studies discussed in this paper are valuable in providing administrators of development programmes guidelines in implementation. If, as is now widely recognised, developing countries are weakest, not in plan formulation but in implementation, then these cases will certainly help them to become more aware of the danger signal one needs to avoid or the features one needs to specifically build into the plan. Admittedly, conditions and circumstances in each country differ widely; and no development project is identical with any other, even if apparently they seem alike. There are intangible, but nonetheless, real shades of difference which may have a significant, and even critical, impact on implementation; these need to be studied and solutions devised to meet the problem. On the other hand, it is also true that in all the developing countries there are broad similarities which create problems which are fairly alike. These case studies, covering a wide range of areas and written by experienced men of public affairs, demonstrate that it is possible to foreast such problems and devise solutions which can assure a high degree of ultimate success to the development projects.

PAPERS PRESENTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF EROPA AT TOKYO IN OCTOBER, 1973

1. Hans C. Blaise, *Planning for Implementation.*
2. Dr. S.S. Hsueh and Andrew Wong (Hong Kong), *Implementation of the Hong Kong Resettlement Programme.*
3. Dr. Stephen Yeh (Singapore), *Public Housing in Singapore.*
4. Dr. Gabriel Iglesias (Philippines), *Implementation of the Philippines' Four Year Rice Self-Sufficiency Programme (1966-70).*
5. Mr. Kiran Nath Pyakuryal (Nepal), *Paddy Production Programme in the Third Plan (1965-70).*
6. Prof. S. Yoshitomi (Japan), *Osaka South Port Development Plan.*
7. Dr. Chakrit Noranitipadungkarn (Thailand), *Bangkok Metropolitan Immediate Water Improvement Programme.*
8. Mr. M. Rajendra (Sri Lanka), *The Rajangana Colonisation Scheme.*
9. Mr. Tang Teng Lai (Malaysia), *Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA)—Its Creation, Development and Growth.*
10. Dr. In-Joung Whang (Korea), *Implementation of the National Family Planning Programme of Korea (1962-71).*

11. Dr. Iraj Ayman (Iran), *Army of Knowledge.*
12. Dr. Ram K. Vepa (India), *Industrial Estates—A Tool for Development of Backward Areas.*
13. Mr. Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo (Indonesia), *The Jatiluhur Project (1952-70).*

□

Planned Economic Change: The Components of Implementation*

T.S. Murty

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT by integrated plans with fixed time spans is half a century old. Throughout this period there has been dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, besides references to defects in planning. The criticism used to be about what we have now come to models. During the last decade, particularly in India, we have come to hear more about weaknesses in plan implementation and less about defects in the plan models. The present study will attempt an understanding of the elements which go to constitute implementation.

The question that can be posed in such an exercise may be :

(*a*) Difference between planning and plan implementation.
(*b*) Whether the complicated nature of planning has to be reflected in plan implementation.
(*c*) The effectiveness of the studies on plan implementation that have been taken up during the last two years.
(*d*) The present system of implementation and the assumptions it is based on.
(*e*) The essential ingredients of scheme implementation.
(*f*) The basic types of situations encountered in execution of dvelopment schemes.
(*g*) If scheme implementation is execution of orders, what are the constituents of the latter and the factors affecting it.

Planning is now used loosely to mean planning proper as well as its implementation. Efficient planning takes into account the steps needed to implement and the ability as well as the possibility of implementation. One can even argue that there is no sharp dividing line between intention and human action; that, instead, there is a grey zone at the edges of which one stage merges in the other. Action too has often to be at multiple levels. Such taking into account the requirements of implementation, while planning, does not affect the fact of a special quality in the stage of implementation. A difference does exist and essentially consists of what we want to do as compared with doing it. The edges are there

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1980, pp. 40-49.

for the grey zone; there is a level at which the majority of individual acts occur; and in the bulk of the situations, the two stages are identifiable. Even if it seems arbitrary, a differentiation is feasible as well as necessary. By planning proper I prefer to mean conception, whether briefly or in detail. It is laying down of objectives and working out the schemes by which we translate the objectives into proposals for detailed action. The draft plan is discussed in December-January with the Planning Commission; the outlays are settled; the detailed sectoral plans are prepared; the integrated state plan is approved; the budget is passed and the volumes laying down the quarterly physical and financial targets are printed. The conception part of planning is then over. By implementation, I mean what comes next: the physical actions by which the schemes thus draw up are executed by the VLWs, the PHCs, the DISs, the cooperative inspectors and the executive engineers.

PLAN CONCEPTION AND PLAN IMPLEMENTATION

Development planning is never easy. There are many planners, many economists, and many models. There is little of agreement on how a plan should be worked out and what should be the objectives that we assign ourselves in planning. Having to deal with a multiplicity of variants—variations in resources, variations in cultures, variations in topography, variations in time, variations in the opinions of the ruled and the rulers, variations among individual groups in each of these categories—planning is an extremely complicated exercise.

Implementation of plan schemes need not follow the pattern inherent in the conception part of planning. The complicated nature of the objectives or the complicated nature of a situation need not result in the action which is to follow the understanding having the same complicated nature. In other words, the sophisticated nature of a situation need not mean that the response to that situation has also to be sophisticated and complicated.

Whether visualised as a complicated or simple phenomenon, the implementation part of planning has come to receive attention only recently. In India, one may even date it from the special issue on *Development of Backward Areas* the IIPA brought out. From the end of 1976 onwards, we are also having numerous courses on plan implementation. I have the syllabus of one such I received recently. It consists of four parts:

(*i*) Implementation planning;
(*ii*) Information monitoring and evaluation;
(*iii*) Funds planning, performance budgeting and control; and
(*iv*) Material and equipment planning and control.

Except for the first, this is not what is really implementation. The detailed list of lectures and workshop projects covering item 1 of the course show that even *item implementation planning*, is still the conception part of planning only and not implementation. The items in that list are: modern techniques of working out detailed planning for different inputs covering project time, man, material and money resources; application of network technique for implementation planning relevant to power projects in Indian situation; network development, time estimation, critical path identification and its analysis and compression; time cost trade-off; manpower optimisation; development of material and financial plans; tender preparation and implementation; CPM; monitoring; data reappraisal; social cost-benefit; inter-departmental coordination; material management; communications. Granted that implementation is a stage which is yet to be clearly marked from the rest of planning, one still doubts if the list really concentrates on what we need to know about implementation.

The problem of implementation is the problem of transition from the setting up of detailed objectives to the achievement of those objectives. The objectives are settled by the political leaders, with discreet nudging from the economists, economists-turned-civil servants and civil servants. The working out of the objectives into detailed schemes has been the responsibility, sometimes entirely and sometimes largely, of civil servants. More particularly the work has been entrusted to the State secretariats, manned by the specialist as well as the generalist, the technocrat and the political-leader-turned-thinker as well as the academic, moving between teaching-research-consultancy-administration. The implementation of the schemes thus formulated is, however, entirely the responsibility of civil servants. Among civil servants it has been the special responsibility of the administration, the executive wing, the men in the field.

In spite of the variety of skills its members represent, the bureaucracy has yet to develop techniques really adequate for the translation of objectives into detailed schemes. The academica too has yet to come up with an adequate methodology. That is as far as the conception part is concerned. As for implementation, neither the civil service nor the academica has made even a beginning in studying what constitutes the processes lumped together as execution of detailed schemes. Once a plan is made, it is assumed it will be implemented. This is a variety of *gyana yoga*. If we know what is the correct thing to do, it will get done. The problem is only knowing what is the correct thing to do. Unfortunately, while it may be just possibly true of economic planning, economic schemes' implementation requires riding simultaneously the twin horses of *karma* and *gyana*.

It is the fashion to condemn the existing administrative structure in

India as a colonial legacy and blame it for the failures in economic development. Nobody can disagree with the statement that the administrative machinery we inherited was essentially meant for regulatory work: for tax collection and for the maintenance of law and order. But the administrative structure is not a colonial legacy. It is something as old as India and the government in India. Credit is due for the system's achievements as criticism for the failures. Such credits as well as failures very much exist in both regulatory as well as development work. It is again unjust to concentrate on failures in development work which are in the implementation part; seeing how little of the traditional administrative system's handling of the planning part of development, the conception part, has received recognition.

It is not useful to dwell on the fairness or unfairness of the criticism of implementation or lack of appreciation of the conception part. But some study of what it is that is execution and what it is that is lacking in implementation has to be done.

WHY SOME SCHEMES GET DONE

One notices that some types of plan schemes get implemented easily while others seem to run into a variety of difficulties. There are some types of schemes which get done and some which do not. For instance, construction of roads or establishment of schools and hospitals. You sanction the money, provide the machinery and appoint the executive engineer, assistant engineers, overseers and workers needed and the road gets completed, maybe by the target date. (Let us ignore for the moment whether the project is completed in time or gets delayed.) You set up a hospital building, stock medicines and post a doctor. The sick people go and get treated. (I do not want to go into the question of some backward societies wherein allopathic medicine requires a geat deal of selling. That is a point of detail.) Similarly you construct a school building, provide a blackboard, some textbooks, appoint a couple of teachers and the children go to school and take their examinations at the end of the acadmic year, failing or passing as the case may be. (Here again, I do not want to go into the question of satisfactory or unsatisfactory attendance, whether students fail or pass, how much or how little of the syllabus is covered, etc. They are peripheral to the main point).

We then have other types of schemes like green manuring, adult literacy, family planning, wherein we allot the funds, appoint the people, supply the equipment. But nothing much seems to get done. Other examples will be the establishment of small industries, training of entrepreneurs or craftsmen, organisation of marketing cooperative societies, etc.

A difference between the two categories is that what is in the first

list (schemes which seem to work) is something which the administrative machinery by itself is capable of handling. It is something which gets done by issuing an order that it should be done. It is in line with the regulatory type of administrative network which has been built up by the British. That network is itself a continuation and is based on the tax gathering, law-and-order-maintaining purposes, which have determined the quality of the government and the administration throughout the ages. Items in the second list (schemes which do not seem to work) definitely require people's participation. The quality of the people's participation and what else is required are matters that can be gone into later. For the present, I only want to emphasise the point that certain types of development schemes require action which is primarily the responsibility of the government. Other types of schemes are primarily those which are the responsibility of the people, with the government and the administration aiding the people to implement the schemes.

Regulatory work means carrying out of orders. You are asked to collect the tax. You collect. If the man does not pay the tax, you seize his household goods, auction them off and deposit the proceeds in the treasury. You are asked to maintain law and order. You beat up the people who are rioting. Regulatory work can be often as simple as that. But asking that an adult literacy campaign be started or that family planning be made popular or that *jhoomias* should take to terracing cannot be done by orders. Because of this, it is where development work consists mostly of obeying of orders that the essentially regulatory machinery, which is the administration, has been successful. It is where something different as well as more than carrying out of orders is needed that the administrative machinery has faced hurdles in coping with the task adequately.

Within the context of what we now see as the administration's capacities and incapacities for development programme implementation, one must note that a part of the incapacity is also due to weaknesses in the conception part that precedes implementation. Regulatory work, as I have said, depends on the issue of detailed orders; the details being those which will list the specific actions required of individual categories of government functionaries, the details of the work that is to be done have to be spelt out. Guidelines are another and different type of instruction. The difference I am making is that a police constable has to be told specifically and briefly what he has to do, if somebody is walking along a road late at night and the constable can decide if he is a suspicious character. A lecture on obtaining the acceptance of the society he works in will not help the constable in coming to a decision. That is what plan implementation is like. The S.P. has to be given a different

type of instructions. Some plan documents are unable to do the former and are instead concentrating on the latter. One may take at random any development scheme from among the various state or central plan documents and check how much of the directions issued deal with what the extension officer, the VLW, or the patwari is required to do. The issue of directions to field staff may be found to have been given little attention. The bulk of the schemes will be concentrating on what the district official (or at the most the BDO) is required to do. The further administrative details are left to the BDO or the director or the DM to work out. The higher direction or instruction which is required for the work is thus getting the time it needs; but the lowest level functionary is not always being given the skills and instructions (as different from the knowledge) necessary for him to do his work.

GROWTH OF ESTABLISHMENT WORK

A concomitant of this failure in the conception (as I define that term) part of planning is the dependence on creation of posts as the essential element of execution of work, a practice inherent in the way a regulatory system works. This is also what the British Indian administration was used to and has been automatically accepted too many of the generalists and the specialists at every level involved in development, during the formative years of our republic. You want to kill all the flies in Madras. Appoint a fly-killing commissioner. There will be deputy fly-killing commissioners, statisticians and perhaps even fly-killers. In fact, the number of actual fly- killers may be very small. Even if there are a lot, it is left probably to the DM to supervise the work and report to the fly-killing commissioner. There is little appreciation of whether appointing a number of individual fly-killers will result in flies getting killed in large numbers. It is assumed that just like a riot ordered to be put down will be put down, the task to be performed will be completed by appointing a fly-killer and ordering him to kill flies. There has to be a comprehension of whether the fly-killer can, in fact, perform his task and how he is to perform the task. It is no answer either to appoint an entomologist and a doctor to give lectures to the fly-killers on habits of flies and damage the flies cause. That is giving the lowest level functionary knowledge which he may or may not need, and failing to endow him with the practical ability to deal with his task. The end result can be, he goes about distributing swatters, pours pesticide in a few drains and spends the rest of his time in a tea-stall.

An inevitable corollary of the approach is also the growth in establishment work. All administrators will bear this out. All academics who have to do administrative work in their college, institute, or university will also bear this out. Because of the emphasis on proliferation of

personnel (in the touching belief that appointment of personnel gets the job done) we are getting bogged down in questions of allowances, office accommodation, reports and returns, stationery, leave, seniority, telephones, accounts, transfers and postings.

What has been stressed till now is the theme that any meaningful study of the problems of implementation have to take into account the difference between the two types of development work that we have to execute. It has to start off with the premise that implementation is essentially a matter of obeying of orders and analysing what constitutes the carrying out of such orders. I now urge that some at least of the various parts inherent in the phenomena of obeying of orders can be identified.

First, there has to be a desire to obey the order, at the very least passive acquiescence. The importance of motivation is often underestimated. It is not a question of a committed bureaucracy or an indifferent one. A person who is interested in doing a work is more likely to do it than one who is not. One can ask some of the civil servants who have been in the administration in the 1950s. At that time the community development and national extension service programmes seemed capable of usherhing in a brave new world. Many of us went round the villages, selling improved agricultural techniques, digging compost pits, constructing roads or cleaning latrines. Many things were achieved, even if small things. The CD programme now is far bigger with vastly greater funds. But one misses the enthusiasm and belief in community development. The results now got through community development programmes are quite different in quality or content to what was done as part of the same programme and by the same schemes in the 1950s.

There must be the knowledge of the subject. Every order will be dealing with a particular subject. An implementor (I apologise for the word) must know about the subject before he can carry out an order about it. If I may stray a little bit, one must differentiate here between knowledge of a subject from the ability to handle that subject. Ability here is ability to implement, whereas knowledge is possession of data. That is, knowledge consists of accumulation of facts, whereas ability is the handling of these facts. Knowledge by itself is not enough. It is like a person who has access to the criminal manual, the Indian constitution and Chitale's fourteen volumes or so of commentary on the constitution, but is not in a position to advise a witness appearing before an enquiry commission, what question he is required to answer and what not.

Receptivity of the target group is the third. The implementation of every order or every scheme necessarily has repercussions on people. It has the implications of changing what the people are doing: stopping

them from doing something that they are doing and making them do something which they are not doing. If the people are not receptive to such doing or not doing, then the government servant who has to carry out an order will face difficulties in carrying out the order received.

The availability of time is the next component of execution. Every government servant, every organisation, every machine is capable of only a given output during a given period of time. The quantum of administrative effort available is always limited. Put simply, I cannot do two things at the same time. If I do a thing it is at the expense of something else. If I do a thing, I do not do something else during the same period of time. If an order-carrying out-person or an implementing agency is given too many jobs to do at the same time, some of them will not get done. In implementation, therefore, we have to ensure that the total volume of work which is being given to the implementing agency is such that they can all be implemented by that agency. The quantum of administrative effort can be marginally increased over short periods of time by not going to sleep or by concentrating harder. But there is a limit in time beyond which such increase in the effort cannot be sustained.

One may say that the answer is to increase the number of persons handling the job. But implementation, whether of a regulatory nature or of a development scheme, is subject also to the constraints of space and the size of the target group. If a village has got a population of two handred adults and I appoint a village level worker to do adult literacy, family planning, fruit preservation, conversion from jhooming to terracing, inoculation, vaccination and small scale industries, the single VLW will not be able to do all of them. Appointing six VLWs and dividing the work among them also will not work. Because the target group is still the same two hundred adults. They do not have the time to listen to each of the six VLWs and carry out what each of them is saying.

There has to be the habit of implementation. Here the question of discipline comes up. I emphasise the point that discipline has to be a habit. That is, the possibility of not doing a thing should be remote. We do things mostly because we cannot envisage not doing them. A situation where they are not done is not within our comprehension. This habit of implementation can be seriously damaged, once schemes which cannot be implemented are orderd to be implemented. The fabric which is the habit of obeying orders gets torn up.

Irrespective of the content of people's participation, implementation administration has to be through an organisational framework. Such a framework has to be pyramidical. It has to have a hierarchical structure. If the implementation organisation is other than pyramidical, then the implementation agency, the organ which is receiving an order but

not carrying out an order, will not be exposed to the penalty of punishment.

Implementation effort requires that the specific actions required to be taken are spelt out by the higher levels in the administration. If not, it will mean that the development schemes will not get executed. Implementation must consist of detailed individual actions. This detailed individual actions are mostly simple, uncomplicated actions. It is these that are not getting done when we say plans are not being implemented; it is these detailed orders which are to be received by the lowest level functionary, that the administrative machinery is finding it difficult to frame. Because of that inability, we are sometimes going in for complicated arrangements achieving a facade of hectic (but not needed-result oriented) activity. We take the plan and then transfer to the execution of the plan the complications, subtleties, the linkages and the multilevel appreciations inherent in the conception part of development. This is done in many ways: by issue of guidelines, by asking for reports and returns, by asking for evaluations of the results of the programme, by the collection of data of secondary importance to the scheme as such, by the creation of a large number of specialist posts, etc. Concentrating on them can mean neglecting the working out of the supplies needed, the sanctions to be issued or inter-departmental coordination.

MONITORING IS NOT IMPLEMENTATION

Data retrieval or monitoring is not implementation. Monitoring is an end to a means. It is not an end in itself. Further, monitoring cannot be directly relevant to effective implementation or the carrying out of individual actions based on orders received by the lowest level functionary in the administrative organisation. It is like prescribing a return from all officers who have not been on tour during the month. Because they do not send the reports or are irregular in sending them, one more monthly report is prescribed, asking them to send periodically a list of all the reports not sent. If a person fails to do a thing, it serves little purpose to ask him to list the things that he is failing to do. I do not deny that time being limited, paper work, reporting, monitoring on the basis of written reports, is the easiest way to keep track of a situation. But it is for keeping track of a situation; it is for planning what is to be done. It cannot be a substitute for ensuring that the work itself is getting done. A check list is given (perhaps incomplete) of what goes to constitute implementation and what does not. These are: desire to implement, knowledge of the subject, receptivity of the target group, quantum of administrative effort, habit of implementation, penalty for failure, and working out of details of actions required at the lowest level of the

administration. We may now take two specific examples of development schemes and see how their implementation has been effected by each of the entries in the check list.

Prohibition : The desire to implement is not there in most cases. The knowledge of the subject is there. The receptivity of the target group is not there. The quantum of administrative effort needed is too much for the police, howsoever much augmented, to be able to tackle. The habit of implementation is not there. The pyramidical or hierarchical structure is not harmed. The administrative bottlenecks of supplies, sanctions are absent or present to the same extent as in other law and order situations. The interdepartmental coordination necessary is not there. Details of what is required at lowest levels have been worked. out.

The second example can be jhoomia resettlement. The desire to implement is not there at the lowest level. The knowledge of the subject is there in the sense of what land is suitable for agriculture; but the ability to deal with it in the sense of persuading the tribals is not there. The receptivity of the target group is often not there. The quantum of administrative effort is well within the limits of the staff assigned the job. The habit of implementation is not there, since resettlement is a new item and whatever experience we have is that of refugees only. The hierarchical structure of the administration is affected in that the resettlement work is done by specialised agencies which are often responsible, not to the local district officials, but to some remote headquarters in the capital. The detailed actions at the lowest levels are only partly worked out. The administrative bottlenecks are solved to a limited extent only and inter-departmental cooperation is often neglected.

CONCLUSION

This study started of by posing a number of questions. The answers proposed for the questions can be summarised as follows:

(*a*) Planning can be regarded as consisting of two parts : planning proper or conception which should include the preparation of detailed schemes as well as the direction for their execution. Implementation is a different stage and consisting of actions taken in the field, at the ground level.

(*b*) Planning proper has to deal with many variants and requires a complicated methodology. The number of variants involved in implementation is smaller and the quality of the methodology required for implementation is different.

(*c*) Study of the implementation part is still being confined to working out details of planning proper or conception and not imple-

mentation on the ground.

(*d*) It is being assumed that the preparation of a detailed scheme and ordering that it should be executed will automatically result in the implementation of the detailed scheme. This is because it is possible to do so in regulatory work.

(*e*) The basic quality of implementation is the carrying out, at the ground level, orders which already have been worked out in detail.

(*f*) The types of development schemes that get implemented easily are those which an essentially regulatory system of administration can cope with at the ground level. Where participation of the public is necessary, they often run into difficulties. More attention is being paid to framing of the schemes rather than building up the ability of the field level workers to execute the schemes. The instructions and guidelines which are prepared should adequately take into account the requirements of the man on the spot. The working out of the practical details from the general directions given cannot be left to the lowest level functionary. Some of these weaknesses are tending to be covered up by other activities of a more or less obfuscatory nature, though not deliberately. A concomitant as the proliferation in numbers and the resulting preoccupation with establishment work.

(*g*) (*i*) Monitoring is necessary for implementation, but is not itself implementation.

(*ii*) Implementation of orders must have eight components: desire to obey the order, knowledge of the subject, receptivity of the target group, correct relation to the possible quantum of administrative effort, particularly of time available for the implementor and for the target group, habit of implementation, hierarchical structure and attention to what the ground level staff needs.

□

Administrative Reform*

Mohammad Mohabbat Khan

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM, as a term, has been much used and abused. Writers on administrative reform, after years of constant effort, have failed to agree on a theoretical framework under which it can be studied and analysed. Worse still, recently, serious doubts have been raised as to the rationale behind the use of the term 'administrative reform' itself and suggestions have been offered to substitute it by using a more comprehensive term like 'reorganisation of the machinery of government'[1].

The discontent and frustrations that have developed over the years about the use of the term 'administrative reform' can be attributed to several factors. One of the rhetorics that is often heard in any reform effort is that it is intended to improve upon the existing situation by aiming to create a good administration which clearly has a normative element. Contrary to these pious wishes, what actually happens in many real situations is entirely a different thing. Many reforms have no other purpose than to strengthen the position of certain power holders, and reform actors are strongly inspired by influence and power motives.[2] The traditional use of the term has left an impression that a clear-cut distinction can be made between changes in the bureaucracy and those in the organisation of the political executive organs. As one observer aptly remarks, "In fact, it may well be that administrative reform has lost its grip on the imagination of the political scientists because it has ignored the conceptual problems involved in adapting static models of administrative perfection to dynamic political reality."[3]

Many so-called administrative reforms have implied considerable changes in the structure and processes of political executive organs and in their relationship with the administrative machinery.[4] It has been

*From *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, 1978, pp. 484-497.

[1]Arne F. Leemans, "Overview", in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed., Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 8.

[2]*Ibid.*

[3]J.D. Montgomery, "Sources of Bureaucratic Reform: Typology of Purpose and Politics", in *Political and Administrative Development*, ed., Ralph Braibanti, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1969, p. 427.

[4]Leemans, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

observed that changes in power structures within and among political executive organs induce changes in the administrative machinery, many of which are inspired by purely political considerations.[5]

Recent discussions show considerable awareness of the need to view administrative reform as a sub-system of a wider societal system which includes a political sub-system. The interactions between and among the administrative and political sub-systems are crucial and to a large extent determine the setting up of objectives, goals, strategies, and probabilities of the success of the implementation of the administrative reform proposals. Experiences of some developing countries point to a dilemma which has not been properly dealt with as yet.[6] On the one hand, there is increasingly a growing need to undertake comprehensive reform programmes to keep in pace with complex social, economic, and political situations which most developing countries must cope with in order to survive let alone prosper. Comprehensive reforms, in practice, have been found to be extremely difficult to implement, on the other.

Another factor which has obstructed the formulation of a theoretical framework with general applicability is the place of contextuality in the success or failure of any reform effort. Developing countries differ vastly among themselves regarding their administrative systems (*i.e.*, nature, composition, and capability), political systems (*i.e.*, absolute monarchy, dictatorship, one-party rule, multi-party democratic system), economic conditions (*i.e.*, stage of economic development), and cultural heritage. These wide-ranging differences and, consequently, the futile attempts to develop an all-embracing and universal strategy to study administrative systems have been widely recognised. Lawrence and Lorsch opine that an optimal change model for a particular case should be "conditional on the task to be done, the environmental conditions to be handled, and the characteristics of the individual contributors involved."[7] Basil and Cook maintain that a "categorization of environmental states is a

[5]Roderick T. Groves, "Administrative Reform and Political Development", in *The Management of Change in Government*, (ed.), Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 99-113.

[6]See, for example, the experiences of Pakistan, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Venezuela in administrative reforms: Albert Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: Function of Political and Economic Change", in *Administrative Problems in Pakistan*, (ed.), G.S. Birkhead, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1966; and V.V. Moharir, "Administrative Reforms in India", pp. 238-51; D. Hadisumarto and G.B. Siegel, "The Optimum Strategy Matrix and Indonesian Administrative Reforms", pp. 252-71; A. Carrillo Castro, "Administrative Reform in Mexico", pp. 185-212; A.R. Brewar-Carias, "Administrative Reform Experience in Venezuela 1969-1975", in *The Management of Change in Government*, (ed.), Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

[7]P.R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch, *Developing Organizations: Diagnosis and Action*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 88.

prerequisite to developing strategies for change".[8] Dror hypothesises that "the preferable mix of administrative reform strategies is in the main a function of the concrete circumstances of each particular reform".[9] Cohen emphasises the uniqueness of each situation, which results in the demand by each to use its own approach suited to the particular situation at hand and builds strategic models on the basis of three variables: task, organisational form, and personal characteristics.[10] Esman, in his authoritative study of administrative reform in Malaysia, concurs with the view that each situation requires its own strategy.[11]

The rejection of universal strategies need not exclude the design of strategic models for the management of induced change which have some degree of validity for similar reform situations and objects. Lee[12] and Cohen[13] provide typologies which suggest that a model of reform strategy can be designed to study divergent types of reform situations.

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM DEFINED

Administrative reform, as a term, has been defined differently by different writers depending on their focus of attention. Thinking on administrative reform can be traced during the fifties when systematic efforts were made to export technical help and know-how to the developing countries from the developed ones in order to strengthen the administrative capabilities of the former, but intellectual discussion did not reach its zenith until the sixties. In spite of the growing attention in recent years, administrative reform still remains conceptually deficient. This can be attributed partially to the inability of the people writing on it to differentiate the term from other related terms.

It is evident that the term administrative reform has acquired

[8]D.C. Basil and C.W. Cook, *The Management of Change*, London, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1974, p. 205.

[9]Y. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform", in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 127.

[10]Allan R. Cohen, "The Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform: Towards More Differentiated Strategies for Change", in *The Management of Change in Government*, ed. Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 165-81.

[11]The Malaysian reform was based on four strategic principles: "(*a*) Working within the existing structure; (*b*) giving priority to central governmentwide processes rather than to specific operating programmes; (*c*) an approach to induced social change which had been identified in recent years as institution building; (*d*) emphasis on technological instruments for inducing organizational and behavioural changes, but supporting technological with cultural and political methods". Milton J. Esman, *Administration and Development in Malaysia*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1972.

[12]Hahn-Been Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform", in *The Management of Change in Government*, (ed.) Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 114-25.

[13]Cohen, "Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform", *op.cit.*, pp. 165-81.

widespread usage and recognition in the literature pertaining to government and public administration. Caiden defines it as "the artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance".[14] Administrative reform, according to Caiden, contains three interrelated properties : moral purpose (which points to the need for improving the *status quo*), artificial transformation (which leads to a considerable departure from existing arrangements), and administrative resistance (when opposition is assumed).[15] He also distinguishes between administrative reform and administrative change by saying that the latter is a self-adjusting organisational response to fluctuating eonditions while the need for the former arises from the latter because of the malfunctioning of the natural processes of administrative change.[16] To Dror, administrative reform is "directed change of the main features of an administrative system".[17] This definition gives the term an objective reference and an ordinal scale of measurement. His two principal attributes of reform are goal orientation (directed. conscious) and the comprehensiveness of change, so that reform can be considered) in terms of its scope (number of administrative components affected) and the rate of change (time required to bring about the desired changes).[18] Hahn-Been Lee views administrative reform as a complex process in which many factors interact and affect one another and whose results can be found over a considerable period of time.[19] Lee broadens his ideas about administrative reform and proceeds to show its link with innovation by declaring that administrative reform involves new values and modes of behaviour to accommodate new ideas within an organisational context. Administrative reform is considered normative as it calls for improvement upon the existing order.[20]

Administrative reform is generally used to describe activities which actually go far beyond its evident meaning. It is conceived as directed action. Administrative reform is defined here as those efforts which call for or lead to major changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to transform the existing and established practices, behaviours, and structures within it.

Reorganisation and administrative development are usually used

[14]Gerald E. Caiden, *Administrative Reform*, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969, p. 65.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]*Ibid.*, pp. 57-58, 65-67.

[17]Dror, *Strategies for Administrative Reform*, p. 127.

[18]Robert Backoff, "Operationalizing Administrative Reform for Improved Governmental Performance", *Administration and Society*, 6, May 1974, p. 75.

[19]Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries", *Policy Sciences* 1, Summer 1970. pp. 77-89.

[20]Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*, p. 114.

interchangeably alongwith administrative reform to convey the same meaning. This is not surprising as reorganisation literally means organising some things differently from what was the case in the past. Reform has literal origins in the giving of new and different form to something, and translating those terms in organisation vocabulary signifies new organisational structure. "Reform has a strong normative connotation. Reorganisation through somewhat restricted and precise in its definition, has come to acquire nearly the same meaning in the American culture, both in its descriptive and in its normative senses.[21] Reorganisation is conscious, deliberate, intended, and planned and intends to bring about significant changes in the existing state of the system.[22]

Administrative development is viewed as the growing capability of the administrative system to cope continuously with problems created by social change towards the goal of achieving political, economic, and social progress.[23] To Riggs, administrative development reflects the capacity of administrative systems to make choices and to exercise discretion to bring about environmental changes by deliberate programmes and self-conscious decisions [24] Administrative development entails the assumption of greater responsibility on the part of the governmental bureaucracy to bring about broader and macro-changes which touch all sectors of the society. Administrative development is also normative as it is considered an intrinsically meaningful development process.

The motive behind any reorganisation effort and administrative development programme is to bring a change in the present state of the administrative system which will enhance its capacity to undertake and perform complex functions as they emerge. It is said that overall development in administration is achieved by administrative reform programmes.

> First, reform proposals challenge bureaucratic inertia and reactionary administrators and although defence mechanisms may temporarily suppress change, things can never quite be the same and peace tokens have to be made if the situation is to be kept in hand. Second, reform programmes attract enterprising administrative talent and provide valuable experience for a new generation of administrative

[21]Frederick C. Mosher, "Some Notes on Reorganizations in Public Agencies", in *Public Administration and Democracy*, (ed.) Roscoe C. Martin, Syracuse, N.Y., Syracuse University Press, 1965, p. 129.

[22]Frederick C. Mosher, (ed.), *Governmental Reorganization: Cases and Commentary*, Indianapolis, The Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc., 1967, p. 497.

[23]Jamal Khan, "Administrative Change and Development in Barbados", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 41, 1975, p. 149.

[24]Fred W. Riggs, "Introduction", in *Frontiers of Development Administration*, (ed.), Fred W. Riggs, Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1971, pp. 25-26.

aspirants. Third, reformers promote badly needed administrative modernisation which is likely to set off a chain reaction in functional reforms as changes in techniques, skills and attitudes in specialised fields seem more attainable than possibly the harder changes to carry through in administration Fourth, constructive progressive forces find openings for their respective creative talent in empirical problem-solving, particularly the kind presented in administrative reform . . . Fifth . . . Any effort to transform administrative systems is to be commended in the face of official indifference, technical ignorance, political intransigence and public apathy.[25]

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM AS A PROCESS

Administrative reform is viewed in this context as a process. It is believed that a process-oriented study will provide a greater understanding and a useful framework to analyse the phenomenon of administrative reform in a sequential manner. Any study of administrative reform must begin with the understanding of the awareness of the need for reform and conclude with a discussion of the problems relating to the implementation of such efforts.

Several advantages can be noted if administrative reform is considered a process. Process carries with it wider implications than the content of the reform. In other words, behavioural aspects are emphasised alongwith the structural ones to make a study of any administrative reform more comprehensive. Alan Cohen describes the role of the reformer in the process approach this way:

(*i*) . . . The way the reformer goes about making changes is at least as important as the specific changes recommended.

(*ii*) . . . If a reformer wants to create more responsible, responsive and initiating civil servants, the reformer himself must begin immediately to behave that way.

(*iii*) The reformer must not only arrive at good answers but must work in a way that is consistent with the desired changes.[26]

A process-oriented approach takes into consideration and gives high priority to the human variable in the reform. At the same time, it demands that reformers must be more knowledgeable, concerned, and involved to bring about the relevant changes.

Caiden disagrees with the notion that process approach is most suitable to study administrative reform. Instead, he opts for systems

[25]Gerald F. Caiden, "Development, Administrative Capacity and Administrative Reform", *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 38, 1973, p. 343.

[26]Cohen, "Human Dimensions of Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*, pp. 172-73.

approach and says that "reform of any administrative system should begin with an analysis of the system rather than an analysis of the reform process."[27] Caiden thinks that the process approach is too narrow in its scope and in the end is unable to consider sources and dynamics of administrative behaviour within the context of an administrative system. Contrary to Caiden's thinking, it can be argued that the process approach is comprehensive in its scope and does include and focus on the interaction between and among individuals and organisations and thereby throws light on the dynamics of administrative behaviour.

AWARENESS OF THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Major administrative reforms are usually direct outcomes of very serious crisis conditions faced by the government. The conditions which necessitate change of such magnitude are the following:

1. The take-over of power, through revolution or otherwise, by political groups who differ strongly from those previously in office.
2. (Semi-) revolutionary developments inspired by violent dissatisfaction with the operations of the machinery of government including the bureaucracy.
3. Grave developments in the environment such as war (or threat of war), economic depression, sharp demands which have strong political support (*i.e.*, for the autonomy of parts of the country).
4. The need for drastic cuts in government expenditure.
5. Maladministration which does not clearly affect the relationship with the environment but is perceived as excessive annoyance by groups within the government.[28]

The awareness of administrative reform arises with the realisation that the present organisational set-up is unable to meet its obligations adequately when a particular administrative system cannot keep with time and fails to make necessary adjustments over a period of time. As a result, its components become maladjusted.

Combination of a number of different and identifiable factors over a period of time will push for major structural changes to rectify the maladies in the existing administrative system. These factors are:

Growth in size of the clientele served; changes in problems and needs

[27]Gerald E. Caiden, "Impact and Implications of Administrative Reform for Administrative Behaviour and Performance", *International Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, New York, United Nations, 1973, Vol. 2, *Technical Papers*, p. 27.

[28]Leemans, *Overview*, pp. 16-17.

and, therefore, in organisational programmes and responsibilities; changing philosophy as to the proper responsibilities of governments; (result of) new technology, new equipment and advancing knowledge; changing and usually rising qualifications of personnel, (*i.e.*, increasing need for specialists) basic policy changes at top level forces change.[29]

FORMULATION OF GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

When the awareness for reform is clearly felt and understood, the logical step that follows is to decide what needs to be done and how that can be accomplished. No reform process can be complete without a clear perception of the role of goals and strategies within it.

There is a clear consensus among practitioners and academicians that desired goals for any administrative reform must be set as clearly and as early as possible. It is essential in order to determine the appropriate strategies. Also, without specification of goals, it will not be possible to determine the extent of success or failure of the reform.

Goals[30] can be divided into external and internal categories. This typology has the advantage of indicating the nature of the reform suggested. Dror, following the same line of thinking, distinguishes between the two principal categories: "(*a*) intra-administration directed goals which are primarily concerned with improving the administration, and (*b*) objectives dealing with the societal roles of the administrative system and with changing policies and programmes."[31]

In many circumstances, internal and external goals remain closely interrelated[32] and pose problems to efforts which intend to differentiate

[29]Mosher, (ed.), *Governmental Reorganization, op. cit.*, pp. 494-96.

[30]In the literature, goals and objectives are used interchangeably and we agree to such usage.

[31]Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform". Dror very rightly says that administrative [reform is a multi-goal-oriented behaviour which necessitates categorization of goals.

[32]In describing goals of reorganisation, Mosher uses a mixed approach. He classifies goals into four main categories: (1) those having to do with changing *policy and programme*, which equate with shifting of agency purpose; (2) those intended to improve *administrative effectvieness* in carrying out existing responsibilities; (3) those directed specifically to *problems of personnel*, individuals or groups; and (4) those intended to counter or respond to *pressures and threats* from outside the organiza-tion. Mosher, (ed.), *Governmental Reorganization, op. cit.*, p. 497.

Also see Grosenick and Mosher, whose categorisation of goals defies any classification. They define goals in terms of continuum—western versus traditional, development versus efficiency, stabilization and legitimacy versus rapid institutional change, primary (direct or short-term) versus secondary (indirect or long-term) goals. Leigh Grosenick and Frederick C. Musher, "Administrative Reform: Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Techniques", *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, New York, United Nations, 1973, Vol. 2, *Technical Papers*, pp. 11-13.

between them. The former are usually set as means towards the greater attainment of external goals, *i.e.*, to realise certain societal situations of relationships, or to increase and improve outputs.

External goals have been specified in general terms in administrative reform programmes in many countries. These mostly concern the revitalisation of the administrative system to bring wide-ranging social and economic development. At the same time, political realities must be taken into consideration in setting goals.

Internal goals have been associated with the attainment of economy, efficiency, and effectivess within an organisational context.[33] Reduction of unnecessary governmental expenditure on trivial administrative activities has been another goal of administrative reform. All these are intended to bring about significant improvements in administrative systems.

Experience has shown that there is a sea of difference between formal or official goals and informal and individual goals of particular reformers which sometimes may be not only dissimilar but contradictory. Commenting on the Philippine experiences in administrative reform, Dr. Josef Abueva charges that undeclared goals of reformers were personal advancement, empire-building, and elimination of rivals.[34]

Strategy is one of those elements in the process of administrative reform whose significance is well recognised, but at the same time little effort has been made until recently to define it or circumscribe it.[35] To complicate the matter further, strategy has been subjected to different interpretations.[36] Dror is one of the first scholars to undertake an in-depth study of, strategy in the context of administrative reform and to provide a conceptual framwork for further elaboration and clarification. He defines it as megapolicies which lays down "the framework of guidelines and the boundaries of policy space within which operational

[33]United Nations Report on Major Reforms specifically challenges the first two goals, saying that "the achievement of efficiency and economy in public administration as reform goals could not be taken as objectives themselves. *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, New York, United Nations, 1973, Vol. 1, *Report of the Seminar*, p. 10.

[34]See Hahn-Been Lee and Alelardo G. Samonte, (eds.), *Administrative Reforms in Asia*, Manila, Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration, 1970, Chapter 2.

[35]See R. Chin and K.D. Benne, "General Strategies for Effecting Change in Human Systems," in *The Planning of Change*. (ed.), Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969, pp. 32-59.

[36]'Strategy' can also mean; a detailed set of planned responses to all possible contingencies in theory of games, fundamental policies, and overall postures in strategic analysis dealing with foreign relations and defence; and main goals and principles for operations which serve as a framework for 'tactics,' in military planning. Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*, p. 126.

and detailed policies are to be established and decisions are to be made."[37] Strategy implies defining the goal boundaries of a desired or intended activity, as opposed to tactics which refer to details of policy programmes.[38]

In line with our definition, strategies in the context of administrative reform must therefore deal with issues such as: "overall goals of administrative reforms; the boundaries of administrative reforms; preference in respect to time, risk acceptability; choice between more incremental or more innovative reform; preference for more balanced *vs.* more shock directed reforms; relevant assumptions on the future; theoretic (trait or explicit) assumptions on which the reform is based; resources available for the administrative reform; and the range of feasible reform instruments."[39]

Strategies have also been viewed from a sequential, logical angle which presupposes careful consideration of several factors which sometimes must be carried out simultaneously. These are as follows:

1. Research and analysis of the current situation;
2. Analysis and discussion leading to general consensus on needs and goals;
3. Forecasting of the future setting of public administration, including the political, economic and social environment, and the probable availability of resources available to administration, as well as to its reform;
4. Development of alternative plans of administrative reform;
5. Analysis of and, where possible, experimentation with alternative plans, their costs and benefits, including social costs and benefits;
6. Decision to proceed on best feasible plan;
7. Implementation; and
8. Continuing feedback on consequences and modification of plan as indicated.[40]

Though strategies, to a great extent, determine the fate of administrative reforms, as has been clearly pointed out by a recent seminar on

[37]Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*

[38]Leemans quotes C.J. Zwart in *Overview*, p. 42. Mosher differentiates between strategy and tactics differently, defines the former as the selection of the one or two or three key factors most likely to 'unfreeze' the conditions of resistance while the latter as the methods and techniques employed, *Government Reorganization*, p. 502.

[39]Dror, "Strategies for Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[40]Grosnick and Mosher, "Administrative Reform: Goals, Strategies, Instruments and Techniques", *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

major administrative reforms,[41] efforts to identify and operationalise one particular strategy as a model to all developing countries has not been successful.[42] The preferable mix of administrative reform strategies is, in the main, the function of the concrete circumstances of each particular reform situation. The best strategy is determined contextually, dependent on and dictated by the special circumstances obtaining in a particular country.

IMPLEMENTATION—THE ACHILLES HEEL OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Most reforms fail at the implementation stage.[43] The age-old advice generally given to the reformers is to keep in mind the interests of politicians and various affected interests within the administrative system so as to obtain the support of these people to facilitate the implementation of the reforms. The blessing of political authorities and cooperation of civil servants (those who perceive real or imaginary threats that they will be adversely affected by the reform) are a must to overcome the greatest hurdles to the success of any reform effort. The difficult position of the reformer in the context of reform implementation is obvious.

> The reformers remain outsiders to the situation they are trying to improve. They have no power, position, status to influence those who can change things or they have no access to people who do have influence, or they have no impact on people who have to be convinced. Even highly prestigious bodies invested with the task of reform discover that nobody else really has any intention of doing anything about their proposals and they are being used to bury a burning issue, not for remedial action. When reformers do something worthwhile to propose and action is intended, they find that administrative systems are extremely conservative, no matter what the recognised value of their suggestion.[44]

The high attrition rate in the implementation of major administrative

[41]The United Nations Report puts it this way: "The frequency with which administrative reform efforts had failed in the past demonstrated the difficulty of making them effective without good reform strategies and the importance of devising appropriate strategies to carry them out", *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms on Developing Countries*, p. 13.

[42]Mukarji, reviewing the Indian experience in administrative reform, comments, "There can be no universal strategy for administrative modernization (reform), but rather separate strategies for each country". N.K. Mukarji, "Formulation of Administrative Reform Strategies", *Interregional Seminar on Major Administrative Reforms in Developing Countries*, p. 46.

[43]Experiences of India and Pakistan can be cited in this regard.

[44]Gerald E. Caiden, "Implementation—The Achilles Heel of Administrative Reform", in *The Management of Change in Government*, (ed.), Arne F. Leemans, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1976, p. 142.

reforms has been considered as one of the most complex and frustrating problems faced by the scholars in the area. In response to this situation, two things have happened. On the one hand, deliberate attempts have been made to identify and analyse those factors and situations which prevent the implementation of reforms. On the other, strategies have been developed to facilitate the process of implementation.

Caiden provides a long list of factors and situations which must not only be understood but avoided as these result in the failure of major administrative reforms.

> A bad beginning; imitation, not innovation; incorrect diagnosis, hidden intentions; indecisive approach; faulty planning, unduly restrictive techniques and instrumentalities, inability to command resources; absence of feedback; no monitoring; evaluation ignored, and goal displacement.[45]

Hahn-Been Lee is one of those few who have tried time and again to come up with a strategy which will increase the probability of success of any reform effort. Lee considers the degree of implementation as a function of the social environment, the political structure, the reform agents, the reform agency, and the reform strategy.[46] He posits two reform strategies: (*a*) the comprehensive, and (*b*) the selective. A comprehensive strategy can be implemented if the leadership of reform agents and the internal structure of the reform agency are strong and if the social environment and political structure are favourable. A selective strategy can be implemented if either: (1) the leadership is strong but the situation is unfavourable, or (2) the situation is favourable but the leadership is weak. It follows, then, if the leadership is weak and, at the same time, the situation is unfavourable, no strategy can be expected to be effective. In Lee's matrix, time and leadership are two crucial variables which deserve wider attention.

Lee, in his most recent writing on the subject, has attempted to relate the types of reforms and the kinds of existing bureaucracies.[47] He argues

[45]Caiden, 'Implementation', *op. cit.*, pp. 145-64. What gives credibility to Caiden's list is his exhaustive use of case studies drawn from many countries in the continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

[46]Lee, "An Application of Innovation Theory to the Strategy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries".

[47]Lee, "Bureaucratic Models and Administrative Reform", *op. cit.*, Lee's typology can be presented like this:

Reform Types	Reform Objectives	Kinds of Bureaucracies
Programmatic	Improved Performance	Closed
Technical	Improved Method	
Programmatic	Improved Performance	Mixed
Procedural	Improved Order	Open

on the basis of the experience of many countries that programmatic reforms have better probabilities of success as these admirably suit the needs of closed bureaucracies which can be found in most of the developing countries. In other words, to enhance the possibilities of implementation, reformers must have a clear understanding of the nature, type, and objective of reform as well as the stage of bureaucratic development.

Bhutani goes beyond Lee, and quite correctly so, to point out that the creation of appropriate environment for the facilitation of the process of reform implementation presupposes the creation, sustenance and spread of appropriate *attitudes* in men who matter most—men who occupy positions in the administrative hierarchy from where the consequences of good or bad leadership emerge and permeate the entire structure.[48] Bhutani, in answering a hypothetical question as to how administrative innovations and reforms can be implemented with speed and effectiveness, suggests awareness and understanding of four essential requirements. These are: implementors must get involved in the process as early as practicable; an adequate agency for follow-up action must be established; the urge to improve must come from within (whether from an individual or from the organisation where reform is introduced) to have lasting improvements; and extreme care must be taken in the choice and training of personnel meant to undertake the implementation of reforms.

Bhutani's insight is valuable not only because he bases his writing on the administrative reform experience in India, but because of his emphasis on the important place an individual holds in the success or failure of a reform effort. It must not be forgotten that he is one of those rare writers who have tried to explain the complexities of principal actor's attitudes and their effect on the surrounding environment which ultimately substantially affect the contemplated reforms.

Backoff, through the use of an innovative framework, uses the characteristics of administrative reform to predict the prospect of success in implementing major administrative reforms.[49] The characteristics are: scope, magnitude of change, sequence of change, goals or objectives, reform instrument or means, and evaluation criteria.[50] It is hypothesised that the greater comprehensiveness, complexity, and magnitude of changes, the lesser the probability of implementation as there will be more resistance—organised and institutionalised.

[48]K.N. Bhutani, "Implementing Administrative Innovations and Reforms", *Indian Journal of Public Administration,* Vol. XII, July-September 1966, *op. cit.*, pp. 612-17.

[49]Backoff, *Operationalizing Administrative Reform.*

[50]For a more detailed discussion, see Backoff, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-94.

The writings of Caiden, Lee, Bhutani, Backoff, and others, have greatly helped to clarify and operationalise the complexities that are found in the process of implementation, yet sizable gaps differentiate pious assumptions from the happenings in the real world in the study of administrative reform. Sometimes the gap is too great to distinguish between the ideal and the real, which eventually seriously dampens the prospect of implementation of reforms.

Caiden crystallises the assumptions generally made, consciously or unconsciously. These are:

> First, that the government has recognised the need to improve its performance and is determined to do something effective; second, that the government has appointed acknowledged experts to identify the weakest points and to concentrate on those remedies likely to have the widest application; third, that the experts, with government backing are able to conduct full inquiries and publicise their efforts, whether in temporary *ad hoc* commissions or more lasting institutional arrangement; and fourth, that the experts are capable of doing a competent job.[51]

In practice, things do not exactly follow the idealistic routine. Many governments only pay lip-service to reforms and have no real desire to see major reforms take place but would like to talk about it because of political gains involved. The reform bodies are mostly manned by incompetent people. Serious efforts are seldom made to maintain a balance between politicians, bureaucrats, academicians, and other outside experts when members are chosen. This uneven composition results in recommendations which are impractical and difficult to implement. Bureaucratic attitudes have not changed, which prompts the perpetuation of negative and hostile attitudes toward any mention of change. Changes are always feared and frowned upon. Reformers have to be extremely fortuitous to expect cooperation from bureaucrats under these circumstances. And cooperation of bureaucrats is necessary to study the situation and eventually to make recommendations for change. Sometimes reformers are not qualified to perform the job that they undertake.

But it may be assumed that the above mentioned gap between the ideal and the real can be narrowed considerably, and the task of implementation will be smoother if the government gives serious attention to three types of actions: "First, a well-defined and bold policy, a firm decision on the part of political leadership in power to carry out the reforms accepted by it. Second, there is the need for adequate institutional arrangements and safeguards for implementation of reforms.

[51]Caiden, *Implementation*, p. 144.

Third, an operational plan to push ahead with the implementation of the accepted reforms."[52] □

[52]K. Hanumanthaiya (Chairman of high powered Indian Administrative Reforms Commission of 1966), "Implementation of Administrative Reforms", an address at the Institute of Public Administration, Lucknow, 23 November 1968, p. 7, cited in R.B. Jain, "Innovations and Reforms in Indian Administration", *The Indian Political Science Review*, 9, July 1975, p. 110.

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